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1.1 Overview of U.S. Fiscal Structure 
 
Fiscal policy is carried out by the governments in a country to affect its economy through 
increasing or decreasing taxes and public spending. The United States has one central 
government, 50 state governments and thousands of local governments. These 
governments hence have to decide whom to tax, how much tax revenue to collect from 
them, and what to spend it on. 
Almost nobody likes to pay taxes, but as Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes put it in 1927, “Taxes are what we pay for a civilized society.” In other words, 
taxes have to be endured in order to fund governmental services such as police, fire, 
water, sewerage, roads, education, and health care. T ble 1 depicts some major 
expenditures of state, local, and combined state and local governments in 2002. When 
looking at local governments, total expenditures amounted to over one trillion dollars, or 
about $4000 per person. Education is the single largest expenditure function, which 
accounts for 37.9% of the total expenditure. 3.9% was spent on highway maintenance and 
construction, 7.0% on hospital and health care, 4.8% on police, 2.3% on fire protection, 
and 2.6% on sewerage. There are numerous other expenditur  categories that took up 
2 
 
Table 1. State and Local Government Expenditures Structures (Year 2002)  
Function of                                  
Expenditure 
State and Local                               
Government                       
(% of combined 
expenditure) 
State         
Government                    
(% of total         
expenditure) 
Local          
Government            
(% of total  
expenditure) 
Education 29.0% 12.6% 37.9% 
Highway 5.6% 5.5% 3.9% 
hospital and health 7.2% 5.2% 7.0% 
Police protection    3.1% 0.7% 4.8% 
Fire protection    1.3% 0.0% 2.3% 
Natural resources    1.1% 1.3% 0.5% 
Sewerage    1.5% 0.1% 2.6% 
Total $2052 billion* $1283 billion $1140 billion* 
*Duplicative intergovernmental transactions are excluded.  
Source: Author’s calculation using Table 2 from Compendium of Government Finances: 2002 (U.S. Census 




smaller shares of the budget such as judicial and legal provisions, public buildings, and 
solid waste management. 
There are also various taxes that are used to finance the various expenditures 
mentioned above. Table 2 presents different sources of tax revenue for state, local, and 
combined state and local governments. As shown, the relative importance of these taxes 
differs greatly among different types of governments. At the state level, the largest share 
of tax revenue is obtained from personal income taxs, and general sales and excise taxes 
together account for almost half of total tax revenu . By contrast, at the local level, the 
property tax is the major revenue source, which produces nearly three-fourth of local tax 
revenue.  
Not all states follow the same distribution of taxes, For instance, seven states 
(Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) do not levy 
personal income taxes, five of these states except Alaska and Florida do not levy 
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Table 2. State and Local Tax Structures (Year 2002) 
Type of Tax 
    State and Local 
Government            
(% of combined     
revenue) 
State   
Government          
(% of own-source 
revenue) 
Local        
Government        
(% of own-source 
revenue) 
General Sales 24.6% 33.6% 11.7% 
Selective Sales (excise) 11.2% 15.5% 5.0% 
Property  30.8% 1.8% 72.9% 
Personal Income 22.4% 34.7% 4.6% 
Corporate Income 3.1% 4.7% 0.8% 
Licenses 4.1% 6.6% 0.4% 
Other taxes 3.8% 3.2% 4.6% 
Total own-source tax $905 million $535 million $370 million 
Source: Author’s calculation using Table 2 from Compendium of Government Finances: 2002 (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2002 Census of Governments, Volume 4, Number 5, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C.). 
 
a corporate income tax, and five states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, 
and Oregon) do not have a general sales tax. Not only d  state and local tax structures 
differ between states, but tax structures differ dramatically within states as well. As 
shown in Table 3, Florida and Tennessee respectively obtain most of their tax revenue 
from a general sales tax, while Oregon relies substantially on personal income taxes, over 
70% of revenue is from personal income taxes. Nevada an  New Hampshire respectively 
collect much of their revenue from license taxes. 
 While Tables 1-3 reveal much about the size and composition of fiscal structure, 
they are not able to tell us the consequences of these governmental activities. In other 
words, they can not tell us whether and how these tax and expenditures affect decisions 
made by households or firms. Neither economists nor policy makers will disagree on the 
importance of fiscal policies on the economy, but they do not agree on how to carry out 
fiscal policies. On the one hand, taxation may discourage people to work, invest, and    
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All 24.6% 11.2% 30.8% 22.4% 3.1% 4.1% 3.8% 
AZ 51% 13% 4% 25% 4% 3% 1% 
DE 0% 15% 0% 33% 12% 36% 5% 
FL 57% 20% 2% 0% 5% 6% 11% 
MA 25% 10% 0% 53% 5% 3% 3% 
NV 52% 32% 3% 0% 0% 11% 1% 
NH 0% 32% 26% 4% 20% 10% 8% 
NY 20% 10% 0% 59% 5% 2% 3% 
OR 0% 13% 0% 71% 4% 10% 2% 
SD 54% 26% 0% 0% 4% 14% 3% 
TN 60% 18% 0% 2% 6% 11% 3% 
TX 51% 31% 0% 0% 0% 13% 5% 
WA 63% 16% 12% 0% 0% 5% 5% 
WY 41% 9% 13% 0% 0% 9% 28% 
 Source: Author’s calculation using Table 45 from Compendium of Government Finances: 2002 (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2002 Census of Governments, Volume 4, Number 5, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington D.C.). 
 
consume, preventing the economy from reaching its full potential. On the other hand, 
taxation is necessary to finance public expenditures, which can be effective in boosting 
economic growth. In this regard, managing fiscal policy is always a difficult task for 
governments. In addition, there are a myriad of other factors that should be considered 
other than government taxes and expenditures that could affect economic development. 
These factors include population size or growth, savings rate, education level, ethnicity, 
housing prices, prices of oil and other natural resources, natural amenities, environmental 
regulations, minimum wage laws, tax policies of its neighbors, just to name a few. Hence, 







We want to examine the impact of fiscal policy on economic development, specifically, 
rural development. In other words, we want to look at nonmetropolitan fiscal variables 
and see how they affect location decisions of households and firms by affecting the 
nonmetropolitan county wages and rents. Some scholars m y question why we do not use 
state level data to examine the effects of state fiscal variables on state wage and state rent. 
We argue that the states are difficult to compare. It is rather difficult to compare a state 
like New York that has New York City using state level data with the state of Oklahoma 
that has more rural areas. We want to take rural counties of similar size in one state and 
compare them with rural counties in other states. We want to see how differences in 
policy across counties matters for the outcomes, which can not be done using state level 
data. Some scholars may also suggest that we could use metropolitan data. We could do 
that but we argue that the metro counties function very differently from each other. For 
instance, a tax in the central county of New York City could function quite differently 
from that in the central city of Denver, due to thedifference of geography, the structure 
of local neighborhoods and local governments. 
We are primarily interested in rural areas and we think the data generating process 
for the rural areas is different from that for the m tropolitan areas. Particularly since 
studies at the metropolitan level or state level have been done over and over again 
(Hoehn, et al., 1987; Izraeli, 1987; Blomquist, et al. 1988; Beeson and Eberts, 1989; 
Gyourko and Tracy, 1989, 1991; Stover and Leven, 1992; Herzog, et al., 1993; Gabriel et 
al., 2003, just name a few), this study could fill the gap in the literature by addressing 




1.3 Purpose of the Study 
 
The U.S. nonmetropolitan area is composed of hundreds of independent government 
jurisdictions (county governments, local municipal governments, school districts, and 
other special districts). Each jurisdiction supplies various public goods and services, such 
as primary and secondary education, and raises revenu s from property and other taxes to 
fund these goods and services. As the renowned Tiebout (1956) model of local 
government indicates, households vote with their fet for the best combination of local 
taxes and expenditures, which gives them the highest utility through migration. Similarly, 
firms sort themselves into jurisdictions in response to changes in the local fiscal policies. 
Not only are location decisions of households and business affected by the local fiscal 
conditions, they are also affected by natural amenities such as lakes, coastlines, or mild 
temperatures as well. 
In this respect, nonmetropolitan areas differ in their desirability, specifically, in 
the local fiscal environment and natural amenities. Households or firms prefer to reside in 
a region with higher levels of quality of life (more favorable fiscal environment, low 
crime rates, a mild climate, etc.) to those with low evels of quality of life as the former 
provides the households higher utility and offers the firms higher productivity. The 
importance of local amenities and fiscal conditions to the households and firms can be 
inferred from the survey (Table 4) undertaken by Halste d and Deller (1997) of two 
thousand small rural manufacturing firms in upper Nw England (Maine, New 




Table 4. Location Decision Factors of Rural Manufacturing Firms  
Unimportant Very important
Item 1 2 3 4 5 Rating Rank
Traditional Factors
Local business services 12 10 26 20 31 3.44 (2)
Loabor costs 14 7 31 23 24 3.35 (3)
Property taxes 10 14 34 20 22 3.24 (4)
Closeness to output markets 27 18 21 12 22 2.8 (7)
Closeness to inut markets 26 22 24 11 17 2.7 (8)
Being near similar firms 70 13 8 4 5 1.59 (16)
Infrastructure Factors
Telecommunication infrastrucutre 20 13 23 21 23 3.11 (5)
Interstate highway access 26 15 22 20 17 2.83 (6)
Sewer/water capacity 42 19 20 8 10 2.2 (11)
Waster disposal facilities 45 18 22 7 8 2.12 (12)
Air freight service 53 19 16 7 5 1.91 (14)
Alternative Factors
Quality of life/amenities 7 6 18 26 43 3.9 (1)
Primary and secondary education 28 13 31 16 12 2.68 (9)
Land for construction/expansion 30 16 27 14 13 2.61 (10)
Technical training programs 43 21 21 10 5 2.1 (13)
Government inducements 67 12 11 5 5 1.64 (15)
Average 
-----------------------  percent responding  --------------------
Source: Table 2 from Halstead and Deller (1997), p. 162. 
 
which were thought to influence their ability to effectively operate their business. 
Amenities and quality of life received the highest rating.1 
The main purpose of this study thus is to examine how regional fiscal conditions 
(government taxes and expenditures) along with amenities affect the location decisions of 
                                                
1 Recent surveys of firms on how state and local fiscal policies affect business location decision include 
Schmenner (1982), Premus (1982), Walker and Greenstreet (1989), and Rubin (1991).Schmenner’s survey 
of Fortune 500 companies found that 35% listed low taxes as ‘desirable if available and helped to tip scales 
in favor of a particular broad region and state for a new branch plant.” Premus’s survey of high-tech 
companies found that 67% listed taxes as “significant” or “very significant” in affecting state growth 
decisions. Walker and Greenstreet’s survey of new Appalachian manufacturing plants found that 37% 
stated that the tax and other financial incentives offered to these plants were decisive in their final location 
decision. Rubin’s survey of New Jersey firms receiving enterprise zone tax incentives found that 32% 




households and firms by affecting household earnings and land prices in the U.S. 
nonmetropolitan counties using a hedonic pricing approach (Roback 1982; Beeson and 
Eberts, 1989; Gyourko and Tracy, 1989, 1991). The hedonic pricing approach predicts 
that, in equilibrium of land and labor markets where no individuals or firms have a desire 
to relocate, by relocating to a more desirable place, the firms are able to pay higher wage 
and higher land rent and households are willing to accept a lower wage and pay higher 
rent. Overall the equilibrium land rent will be unambiguously pushed up and the 
equilibrium wage is indeterminate depending on whether firms’ labor demand effects or 
households’ labor supply effects dominate. Therefore in equilibrium, local specific 
characteristics such as local fiscal characteristics and amenities are fully capitalized into 
the labor market (or wage) and land market (or rent). 
These fiscal effects, as examined in a locational equilibrium of the land and labor 
markets, then allow us not only to examine which fiscal variables matter most on local 
wages and rents, but also to decompose wage and rent iff rentials across 
nonmetropolitan counties into two components: an amenity component and a productivity 
component. Consequently, the relative importance of pr ductivity effects and amenity 




This study contributes to the regional development literature in the following ways. First, 
a large literature on economic development/growth has focused on the state, regional, 
MSA, or national level. No hedonic fiscal policy studies have been done at the 
nonmetropolitan level. This study could fill the gap in the literature by focusing on 
9 
 
nonmetropolitan economic development. Specifically, this study examines how 
household earnings and land costs of nonmetropolitan counties are affected by the state 
and county governmental taxation and expenditures in a hedonic framework. A focus on 
local government is important. Local government fiscal policies vary greatly; in addition, 
counties differ dramatically in their natural resources, demographic characteristics, 
location, and histories. The large number of counties in the U.S. represents a reservoir to 
examine the effects of various policies. Local governments may respond not only to local 
conditions and to the preferences of local voters, but also to the policy choices of 
neighboring local governments. If so, a focus only on higher levels of geography would 
yield biased results in estimating the effects of loca  policies. By the same token, data 
aggregated over counties can mislead the true nature of a state’s characteristics. For 
instance, Nevada is considered as a rural state, while almost 86% of its population lives 
in the two counties (Clark County and Washoe County) containing Las Vegas and Reno. 
In addition, almost 99% of population in the Clark County lives in the Las Vegas MSA 
(Census 2000). Similarly, MSA level data are not used, as MSAs by definition include 
one urbanized area of 50,000 or more population, and an adjacent area that has a high 
degree of social and economic integration with the core.2 In this respect, MSAs include 
dozens of cities and several counties and do not provide much insight as to local effects. 
Also counties cover the entire surface area of the s ates and have relatively stable borders  
                                                
2 OMB Bulletin No. 07-01, “Updates to Statistical Area Definitions and Guidance on Their Uses,” 
December 18, 2006. 
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across time compared with those of MSAs, which enables researchers to explore spatial 
interactions between each jurisdiction.3 
Second, county governments are believed to be economically interdependent 
although politically independent. The fiscal policies of one county may have effects 
reaching beyond its political boundary. We account for he spatial effects in the cross-
sectional study which allows for arbitrary spatial correlation and arbitrary 
heteroscedasticity within the BEA defined clusters. Statistically if one expects that error 
terms are correlated within clusters, the OLS estimators are still unbiased but not efficient 
(Wooldridge, 2001). The standard procedure in the empirical work is to use clustering 
methods to correct estimated standard errors. Another concern of this cross-sectional 
study is that some of the explanatory variables such as tax or expenditure variables, 
depend to some extent on the dependent variable (wage or rent), thus introducing 
simultaneity bias. Instrumental variable estimation is used in attempt to reduce this bias. 
Third, the hedonic approach has been often used in reg onal/urban economics, but 
it has received little attention from planners and policy makers. The findings of this study 
provide some, though limited, insights into wages and rents differentials across counties. 
It has implications for economists, economic planners, and policy makers in enhancing 
their understanding of whether and how fiscal policies matters for economic 
performance. Consequently, proper tax policies can be conducted and public resources 
can be efficiently allocated to improve the local economy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews literature 
that relates state and local government policy, amenities, and the hedonic approach to 
                                                
3 We do make one adjustment to the county definition. That’s, following the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, we combined “independent cities” with thecounties that completely surround them to form a 
more functional region (mostly in Virginia). 
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economic development. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical models and econometric 
specifications. Chapter 4 describes the data sources. Chapter 5 reports the empirical 
results. The final chapter summarizes the key findings, policy implications, and 




































CHAPTER 2  
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
A large literature has examined the impacts of state and local fiscal policies (usually in 
the form of taxation, and public services) and amenities on economic development, as 
measured in terms of population, employment, income, or plant location (see Bartik, 
1991; Fisher; 1997; Wasylenko, 1997 and Malpezzi 2001 for surveys). 
 
2.1 Taxes and Economic Development 
 
Bartik (1991) reviews a list of 48 studies on the relationship between taxes and growth in 
different MSAs and states. Based on his review, he concludes that, on average, if a state 
or a MSA reduces state and local taxes by 10 percent, teris paribus, economy activity 
in that jurisdiction would increase in the long run by somewhere between 1 and 6 percent 
(Bartik, 1992). The conclusion is drawn under the pr mise that other factors such as 
public services or fiscal policies in another jurisdiction will not change, which is 
problematic in that other factors could change in the face of significant tax cuts. 
The wide range of the estimates in these findings, as Wasylenko (1997) argues, 
are  owing to variations in data, time periods, andother variables used in the empirical 
analyses. In addition, he contends that the results are fragile and the magnitude of change 
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depends on which variables are included in the analysis and which time frame is 
analyzed. 
There seems to be a consensus among researchers or policy makers that tax policy 
affects economic behavior; however, researchers disagree on the magnitude of the tax 
policy effect. In his review of at least 75 studies that relate state and local taxes to 
employment growth, investment growth, or firm location at the state, city, or regional 
level, Wasylenko (1997) argues that researchers have struggled mightily over the past 20 
years to understand the extent to which state and local tax policies influence business 
activity. 
 
2.2 Public Services and Economic Development 
 
To some extent public services can be treated as either productive amenities which lower 
firms’ costs, or consumer amenities. Fisher (1997) summarizes the burgeoning literature 
examining the relationship between public services and economic development in the 
jurisdiction providing those services. In his review of the literature he states, “In many 
studies, government spending, public capital, or public services are estimated to exert a 
positive and statistically significant effect on economic development… But the results 
vary greatly. Perhaps the most that can be concluded is that some public services clearly 
have a positive effect on some measures of economic development in some cases” 
(Fisher, 1997, p. 54). 
Of all the public services, transportation services and highway facilities show the 
most considerable evidence on affecting economic development. Among the fifteen 
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studies Fisher (1997) reviewed, ten studies reported a positive effect (eight of which are 
statistically significant) of highway facilities or spending on economic development. 
Fisher also reviewed nine studies of the role of public safety services on 
development. He found that the results are less coniste t than those from the 
transportation studies. The lack of consistent results is partly due to measurement 
problems. He argues, “…public safety services…measured by government spending on 
public safety and not all by measures of public facilities or activity” (Fisher, 1997, p. 56).  
Education spending is one of the three major public service categories that are 
essential for economic development and growth. However, nineteen studies reviewed by 
Fisher (1997) show that the evidence about the relationship between economic 
development and spending on education is the least convincing. The empirical evidence 
about whether and how education influences economic act vity, according to Fisher, is 
very cloudy. 
 
2.3 Amenities/Quality of Life and Economic Growth/Development 
 
A growing number of studies have explored the economic importance of site specific 
amenities such as a clean environment, a desirable climate, and topography. A search of 
the Econlit database, which covers mainly economic literature using the key words 
“amenity” and “economics”, generated a result of 34 articles from 1981 to 1990. The 
number increased to 84 from 1991 to 2000, and 165 in 2001-2007.  
Dissart and Deller (2000) conducted a review of the planning literature related to 
quality of life. Specifically they reviewed the notion of quality of life (QOL) and how it 
affects human migration, firm location, and growth/development. To assess the role of 
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QOL on industrial location, Blair and Premus (1987) found that because of advances in 
technology and growing environmental awareness, industrial location choices are 
influenced to a lesser extent than in the past by traditional factors such as access to 
markets and raw materials. Nontraditional factors such as quality-of-life factors are 
gaining importance, and these factors are most important for smaller firms because they 
are usually located where their owner lives (Halsted and Deller, 1997). More recently, 
Gottlieb (1994) reviewed specifically the literature on amenity-oriented firm location and 
noted that “pools of technical professionals can only be maintained in an area that has a 
high quality-of-life and amenities that appeal to a m nagerial elite” (Gottlieb, 1994; p. 
272). The role of amenities/quality-of-life in affecting business locations can be directly 
seen from the survey (Halstead and Deller; 1997) evidence of two thousand small rural 
manufacturing firms in upper New England and Wisconsin. Amenities and quality of life 
received the highest rating among the sixteen factors that were considered to affect the 
firm’s operation (as shown in Table 4). 
On the other hand, Biagi et al. (2006) presented a det iled review of economic 
effects of QOL in the economic literature and, particularly, in the urban economics 
literature. Among the literature that examined economic activities (namely, population or 
employment growth or location choices) in counties, the most well-known studies include 
Carlino and Mills (1987), Stover and Leven (1992), Clark and Murphy (1996), and 
Beeson et al. (2001), among others. 
 




Although a large amount of literature has examined th  effects of local fiscal policies 
and/or amenities on economic activities at the state, MSA, county or city level, studies on 
the local amenity and fiscal policy effects using a hedonic approach are relatively few. 
This hedonic approach argues that the fiscal and amenity attributes do not have a market 
price; however, these attributes have an implicit price and hence affect the location 
decisions of households and firms. 
According to the hedonic approach, if a location is equipped with a higher level of 
natural amenities and/or with more favorable fiscal conditions (called man-built 
amenities, to some extent) than elsewhere, households would like to reside in that place 
by accepting a lower wage and a higher cost of housing. In addition, if the desirability 
reduces business cost or is productive, firms would like to locate in that place by paying 
higher wages and higher land costs.  
Therefore, the hedonic approach allows us to examine both the amenity 
component and productivity component of a site specific attribute and further to evaluate 
the relative importance of amenity and productivity differences in explaining wage and 
rental differentials across jurisdictions.  
The QOL literature in the hedonic framework can be grouped into those studies 
that consider only wage differentials (Nordhaus andTobin, 1972; Getz and Huang, 1978; 
Rosen, 1979; Cropper, 1981; Gerking and Weirick, 1983; Clark and Kahn, 1989; Clark 
and Cosgrove, 1991), those that consider only rent differentials (Ridker and Henning, 
1967; Ozanne and Thibodeau, 1983; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995; Shultz and King, 
2001), and those that consider both wages and land rents (Haurin, 1980; Roback, 1982; 
Hoehn, et al., 1987; Izraeli, 1987; Blomquist, et al. 1988; Beeson and Eberts, 1989; 
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Gyourko and Tracy, 1989, 1991; Voith, 1991; Stover and Leven, 1992; Herzog, et al., 
1993; Kahn, 1995; Gabriel et al., 2003).  
In the hedonic literature, Gyourko and Tracy (1991) is the only study that prices 
local fiscal policy out of local land rent and wage by applying hedonic analysis to 
metropolitan areas. Their study finds that overall inf uences of fiscal differentials on 
intercity qualify-of-life comparisons are almost equally important as amenities. 
Specifically they find that: 1) a higher property tax rate reduced housing prices, and 
because of omission from the wage equation, it implies that property taxes are capitalized 
solely in the land market; 2) state and local income taxes reduced housing prices but had 
insignificant effects on wages, which is at odds with expected higher wages and/or lower 
housing prices; 3) a higher corporate income tax positively and significantly increased 
housing prices and reduced wages, in which the authors suggest that housing prices may 
have spuriously picked up agglomeration effects; 4) a measure of hospital services was 
negatively and significantly related to wages but not to housing prices, suggesting 
hospital services served as a household amenity; 5) a measure of fire services positively 
and significantly affected housing prices and wages, suggestive of a strong firm amenity 
effect; 6) education was insignificant for both variables. 
This dissertation focuses on fiscal policy effects in the nonmetropolitan areas. We 
not only account for the household quality-of-life effects which are considered by 
Gyourko and Tracy (1989; 1991), but also extend the work by Gyourko and Tracy by 





CHAPTER 3  
 
MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Spatial Equilibrium Wage-Rent Model 
 
3.1.1 Theoretical Model 
 
The first basic model in this paper applies the canonical interregional equilibrium model 
of household and firm location (Roback, 1982; Gyourk  and Tracy, 1989, 1991). Under 
this model, interregional wages and land rents differ n site-specific characteristics. On 
the firm side, these site-specific characteristics can be productive (harbor facilities, for 
example, as they lower transportation costs for firms located nearby) or unproductive (for 
example, clean air, as it costs firms to use a nonpolluting technology). On the household 
side, these site-specific characteristics can be amenity or disamenity to households 
through affecting the households’ utility directly or indirectly through their effects on 
wages and land rents. 
The model assumes a world comprised of two groups of agents, workers and 
firms, who are assumed to be able to migrate freely across regions. Workers are assumed 
to have identical preferences and to be able to migrate without cost across regions. A 
representative worker earns income from selling one unit of labor. Workers produce and 
consume a numeraire composite good (X). Firms employ local residents and land to 
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produce the composite good (X) with identical constant-returns-to-scale production 
technologies. The rental rate for a unit of land, either demanded by households for 
residential purpose or by firms for production purpose, is assumed to be same. The goal 
of a representative worker is to choose a consumption bundle (the composite good X and 
residential land Lh), and location (s) to maximize his/her utility subject to a budget 
constraint, 
max U(X, Lh; s)   subject to hrLXIw +=+       (1) 
where w and r stands for wage and rent, respectively; I denotes nonlabor income which is 
assumed to be independent of location (s). 
Solving equation (1) to get the utility maximizing levels of X and Lh, and 
substituting them back into the utility function we obtain the indirect utility function of 
wage (w), land rent (r), and site-specific characteristics (s). In equilibrium, there is no 
incentive for workers to migrate, implying that utility is equalized at all locations, or, 
Isoutility curve:  VsrwV =);,(          (2) 
where Vw>0; Vr <0; Vs < >0 (depending on whether s is amenity or disamenity). The goal 
facing a representative firm is to minimize production costs by choosing the optimal 
inputs of land and labor. In equilibrium, there is no incentive for firms to locate 
elsewhere, implying that unit costs for the composite good (X) are equal to one (the price 
of X), or, 
Isocost curve:   1);,( =srwC         (3). 
Defining Lp and Np as the land and labor used in production, the unit cos  is 
increasing in factor prices so that Cw = Np /X > 0, Cr = Lp/X > 0 and Cs < > 0 (depending 
on whether s is pro-productive or anti-productive). 
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Equilibrium wages and rents are determined by the interaction of households and 
firms. The effects of site-specific attribute (s) on wages and rental rates can then be 










dr −=       0       (4) 
 
where DET = 0>− wrwr CVVC . As shown in equation (4), the indeterminate signs for 
dw/ds and dr/ds depend on signs for Vs (household marginal valuation of site 
characteristics) and Cs (firm marginal valuation of site characteristics). 
 
3.1.2 Illustration of Site Characteristics Effects on Equilibrium Wages and Rents 
 
The unique equilibrium wage and rent in a region given the regional level of s in equation 
(4) can be illustrated on a graph (Figure 1).4 The y-axis is wage and the x-axis is rent. The 
isoutility curves are upward sloping because higher rents must be compensated by higher 
wages to leave the household equally well-off. The isocost curves are downward sloping 
because higher rents must be offset by lower nominal wages to keep costs unchanged. 
Hence, the equilibrium wages and rents are determind by the intersection of the 
isoutility curve and the isocost curve. An amenity variable (for example, close to a 
harbor) which is desirable to both firms and households will shift the isoutility curve and  
                                                
4 To illustrate the effects of different site-specific characteristics on wages and rents, I borrowed heavily 
from works of Roback (1982), Beeson and Eberts (1989), and Partridge et al. (2007).  
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Figure 1. Diagram Analysis of Amenity (access to harbor) Effect on Equilibrium 
Wages and Rents 
 
 
the isocost curve rightward. The accessibility to aharbor unambiguously increases the 
equilibrium rental rate from r1 to r2 as firms and households are more likely to locate in 
the area, implying more demand for land (equation (4)). However, as more firms raise the 
wage rate via increased labor demand and more houseld  reduce the wage rate via 
increased labor supply, the overall effect on the equilibrium wage is ambiguous, 
depending on the size of relative shifts. Figure 1 shows a case that the isocost curve shifts 
more than the isoutility curve, leading to a rise in the equilibrium wage from w1 to w2.  
In brief, the above illustration shows an example that a site-specific variable that 
has both amenity value (i.e. Vs (w, r; s) > 0) and productive value (i.e. Cs (w, r; s) < 0) 




3.1.3 Decomposition of Wage Differential and Rent Differential 
 
Following Beeson and Eberts (1989), the wage and retal differential (dw/ds or w1 - w2; 
dr/ds or r1 - r2) between two regions can be decomposed into two components: the 
productivity component ([dw/ds]C or w1 - w3; [dr/ds]
C or r1 - r3) related to the shift in the 
isocost curve and amenity component ([dw/ds]V or w3 - w2; [dr/ds]
V or r3 - r2) related to 
the shift in the isoutility curve. Algebraically,  
w1 - w2  =  (w1 - w3) + (w3 - w2) 
















)()( +=          (6). 
 
 To identify the sign on dw/ds or dr/ds, we have to know the relative size of shifts 
of the isoutility and isocost curve, implying we have to know the slope of the two curves. 
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/)/()( −=                      (8). 
Solving equations (5)-(8), we can derive the site sp cific characteristics effect on 













































=                             (9b) 
 
where kl (= rLh/w) is the share of land in a household’s budget. Details on calculations 
can be found in Appendix A. 
 Equation (9b) is not directly estimable as we only observe data on housing costs 
instead of land costs. Hence, we will have to relate the unit cost of land (rl h/h) to the unit 
housing rents (ph) as the unit housing rents are equal to the unit cost of land plus the unit 
price of the structure ( 'hp ), namely,  
'/ hhh phrlp +=                      (10) 
where h is the quantity of housing. By assuming that variations in unit housing price 






















h ln1)/(11ln ====                                       (11). 
 
The equilibrium conditions of full employment of labor (Np = N) and land (L = 
NLh + Lp) are imposed, where labor is used only in production of the good and land is 
used for residential and production purpose. Rearranging equation (11) to obtain dlnr/ds 




















ppV −=       (12) 
where kh = phh/w, which is the share of a household’s budget spent on housing and 
assumes a value of 0.27 in this study based on the calculation from the Census data by 
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 is calculated to be 0.399 using their 
estimation results on rL/wN (0.088) and kl (0.05). Therefore, equation (12) becomes, 












wd hV −=             (12b). 
 The productivity components can be obtained by substit ting equation (12) into 
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wd h+=                    (13b). 
 A similar procedure is used to derive the amenity component and productivity 
















































( −=     (15)  








pd h +=                      (15b) 
where rL/wN = 0.088, kl = 0.05 and kh = 0.27 following Beeson and Eberts (1989).  
The four equations (12b, 13b, 14b, 15b) form the basis for empirically 





3.1.4 Empirical Model Specification 
 
In order to examine the effects of state and local fiscal characteristics on local economic 
development, two types of empirical models, i.e., the level equation model and the 
differenced equation model, are specified given that t ey are conceptually the same, but 
address statistical considerations, which are elaborated below. 
 
3.1.4.1 Empirical Model Specification – Level Equation Model 
 
To examine how state and local fiscal conditions affect local economic development, the 
whole sample of 1998 U.S. nonmetropolitan counties (excluding counties in Alaska and 
Hawaii) is used to investigate the importance of loca  expenditure and tax characteristics 
in the local labor and land market. The same analysis is applied for two disaggregated 
subsamples, namely, the one consisting of 1040 nonmetropolitan counties that are 
adjacent to a metropolitan area (which corresponds to the Beale codes 4, 6, 8 in Table 5), 
and the one consisting of 958 nonmetropolitan counties that are not adjacent to a 
metropolitan area (which corresponds to the Beale codes 5, 7, 9 in Table 5). Comparisons 
are made between each subsample and the full sample, and also among the different 
subsamples. Throughout the study, we term the whole sample as Nall and two 
subsamples as N468 and N579, respectively.  
 Table 5 provides an overview on the Beale codes or rural-urban Continuum codes 
defined by the Economic Research Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture (ERS, 
USDA). The Census Bureau classifies the U.S. territory into either metropolitan (metro) 
statistical areas or nonmetropolitan (nonmetro) statistical areas. Further, nonmetro is 
divided into micropolitan statistical areas and pure rural areas. The Census defines a  
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1 Counties in metro areas of 1 million population or more 413
2 Counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million population 325
3 Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population 351
4 Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area 218
5 Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area 105
6 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area 609
7 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area 450
8 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area 235





Source: ERS, USDA, 2003. 
 
 
metropolitan area for the 2000 Census as containing a core urban area of 50,000 or more 
population and including counties which include the core urban area, as well as any 
adjacent counties that have 25% residents commuting to the urban core. Micropolitan 
areas are defined in a similar way except that the Census uses 10,000 population (but less 
than 50,000) for defining the urban center. The ERS takes the Census definition of metro 
and nonmetro statistical areas, creates the Rural-Urban Continuum codes (or Beales 
codes) by classifying counties into nonmetro and nonmetro type, and furthermore refines 
each county type by adding more classifications to examine the size of its urban 
population and its proximity to a metro area. 
In specifying the hedonic wage and rent models, the first implementation of our 
analysis begins with the most parsimonious model which includes only state and local 
























210        (16) 
where WAGE and RENT are average wage per job and fair market rent respectively, 
both of which are expressed in natural logarithms. SFISCAL i is a vector of state fiscal 
attributes which includes five categories of tax revenues and seven categories of 
expenditure variables. Specifically the tax variables include such major items as revenue 
from property tax, sales tax, individual income tax, corporate income tax, respectively. 
The expenditure variables include those, respectively, on education, highways, hospitals, 
public safety, and so on (See Table 4). CFISCAL i is a vector of county fiscal attributes 
which includes property tax, sales tax, and five variables of expenditures on highways, 
safety, natural recreation, sewerage and education, respectively.  
Next, the empirical implementation adds to the most parsimonious model the right 
to work (RTW ) dummy variable, the Census dummies and the rural-urban continuum 
dummies (Table 5) as additional explanatory variables to account for state or region 
specific fixed effects. Therefore, for the full sample and two subsamples of 
nonmetropolitan counties, there are eight Census dummies. There are five rural-urban 
continuum dummies for the full sample (Nall) and two rural-urban continuum dummies 
for each subsample (N468, N579). 
Further, we introduce the first key set of control variables (AMENITY ) that may 
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where AMENITIY is a vector of amenity variables that include the following weather 
and topography variables: climate, topography, the average temperature for January and 
July respectively, the average hours of sunlight for January and the average humidity for 
July, the percentage of county area that is covered by water; the topography score index.   
REG is a vector of Census dummies (Pacific is the omitted division) and rural-urban 
continuum dummies, which are used to capture unobserved differences common to given 
Census division or Beale region.  
 The second set of control variables we focus on are the demographic variables 
(DEMOG ) which can affect household’s earnings. The DEMOG  vector includes six age 
and five racial composition variables, four education variables, the percentage of 
population that is female, married, and that has a linguistic isolation problem, 
respectively. As the introduction of the demographic variables into the wage model could 
incur possible endogeneity bias, we try to mitigate this problem by including the 1990 
values of these labor quality variables in the empirical regression model. Consequently 













































    (18). 
 Next we respecify a model which replaces state fiscal variables, including the 
RTW dummy and Census division dummies, with 47 state dummy variables in equation 




















43210   (19). 
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In doing so we are able to examine not only the different way that the county 
fiscal variables might behave but also the effects of state fiscal variables in another 
perspective through the fixed effects regressions as el borated below. 
 
Endogeneity Issue  
 
One of our empirical concerns is that local labor and land markets could influence fiscal 
variables. One could make a good argument that tax or e penditure variables depend to 
some extent on the dependent variables, housing values for instance. Given the level of 
public spending, the higher home values in a county, the lower are the tax rates needed to 
generate revenues to finance governmental programs. If this is the case, the OLS 
estimates could be spurious and not reliable. 
 In order to overcome the potential endogeneity of the OLS variables, the 
Instrumental Variable (IV) method or two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation method 
is implemented. In the first stage, we regress the year 2002 fiscal variables on 
instrumental variables and exogenous variables using OLS and then compute the 
predicted value for the fiscal variables. In the second stage, we then regress the outcome 
variables (WAGE, RENT) on exogenous variables and the predicted values of the fiscal 
variables. However, there is a practical difficulty in the 2SLS estimation in that it is 
difficult to identify one or more appropriate instruments. What variables can explain the 
changes of fiscal variables and not be determinants of the change of wage or rent? We 
will have to seek instruments which can affect the outcome variables only through the 
mechanism of the changes of fiscal variables. In other words, taking a look at equation 
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(18), we will have to find at least one instrumental variable such that the instrument is 
strongly correlated with SFISCAL and CFISCAL but uncorrelated with the error term.  
The choice of suitable instruments is a difficult task. Since there are no obvious 
instrumental variables from economic theory, we follow the standard way of correcting 
simultaneity bias by identifying the earlier values (i.e., one-period lag) of the endogenous 
fiscal variables as instruments.  
There are three general tests associated with the 2SLS regression – the 
endogeneity test, the test of the validity of instruments and the overidentification test. To 
diagnose the possible endogeneity of SFISCAL and CFISCAL in this study, the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test (Durbin, 1954; Hausman, 1978; Wu, 1973) is employed. The Durbin-
Wu-Hausman (thereafter, DWH) test involves two step. The first step is to regress each 
individual endogenous variable on the instrumental variables (in this case are year 1992 
fiscal variables, or SFISCAL1992 and CFISCAL1992 ) and all exogenous variables (i.e., 
demographic and amenity variables) to obtain their predicted residuals. The second step 
is to estimate OLS models with WAGE and RENT as dependent variables and the 
SFISCAL and CFISCAL variables, all exogenous variables, and the predict  residuals 
as independent variables. Then a joint F-test is performed to test the statistical 
significance of the estimated coefficients on the predicted residuals under the null 
hypothesis that the SFISCAL and CFISCAL variables are exogenous variables. If the 
estimated coefficients on the predicted residuals are statistically significant, one can 
reject the null hypothesis and conclude at least one suspected variable is endogenous. 
To verify the validity of instruments (i.e., SFISCAL1992 and CFISCAL1992), we will use 
the F-test of the joint significance of the instruments i  the first stage regression to check 
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whether they are highly correlated with SFISCAL2002 and CFISCAL2002 (Bound et al., 
1995; Staiger and Stock, 1997). The general rule of thumb is for a single endogenous 
regressor, an F-statistic less than 10 is cause for concern (Staiger and Stock (1997), p. 
557). In addition, we also check the identification conditions for our instruments. As in 
the sensitivity analysis discussed below, the set of instruments is overidentified since the 
number of exogenous instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis  
 
In our sensitivity analysis, alternative state policy variables are included in the model 
outlined above. The top marginal personal income tax rate and marginal corporate 
income tax replaces the effective tax rate such as t e tate corporate income tax and the 
state personal income tax, and further additional state fiscal variables are added in 
equations (16)-(19). In addition to the top marginal personal income tax rate and top 
corporate income tax, additional variables will include the following variables such as 
capital gains tax, death tax, unemployment tax rate, utility costs, workers’ compensation 
cost, gas tax, and state minimum wage. These variables re components of the Small 
Business Survival Index (SBSI) compiled and updated annually by the Small Business 
and Entrepreneurship Council to evaluate the busines  climate for the start-up companies 














































  (20). 
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 In addition, equation (20) can be further experimented with by including four 
additional ERS typology variables; namely, we include four additional dummy variables 
(fm, mi, fl, rec) to identify whether a county is farming dependent or mining dependent, 
whether the county has 30% of the federally-owned lan s, and whether the county 
belongs to a recreational county.5 
 
Fixed Effects Regression 
 
Instead of examining directly the state fiscal effects from the wage and rent equations, we 
conduct the fixed effects regression to examine these effects in an alternative way. The 
regression involves two steps. First, we obtain state fixed effects from estimating wage 
and rent equations in equation (19), where the fixed effects are obtained by removing 
county fiscal variables and demographic variables from the right-hand side explanatory 
variables, as we expect the explanatory variables to be purely exogenous, and then we 
regress the fixed effects from the wage and rent equation respectively on the state fiscal 
variables. In doing so we are attempting to obtain state fixed effects from running both 
wage and rent regressions, of which the right-hand side includes only the exogenous 
amenity variables. In sensitivity analysis, we conduct additional regressions by replacing 
some of the state fiscal variables from the Census with the SBSI variables. 
 With respect to the state fiscal effects, next we conduct the sensitivity analysis to 
the fixed effects regressions. We regress these fixed effects obtained from the wage and 
rent model on these state fiscal variables but dropping out the fixed effects that 
correspond to each of the nine Census divisions, which means that we will have nine 
                                                
5 The county classification and definition can be found at http://srdc.msstate.edu/measuring/ 
   overview.pdf 
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groups of regressions. For instance, the first Census division (New England region) has 
six states, therefore the first group regression will drop 6 observations of fixed effects. By 
the same token, for the second Census division (MidAtlantic region) which contains 
three states, we will drop three fixed effects. Further, we check the robustness of the state 
fiscal effects by including SBSI variables as additional explanatory variables.  
 
3.1.4.2 Empirical Model Specification – Difference Equation Model     
 
Theoretically, when we specify a levels equation model of wage and rent we are 
assuming an equilibrium model of local labor and land markets. For instance, in 
equilibrium the difference in wages between two locations will reflect the workers’ 
marginal valuation of the difference in local conditions. However, in specifying the 
difference equation model we are implicitly not assuming that. As a matter of fact we are 
examining the contemporaneous effects of the changes i  government tax and 
expenditure variables on the changes of local wages nd rents.  
 Econometrically, the first difference equation model provides certain superiorities 
over the levels equation models in circumstances when t ere are powerful unobservable 
and unchanging variables that bias the cross-sectional estimates (Liker, Augustyniak, and 
Duncan; 1985). Therefore by taking differences of the level equation we implicitly 
control for county fixed effects or omitted variables at the county level that bias our 
coefficients. The first difference equation model has an additional advantage as it often 
reduces the severity of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2004; p. 367), because even though the 
levels of fiscal attributes may be correlated with o er explanatory variables, there is no 
prior reason to believe that their differences willalso be highly correlated. 
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 Similar to the procedures done in the levels equation regression, we will conduct a 
first difference regression on the full sample and each individual subsample, respectively. 









































    (21) 
where the ∆ before the wage, rent, and each fiscal variable indicates the value of the year 
2002 minus its corresponding year 1992 value, and the ∆DEMOG  is a vector of  change 
of the value for the demographic variable in year 2000 minus its corresponding value in 
year 1990. For comparison purposes, we can rerun the above model by including 




Even though the first difference model has its advantages over the levels equation model, 
the first difference model equation (21) is not without problems. It could incur the same 
problem as found in the levels form regression. Namely, there is the possibility of 
endogeneity between the change of local fiscal variables and the change of local outcome 
variables. The change of local fiscal variables (taxes or expenditures) may be 
simultaneously determined with the contemporaneous change of wages or rents. In order 
to correct for the problems of the OLS biased estimates, the 2SLS estimation technique is 






The political system could affect the outcome of local fiscal policies. For instance, 
Republican governments tend to favor low taxes and low spending while Democratic 
governments tend to have higher levels of expenditures being financed by higher taxes. In 
the sensitivity analysis, we hence consider whether the 2SLS results are robust to the 
inclusion of two additional political voting behavior instruments, i.e., the percentage of 
votes cast for the Republican candidate in the 1972 presidential election (PRES_REP72) 
and the percentage of presidential election turnout in 1972 (PRES_TO72). In such case, 
we are able to compute the Sargan (1958) Chi-Square st tistics to test the general validity 
of the instrument sets.  
 
Spatial Correlation Issue 
 
The U.S. nonmetropolitan area is composed of hundreds of independent government 
jurisdictions. Although politically independent, the county governments are believed to 
be economically interdependent. The fiscal policies of one county may have effects 
reaching beyond its political boundaries. An understanding of such spatial effects could 
have strong empirical implications. 
One way to account for the spatial effects in our cross-sectional study is to use a 
clustering method, which is included in most statisical software packages such as 
STATA to allow for computations of standard errors that are robust to arbitrary 
correlation within clusters and arbitrary hetereosedasticity. The BEA has developed an 
exhaustive set of BEA Economic Areas based on similar traits and characteristics. It 
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classified all U.S. counties into 179 clusters, which are used in our study for robustness 
check purposes. 
Econometrically, when the residuals are correlated within a cluster, not only are 
the OLS standard errors biased but the slope coeffiients are not efficient. For estimating 
the coefficients and standard errors in the presence of within cluster correlation, we use a 
commonly used method. Namely we apply OLS to estimate the coefficients but reported 
clustered standard errors which are standard errors adju ted to account for possible 
correlation within a cluster (BEA Economic Area). 
  
3.2 Dynamic Growth Model 
 
3.2.1 Three Hypotheses of Sources of Economic Growth 
 This section follows the pioneering work of Glaeser and Tobio (2008) which adapts the 
original static Roback (1982) equilibrium framework explicated in Section 3.1 into a 
growth model context. Specifically, this growth model uses changes in population, 
income, and housing prices to evaluate the potential sources for the U.S. nonmetropolitan 
economic growth. Three hypotheses are proposed to identify nonmetropolitan economic 
growth. First, economic growth could be due to rising productivity in a nonmetropolitan 
county. Second, the county may have become a more attractive place to live for 
households (say, mild winter) or to locate for firms (say, favorable business environment-




The growth framework of Glaeser and Tobio (2008) differs from previous static 
approach of Roback (1982) in a number of perspectivs. First, these two models 
conceptually are based on two different assumptions of local labor or land markets. In the 
growth context, instead of assuming an equilibrium of labor and land markets, we assume 
by some means that there are disequilibrium forces in the current period, and there are 
some disequilibrium innovations going on that affect current levels and subsequent 
changes. Second, the housing sectors are treated diff rently in these two frameworks. In 
the Roback (1982) model, there are only firm and household sectors in the model; there 
are no innovations from housing. Housing price changes in a place because households or 
firms move there and the differences in housing prices or land prices just reflect the 
productivity (dis)advantage or amenity (dis)advantage of a place. In Glaeser and Tobio 
(2008) model however, there are household, firm and housing sectors, and innovations to 
all these three sectors. There are various innovatins to the housing sector such as 
changes of regulations and zonings which can affect households and firms’ locations. In 
brief, the explicit treatment of the housing sector gives housing a more active role in the 
Glaeser and Tobio (2008) model. 
 
3.2.2 Framework and Decomposition of the Sources ofEconomic Growth 
The formal framework following Glaeser and Tobio (2008) allows for evaluating the 
relative contribution of productivity growth, site specific factor growth such as amenity 




  Assuming a Roback (1982) spatial equilibrium model where firms and households 
are indifferent across space in one time. Each firm in a region is assumed to have the 
following production function, 
γβγβ −−= 1ZKANY           (21) 
where A indicates regional specific productivity level, N is the number of workers, K is 
traded capital, and Z is non-traded capital. Traded capital can be purchased anywhere 
with a price equal to one. Non-traded capital in region is fixed which is equal toZ . Firms 
in a perfectly competitive market hence have the following labor demand equation based 
on firms’ first order conditions of output maximization subject to a cost constraint 

















        (22). 
Households in a given region, who consume a non-traded housing (H, with price 
PH) and numeraire traded goods (C), have the following Cobb-Douglas utility function, 
ααθ −= 1CHU                      (23). 
Optimizing the utility function in equation (23) subject to budget constraint gives 
us the following indirect utility function, 
VWPH =−
−− ααα θαα 1)1(          (24). 
 Regional housing supply is produced competitively with certain height (h) and 
land (L). Total quantity of housing supply for a developer thus is, 
hLQH =           (25). 
Meanwhile, the developer faces two types of costs: the cost of using land L in 
housing production and the cost of producing HQ units of structure on top of L units of 
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land, which is assumed to be equal to Lc δh0 . The developer’s first order profit 






PH             (26a). 









         (26b). 
This total housing supply must be equal to total housing demand, i.e., the total 
number of households in the region times housing consumption for each household, 
which is W
PH
α)1(  derived from the first order condition of utility maximization in 
equation (23). Eventually, the equilibrium of housing supply and housing demand yields 













cPH          (27). 
 Given the firms’ labor demand function (equation (22)), the households’ indirect 
utility function (equation (24)), and the housing price equation (equation (27)), solving 
these three equations with three unknowns (population N, income W, and housing price 
























CP PH       (28c) 
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where CN, CW, and CP are constant terms that differ across regions but not within a 
region. Assuming innovations to productivity, region specific characteristics (amenity or 














L εφ ++=+ )ln( 1 , where CA, 
Cθ, and CL are constants, θφφ ,A  and Lφ  are coefficients, θεε ,A  and Lε  are error terms, 
and S is a region specific variable. 















P εφγββφφδτ θ +−−−+−+= ∆+ ]})1()[1{()ln( 1      (29c) 
where 1)]1()1([ −−+−−= δαβγβδτ . Hence if letting PWN ΒΒΒ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ represent the 
estimated coefficients on S variable from estimating the population, wage and housing 
price change equations (29a-29c), then, 
WNA Β−+Β−−= ˆ)1(ˆ)1( γγβφ          (30a) 








δφ PWNP         (30c). 
 In the empirical analysis section the coefficient stimates for WN ΒΒ ˆ,ˆ  and PΒ̂  are 
obtained from regressing equations (29a-c) first, and then these estimates are used to 
41 
 
estimate θφφ ,A  and Lφ using equations (30a-30c) assuming that parameters α, β, γ, and δ 
are known. Following Glaeser and Tobio (2008), the expenditure share on housing α 
takes the value 0.3, labor share of input costs β takes the value 0.6, the share of mobile 
capital γ is 0.2, and the elasticity of housing supply, δ = 1.5 or δ = 3.  
 As a result, this framework allows us to decompose regional growth into three 
potential sources: 1) rising productivity; 2) rising amenities or favorable policy; and 3) 
flexible housing supply, which is ignored in the standard Roback (1982) model of 
previous section. It allows us to estimate the relative shocks to productivity, region 
specific characteristics, and housing supply in a region and to assess the relative 
contribution of each type of shock to regional growth.  
 
3.2.3 Empirical Model Specification – Growth Equation Model  
In order to examine the impact of current local fiscal conditions on the nonmetropolitan 
wage and rent growth, we estimate the following growth model for the entire sample and 

















































  (31) 
where the dependent variables are the ensuing period’s percentage change in wage and 
rent using data from BEA and HUD, respectively. The explanatory variables, except the 
dummy variables (RTW state dummy, Census and ERS typology dummies) and Amenity 
variables, are measured at their initial 1992 or 1990 values. 
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To test whether the coefficients are constant across samples or to test whether we 
should run a full-sample regression (pooled regression) or subsample regressions, we 












=−      (32) 
where RSSP is the total sum of the squares of the residuals in the full sample. RSS1 and 
RSS2 are the sum of the squares of the residuals in two-subsample regression respectively. 
The parameter k is the regression coefficients and  is the total observations in the full 
sample (Nall). Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the pooled sample regression 
is inadequate and we should run separate regressions for the two subsamples (N468 and 
N579) in this study.  
The growth equation model of wage and rent theoretically implies a different 
assumption of local labor or land market from the two ypes of models as mentioned 
above. In other words, when specifying a growth equation model, and running 
regressions of the growth variables on initial fiscal policy variables, we assume by some 
means there are disequilibrium forces in the current p riod. There are some 
disequilibrium innovations going on that affect current levels and subsequent changes. 
Econometrically the growth model specification has the advantage over the level 
form or first difference form specification. By regr ssing the wage and rent growth from 
1992-2002 on the initial values of the explanatory variables, the growth model overcomes 







We next consider a set of sensitivity checks in the growth model similar to what we 
implemented in the differenced model.  
First, we check the sensitivity of regression results to standard errors which are 
clustered by BEA defined economic areas and examine whether the significance of the 
coefficient estimates varies.  
Second, we consider whether our results are robust to inclusion of the SBSI 
variables.  
Third, we examine how the results of the governmental tax and expenditure 
variables are robust to using alternative measures of dependent variables using the 
Census earning and housing cost data.  
Our last specification is to disaggregate the entir sample into several sub-samples 
by nine Rural-urban Continuum Codes (Beale codes) to tudy the effects of tax and 
expenditure variables on local wages and rents. Through addressing the issue of sample 









4.1 Wage and Rent  
 
The average wage per job variable is used in this empirical analysis as one of the 
dependent variables. It is defined as total wage and s lary disbursements divided by total 
wage and salary employment. There are three major sources to acquire data for labor 
employment and wages – Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) or U.S. Census Bureau. The BEA employment and wage estimates are 
more comprehensive than BLS data as the BEA adjusts the BLS estimates by accounting 
for employment and wages not covered in the categori s such as farms, private 
households, private elementary and secondary schools and other omitted categories. The 
data for average wage per job, therefore, are taken from the Regional Economic 
Information System (REIS) of the BEA.  
 As another dependent variable, the cost of housing i  measured using county level 
fair market rents (FMR) compiled by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). FMR are gross rent estimates that include rent plus the cost of all 
utilities derived from annual estimates for 530 metropolitan areas and 2045 
nonmetropolitan county FMR areas. The FMR figures, flecting the 45th percentile 
(50th percentile after fiscal year 1995) rent for a st ndard quality two-bedroom housing 
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unit, have the advantage that they provide rent for a standardized housing unit, thus 
allowing comparisons across counties. 
In sensitivity analysis this study uses an alternative measurement for wage using 
Census median household earnings for year 2000. In the rent equation, following 
Partridge et al. (2007), the alternative measurement for rent, calculated based on data 
from the U.S. Census of Bureau, is defined as the weighted average median gross rent of 
owner and renter occupied housing units for 2000 (Blomquist et al., 1988; Gabriel et al., 
2003). For the owner occupied units, median housing prices are converted into imputed 
annual rent using a discount rate of 7.85% (Peiser and Smith, 1985). The imputed annual 
rent for the owner occupied units along with the median monthly rent for the renter 
occupied units are then used to calculated the weight d average median rent, using the 
shares of owner and renter occupied houses as the weights. 
 
4.2 State and Local Fiscal Variables 
 
Variables of government taxes and expenditures are obtained from the Census of 
Governments (COG) 2002 and 1992 SF3 files. COG provides detailed budgetary 
information for all levels of government (state, local, county, municipal, school district 
and so on) in the United States. This study consider  fiscal variables at the state level and 
county level, respectively.  
For the state fiscal variables, we derive the proxy variables for effective tax rates 
by dividing state and local government tax revenues from individual income, sales, 
property, corporate income and other taxes by statepersonal income. The structure of 
government services is also adjusted by state personal income and includes expenditures 
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on highway, education (higher education, elementary and secondary education), public 
safety (police protection, fire protection, and correction), public health and hospitals, 
environment (natural resources, parks and recreation), h using (housing and community 
development, sewerage, and solid waste management), and government administration 
(financial administration, judicial and legal).  
For the county level fiscal variables, similar variables are used as those at the state 
level and all divided by county personal income. Tax structure variables include property 
taxes, sales taxes, while government spending includes expenditures on highway, 
education, environment and housing (natural recreation, and sewerage). All government 
expenditures at the state and county level are measur d as net values (namely, 
expenditures minus their corresponding charges).  
 
4.3 Small Business Survival Index Variables 
 
Business climate affects companies’ decision about plant location, job creation and 
retention. To appraise how business-friendly a state is, the Small Business and 
Entrepreneurship Council created and updated annually the Small Business Survival 
Index (SBSI), which ranks U.S. states according to the governmental burdens placed on 
the start-up companies or existing ones in individual state. The SBSI consists of such 
major state fiscal variables as top personal income tax, capital gains tax, top corporate 
income tax, death tax, unemployment tax rate, utility costs, workers’ compensation cost, 
gas tax, and state minimum wage. The lower is the ind x number, the lighter are the 
governmental burdens, or the better is the business environment. According to the 2002 
47 
 
SBSI in our sample, the most business friendly state  re South Dakota and Nevada. In 
contrast the most anti-business states are Maine and Minnesota. 
 
4.4 Amenity Variables 
 
The amenity variables are taken from the Economic Research Service of United States 
Department of Agriculture (ERS, USDA) and are available from the ERS for counties in 
the 48 contiguous states. The amenity variables measur  the physical conditions of a 
county that facilitates people to live or firm to locate and include measurements such as 
climate, topography, and water area. Specifically, these variables used in this study are 
the mean temperature (from 1941-1971) for January and July respectively, mean hours of 
sunlight (from 1941-1971) for January and mean humidity (from 1941-1971) for July; the 
percentage of county area that is covered by water; nd the topography score variable, 
which have a value range of 1 to 21, where 1 represnts flat plains and 21 represents the 
most mountainous land. 
  
4.5 Demographic Variables 
 
The demographic variables are taken from the 1990 and 2000 Census (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Characteristics of the Population) and include variables on age structure, gender 
composition, education level, marital status, and ethnicity. Details on these variables are 




4.6 Business Cycle Variable 
 
Local conditions, except conditions of fiscal policies, local amenities, and demographic 
compositions, can also include state regulation that influences local wage and rents. We 
include a dummy variable to indicate whether the local area is in a state with a right-to-
work law (RTW). A right-to-work law disallows the union shop where all employees are 
required to join the union. Most of the 22 states that have a RTW law adopted them since 
the 1940s. The states with RTW laws and their adoption dates, according to Newman 
(1984), are (in ascending order): Florida (1944), Nebraska (1946), South Dakota (1946), 
Virginia (1947), Texas (1947), Tennessee (1947), North Dakota (1947), North 
Carolina(1947), Iowa (1947), Georgia (1947), Arkansas (1947), Arizona (1947), Nevada 
(1951), Alabama (1953), South Carolina (1954), Mississippi (1954), Utah (1955), Kansas 
(1958), Wyoming (1963), Louisiana (1976), Idaho (1986), and Oklahoma (2001).  
What effects the RTW laws have on wages is a hot topic. On the one hand, 
proponents of right to work laws claimed that these laws create jobs by creating a “pro-
business” environment (Holmes, 1998) and lead to higher wages, on the other hand, 
opponents argued that a right-to-work law leads to lowered wages and weakened unions. 
Among the empirical studies on RTW laws, Carroll (1983), and Garofalo & Malhotra 
(1992) report RTW laws have a large, significant, negative effect on average wages, 
Moore et al. (1986) and Hundley (1993) find that RTW laws have no significant effect on 
union or nonunion wages in the private sector and in the public sector, respectively. In 





4.7 Housing Structural Variables 
 
Unlike the fair market rent data from the HUD that are constructed from the standardized 
two bedroom housing unit, the Census housing cost used as an alternative dependent 
variable in the rent equation is constructed from rents of houses and apartments that are 
not standardized and directly comparable between thm. Therefore, we include several 
housing quality control variables in the rent equation o account for differences across the 
housing structures. These control variables are drawn from the U.S. Census Bureau SF3 
file and include the median number of rooms in the structure, the age of housing units, 
the shares of 1-5 bedrooms out of total rooms, the share housing units that are mobile 
homes, and the shares with complete plumbing and kitchen. The median number of 
rooms indicates the size of rental units. The age diff rences in the housing units reflect 
the differences in construction technology, type and efficiency of mechanical systems 
(for example, heating and wiring) and the time over which the structure has been subject 
to normal wear and tear (Galster, 1987). Thus, smaller nd older rental units are expected 














The empirical results of the local fiscal effects on nonmetropolitan wage and land rent are 
presented in this chapter.  
 The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section reports the results of 
the wage and rent model in level form. The second section reports the results of a first 
differenced wage and rent model. The third section reports the growth model results. 
Comparisons are made among these three models. In addition, the results are compared 
between each subsample and the full sample, and also between alternative specifications 
within each sample. 
 Recalling from equation (4), the coefficient sign of a specific fiscal variable in 
either wage or rent equation depends on households’ an /or firms’ marginal valuation of 
that variable (Vs and/or Cs). Theoretically Vs and Cs can be positive, negative or zero. In 
other words, the variable can be an amenity, disamenity, or has no amenity value. On the 
other hand, it can be productive, counterproductive, or does not affect production. 
Therefore theoretically the possible attributes of a variable generates nine combinations 
of outcomes for the wage and rent model as shown in Table 6. In this study however, we 
expect that tax variables are considered as disamenities and counterproductive and that 
expenditure variables are amenities and productive. Consequently, we expect that in 
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Table 6. Fiscal Impacts on Equilibrium Wage and Rent 
Productive Counterproductive No Productivity
(Cs < 0) (Cs > 0) (Cs = 0)
Amenity (Vs > 0)   Wage +/-;  Rent  +   Wage -;      Rent +/-   Wage -;     Rent +
Disamenity (Vs < 0)   Wage +;     Rent +/-   Wage +/-;   Rent -   Wage +;   Rent -




the rent equation, the sign on tax variables is negative and the sign on expenditure 
variables is positive.  
We assume that tax and expenditure variables considered in this study affect each 
subsample in the same manner regardless of the group to which they belong. As a result, 
the predicted signs for the subsample are the same as those for the sample as a whole. 
Besides we expect the sign of a coefficient estimate for a given fiscal variable in the level 
regression to be the same as in the difference equation and growth equation as well. Put 
differently, we expect that higher taxation levels l ads to a lower rental rate when running 
a levels form regression, which implies that we expect changes of taxes to generate 
negative effects on the change of rental rate if we run a difference form regression. If we 
regress changes of rents on initial levels of fiscal variables, we expect higher level of 
taxes to have a negative effect on subsequent growth. 
Before reporting and interpreting the coefficients of fiscal variables, we should 
always keep in mind that government taxes and expenditures variables enter the 
regressions with a balanced budget constraint, where by definition the sum of revenues is 
restricted to equal the sum of expenditures. Governm nt revenues are the sum of 
intergovernmental revenue (i.e., grants), tax revenue, charges and user fees, and non- 
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general revenue (liquor store, utility, or insurance trust revenue), and government bond 
revenues. Government expenditures are the sum of expenditures on education, highways, 
public safety, transportation, health and hospitals, environment and housing, government 
services and three non-general expenditures (liquor store, utility, or insurance trust 
expenditure).6 However, in order for the models to be estimated, one of the revenue or 
expenditure variables has to be excluded to avoid perfect multicollinearity. Thus, the 
omitted variable becomes important to interpret the co fficients of the fiscal variables 
included in the model because all the tax variables or expenditure variable are evaluated 
against the change of the omitted variable.  
In this study, the omitted variables are intergovernmental revenues, non-general 
revenues, bond revenues, and non-general expenditures. Therefore, the sales tax 
coefficient in the model specifications should be interpreted as the effect of faster growth 
of the sales tax at the expense of slower growth in intergovernmental revenues, non-
general revenues and bond revenues, and/or the faster growth in the non-general 
expenditures. Similarly, the education coefficient should be interpreted as the effect of a 
one unit increase in education financed by the increase of intergovernmental revenues 
and non-general revenues, and/or bond revenue. In addition, the net impact of increasing 
sales tax revenue to fund an equivalent increase in the education can be found by adding 
their respective coefficients together. 
 
5.1 Level Equation Model Results 
 
                                                




This section presents the empirical results of the lev ls equation (Tables 7-11). The 
analysis in this section proceeds in five major step . First, Tables 7A-7B report the state 
and local fiscal effects from the wage and rent equation for the whole sample of 
nonmetropolitan counties using data from the BEA and HUD. Second, these fiscal effects 
are evaluated using alternative Census earning and housing cost data. The results are 
presented in Tables 8A-8B. Third, Table 9 reports the results of sensitivity analysis by 
adding the SBSI variables into the models in Tables 7A-7B. The same analysis conducted 
for the whole sample (Nall) in Tables 7-9 is applied to the two subsamples (N468 and 
N579). The results are reported in the Appendix Tables. Fourth, state fiscal policy 
variables are further examined in the fixed effects regression. The results are presented in 
Tables 10-11. The last step is to apply the 2SLS technique to address the endogeneity 
issue arising from this cross-sectional analysis. The results are shown in the appendix 
tables. 
Table 7A shows labor market effects and Table 7B show  housing market effects. 
Both tables report the OLS estimates with t statistics based on robust Huber-White 
(Huber, 1967; White, 1980) standard errors and adjusted R-squared values from a full 
sample of 1998 nonmetropolitan counties. Various forms of empirical specifications are 
presented in both Tables 7A and 7B. Model 1 reports the results of our most 
parsimonious model which includes only the state and local fiscal variables 
(corresponding to equation (16)). Model 2 adds the RTW state dummy variable, Census 
dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies to the first model. Next, Model 3 includes 
additional amenity variables to the second model. Model 4 includes further demographic 
variables into Model 3 to control for labor force quality in the wage equation. Model 5 
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removes the state fiscal variables together with Census dummies and the RTW state 
dummy variable from Model 4 while adding 47 state dummies to the model. Model 6 
evaluates some major state and county fiscal variables based on Model 4.   
Generally speaking, Model 1 in Table 7A shows that almost all the coefficients on 
the state and county tax variables are positive and statistically significant. The education 
and highway variables (stl02_firstsecond, stl02_higheredu, cty02education, 
stl02_highway, cty02highway) at the state level or county level are found to be negative 
and most of them are statistically significant. The expenditure variables on environmental 
housing (stl02_environhousing), government administration (stl02_govtadmin), and 
natural recreation (cty02naturalrec) are found to be positive. The sewerage variable  
(cty02sewerage) is negative and statistically significant. These fi cal variables explain 
only 21% of the wage equation. According to the compensation differential theory, we 
should expect a higher wage in an unfavorable, higher tax location, and lower wage in a 
favorable, better public services provided location, ther things being equal. Therefore 
we expect tax and expenditure variables to have opposite signs in the wage equation. As a 
result, the estimates in Model 1 do not meet our expectations very well. We find 
somewhat mixed coefficient signs between these two fiscal variable groups.  
With respect to the size and statistical significance, the estimates of Model 1 are 
sensitive to the subsequent model specifications in Models 2-6. In contrast to Model 1, 
Models 2-6 show that stl02_property, stl02_individual, stl02_corporate, cty02sales are 
found to be negative but only cty02sales is statistically significant. The variables on first-






Table 7A. Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Dependent variables: 
ln(wage2002) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
stl02_property 3.211** -1.020 -1.083 -1.274   
 (4.55) (1.04) (1.10) (1.38)   
stl02_sales 1.990** 2.020** 2.126** 1.371*   
 (3.23) (3.54) (3.67) (2.54)   
stl02_individual 1.384** 0.600 1.080 -0.710  -1.707** 
 (2.93) (1.06) (1.57) (1.05)  (4.33) 
stl02_corporate 12.492** -6.186* -5.440 -3.670  -0.873 
 (5.53) (2.16) (1.91) (1.34)  (0.39) 
stl02_rest 2.534** 4.132** 4.863** 2.992*   
 (2.90) (4.29) (4.01) (2.52)   
stl02_firstsecond -2.006* 0.860 1.020 0.720  -0.615 
 (2.17) (0.92) (1.08) (0.80)  (0.76) 
stl02_higheredu -1.050 -1.310 -2.320 1.690  2.989 
 (0.68) (0.82) (1.14) (0.86)  (1.84) 
stl02_hospitalhealth -6.039** -5.133** -4.841** -2.890   
 (3.44) (2.95) (2.84) (1.88)   
stl02_highway -10.194** -8.360** -8.167** -8.511**  -5.005** 
 (9.18) (6.69) (6.55) (7.38)  (5.54) 
stl02_publicsafety 1.280 -1.720 -2.040 1.680  5.545* 
 (0.62) (0.65) (0.80) (0.65)  (2.20) 
stl02_environhousing 9.367** 2.670 1.640 3.260   
 (4.01) (1.08) (0.62) (1.25)   
stl02_govtadmin 9.642** 2.190 1.090 0.590   
 (4.65) (1.04) (0.46) (0.26)   
cty02property 0.788** 0.965** 0.944** 0.370 0.480* 0.245 
 (4.50) (5.35) (5.31) (1.94) (2.56) (1.33) 
cty02sales -0.170 0.210 0.250 -2.315** -1.320 -1.943** 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.26) (2.59) (1.08) (2.60) 
cty02education -1.171** -0.757** -0.739** -0.735** -0.834** -0.676** 
 (7.39) (4.94) (4.81) (4.43) (5.18) (4.16) 
cty02highway -3.533** -1.866** -1.828** -1.383** -1.485** -1.165** 
 (6.91) (4.09) (3.99) (3.24) (3.54) (2.84) 
cty02safety 3.490* 1.070 1.000 0.720 0.090 0.994 
 (2.33) (1.15) (1.09) (0.89) (0.12) (1.14) 
cty02naturalrec 0.600 0.650 0.660 0.400 0.510  
 (1.31) (1.69) (1.71) (1.36) (1.78)  
cty02sewerage -2.131* -0.170 -0.150 0.290 -0.450  
 (2.02) (0.18) (0.16) (0.35) (0.55)  
Constant 10.013** 10.228** 10.225** 9.073** 9.165** 9.064** 
 (211.96) (103.12) (103.49) (23.40) (23.49) (23.32) 
Observations 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998  
Adj. R-squared 0.21 0.36 0.36 0.48 0.52 0.47 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant 
at 1% level; Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties; Model 2 adds to Model 1 additional RTW state dummy variable, Census 
dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies as explanatory variables; Model 3 includes additional amenity variables; Model 4 
includes demographic variables; Model 5 replaces state fiscal variables with 47 state dummies; Model 6 is similar to Model 4 except 
including only some major fiscal variables. Wage data are from the BEA and Rent data are from the HUD. 
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Table 7B. Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Dependent variables: 
ln(rent2002) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5 Model 6 
stl02_property 7.170** 3.706** 3.676**   
 (13.76) (4.85) (4.78)   
stl02_sales -2.795** 0.360 0.410   
 (4.24) (0.67) (0.75)   
stl02_individual -0.640 -0.010 0.220  0.082 
 (1.54) (0.01) (0.37)  (0.27) 
stl02_corporate 8.426** 2.670 3.030  -2.403 
 (3.41) (1.04) (1.16)  (1.06) 
stl02_rest -3.359** -2.041** -1.690   
 (5.25) (2.75) (1.73)   
stl02_firstsecond -6.927** -5.537** -5.460**  -3.598** 
 (8.86) (8.43) (8.16)  (6.01) 
stl02_higheredu -6.304** -4.392** -4.873**  -5.187** 
 (5.28) (3.80) (3.11)  (4.28) 
stl02_hospitalhealth -5.470** -0.420 -0.280   
 (3.47) (0.30) (0.20)   
stl02_highway 1.670 0.580 0.670  -1.532* 
 (1.70) (0.64) (0.74)  (2.25) 
stl02_publicsafety 17.541** 7.121** 6.966**  6.384** 
 (9.61) (3.67) (3.69)  (3.79) 
stl02_environhousing -0.670 -2.490 -2.980   
 (0.35) (1.44) (1.53)   
stl02_govtadmin 14.411** 2.650 2.130   
 (8.25) (1.57) (1.15)   
cty02property 0.440** 0.258** 0.249** 0.363** 0.426** 
 (3.82) (3.14) (3.00) (5.41) (4.93) 
cty02sales 4.060** 0.690 0.700 3.192* 0.074 
 (3.57) (0.67) (0.70) (2.43) (0.09) 
cty02education -0.579** -0.327** -0.318** -0.468** -0.387** 
 (4.63) (3.35) (3.18) (5.24) (3.60) 
cty02highway -1.196** -0.150 -0.130 -0.679* -0.097 
 (3.42) (0.47) (0.41) (2.46) (0.30) 
cty02safety 4.046** 1.615* 1.581* 0.360 1.453 
 (2.91) (2.06) (2.01) (0.68) (1.88) 
cty02naturalrec 0.210 0.240 0.250 0.260  
 (0.51) (0.96) (1.00) (1.07)  
cty02sewerage 0.960 0.720 0.730 0.280  
 (0.75) (0.81) (0.82) (0.40)  
Constant 5.985** 6.677** 6.675** 6.293** 6.726** 
 (139.68) (77.74) (77.30) (85.13) (78.83) 
Observations 1998 1998 1998 1998  
Adj. R-squared 0.40 0.65 0.65 0.77 0.63 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant 
at 1% level; Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties; Model 2 adds to Model 1 additional RTW state dummy variable, Census 
dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies as explanatory variables; Model 3 includes additional amenity variables; Model 4 
includes demographic variables; Model 5 replaces state fiscal variables with 47 state dummies; Model 6 is similar to Model 4 except 





government administration, environmental housing, ad sewerage appear to have positive 
signs but statistically all are insignificant. However, we do find consistent signs and 
significance for stl02_sales, stl02_rest, stl02_highway, cty02education, cty02highway 
across different model specifications. 
Next turning to the rent equation with the same model structure as in the wage 
equation, in general property tax variables (stl02_property, cty02property) are found to 
be positive and statistically significant while general sales tax variables (tl02_sales, 
cty02sales) are found to be positive and insignificant. The education variables 
(stl02_firstsecond, stl02_higheredu, cty02education) are found to be negative and 
significant and the highway variables (stl02_highway, cty02highway) generally are found 
to be negative. The public safety variables (stl02_publicsafety, cty02safety) appear to be 
positive and significant. Briefly, the coefficient signs from the rent equation are counter 
to the ones predicted by the compensation differential theory. 
Next we re-estimate Models 1-7 in both wage and rent equations using Census 
earnings and housing cost data instead of BEA wage and HUD rent data. The results are 
reported in Tables 8A-8B. In general models in Table 8A (8B) have better goodness of fit 
with higher adjusted R-squares than those in Tables 7A (7B). However, in terms of the 
direction of the coefficients, the estimates of these fiscal variables in Tables 7A and 8A 
(or Tables 7B and 8B), generally speaking, are in the same direction (the obvious 
exception is that we find stl02_corporate is significantly negative in the rent equation 
using Census data). 
Furthermore, to address the issue of possible sample heterogeneity, the same 
models for the entire sample in Tables 7A-7B are analyzed for two subsamples: the  
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Table 8A. Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Dependent variables: 
ln(earning2000) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
stl02_property 3.831** -0.874 -0.977 -1.521*
(5.81) (0.96) (1.08) (2.35)
stl02_sales 2.990** 1.030 1.203 1.914**
(4.61) (1.32) (1.54) (3.79)
stl02_individual 2.572** -0.021 0.766 -0.857 -0.322
(5.71) (0.04) (1.09) (1.56) (1.06)
stl02_corporate 4.932* -14.405** -13.184** -10.724** -6.456**
(2.23) (5.04) (4.58) (4.80) (3.48)
stl02_rest -0.076 0.415 1.608 -1.160
(0.09) (0.43) (1.36) (1.22)
stl02_firstsecond -2.999** -1.559 -1.296 -0.511 -0.762
(3.66) (1.82) (1.51) (0.76) (1.25)
stl02_higheredu -1.948 0.909 -0.740 3.843* 3.978**
(1.35) (0.57) (0.37) (2.51) (2.98)
stl02_hospitalhealth -4.338* -4.648* -4.171* -1.205
(2.45) (2.47) (2.26) (0.95)
stl02_highway -9.049** -8.305** -7.990** -8.069** -5.795**
(8.25) (6.96) (6.74) (9.29) (8.47)
stl02_publicsafety -2.394 2.475 1.946 5.092** 6.547**
(1.18) (0.98) (0.81) (2.65) (3.46)
stl02_environhousing 3.580 -2.824 -4.505 1.313
(1.74) (1.23) (1.80) (0.69)
stl02_govtadmin 8.803** 11.763** 9.958** 7.087**
(4.63) (5.20) (4.19) (4.17)
cty02property 1.124** 1.244** 1.210** 0.090 0.177 -0.046
(5.96) (7.07) (6.86) (0.64) (1.38) (0.33)
cty02sales -1.137 0.807 0.871 -2.251** -1.851 -0.554
(1.15) (0.70) (0.77) (2.78) (1.59) (0.77)
cty02education -1.953** -1.679** -1.649** -0.767** -0.755** -0.768**
(11.91) (11.19) (10.85) (5.18) (5.83) (5.14)
cty02highway -1.470** -1.022 -0.960 -1.667** -1.929** -1.276**
(2.80) (1.63) (1.51) (3.52) (3.85) (2.67)
cty02safety 1.625 0.711 0.595 0.875 0.094 0.814
(1.76) (0.84) (0.68) (1.29) (0.15) (1.15)
cty02naturalrec -0.137 -0.195 -0.173 -0.345 -0.120
(0.38) (0.55) (0.48) (1.15) (0.48)
cty02sewerage -1.048 -0.383 -0.350 0.981 0.411
(0.84) (0.34) (0.31) (1.31) (0.56)
Constant 9.932** 10.011** 10.006** 9.493** 9.729** 9.529**
(217.82) (94.95) (94.90) (29.96) (32.57) (29.08)
Observations 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
R-squared 0.25 0.34 0.35 0.68 0.73 0.66 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level; Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties; Model 2 adds to Model 1 additional RTW state dummy variable, Census 
dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies as explanatory variables; Model 3 includes additional amenity variables; Model 4 
includes demographic variables; Model 5 replaces state fiscal variables with 47 state dummies; Model 6 is similar to Model 4 except 




Table 8B. Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Dependent variables: 
ln(housing2000) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model5 Model 6
stl02_property 3.394** 1.550 1.508
(3.41) (1.36) (1.33)
stl02_sales -5.824** -0.246 -0.186
(5.95) (0.30) (0.23)
stl02_individual 0.189 2.159** 2.472** 1.935**
(0.29) (3.03) (2.61) (4.17)
stl02_corporate 9.919** -8.630** -8.173* -12.819**
(3.29) (2.69) (2.41) (4.25)
stl02_rest -7.065** 1.707 2.164
(6.40) (1.41) (1.44)
stl02_firstsecond -5.636** -1.418 -1.302 -1.413
(4.68) (1.33) (1.18) (1.40)
stl02_higheredu -1.350 1.133 0.502 3.702
(0.65) (0.56) (0.20) (1.90)
stl02_hospitalhealth -1.027 -4.010 -3.800
(0.42) (1.89) (1.83)
stl02_highway -2.848 -6.557** -6.410** -9.482**
(1.67) (4.13) (3.96) (7.96)
stl02_publicsafety 26.613** 4.066 3.774 1.532
(9.78) (1.50) (1.34) (0.67)
stl02_environhousing -1.620 -16.120** -16.766**
(0.50) (5.66) (5.29)
stl02_govtadmin 18.692** -0.735 -1.393
(6.91) (0.26) (0.45)
cty02property 1.456** 1.333** 1.322** 1.439** 1.433**
(5.65) (7.00) (6.95) (7.43) (7.79)
cty02sales 4.167** 5.744** 5.777** 8.604** 3.761**
(2.65) (4.95) (4.97) (6.49) (4.06)
cty02education -2.650** -2.269** -2.254** -2.351** -2.328**
(8.64) (10.06) (9.91) (10.43) (10.32)
cty02highway 0.102 0.230 0.265 -0.386 0.235
(0.15) (0.40) (0.46) (0.64) (0.39)
cty02safety 1.725 0.967 0.911 -0.661 0.939
(1.17) (1.01) (0.94) (0.67) (0.98)
cty02naturalrec 0.050 0.115 0.129 -0.037
(0.06) (0.19) (0.22) (0.06)
cty02sewerage 0.203 0.125 0.135 -1.113
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.94)
Constant 7.005** 7.143** 7.129** 7.050** 7.113**
(10.24) (15.40) (15.29) (15.75) (14.98)
Observations 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
R-squared 0.70 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.80  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level; Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties; Model 2 adds to Model 1 additional RTW state dummy variable, Census 
dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies as explanatory variables; Model 3 includes additional amenity variables; Model 4 
includes demographic variables; Model 5 replaces state fiscal variables with 47 state dummies; Model 6 is similar to Model 4 except 
including only some major fiscal variables. The rent data are from the Census. Certain control variables are added: median number of 
rooms in the structure, the age of housing units, the shares of 1-5 bedrooms out of total rooms, the share housing units that are mobile 
homes, and the shares with complete plumbing and kitchen. 
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nonmetropolitan counties that are adjacent to a metro area (sample N468) and the 
nonmetropolitan counties that are not adjacent to a metro area (sample N579). The results 
are reported in the Appendix Tables 2A-2B for sample N468 and Appendix Tables 3A-
3B for sample N579, Overall the results in Tables 7A-7B are not sensitive to 
disaggregation of the whole sample into two subsamples. 
To date the results for the tax group variables or expenditure group variables are 
found to be very inconsistent with each other. The co fficient signs on tax variables in 
either wage or rent equation do not follow the same dir ction, either do the signs on the 
variables, property and sales taxes. expenditure variables. In addition, according to Table 
6 the results of two expenditure variables, education and highway (having negative signs 
in both equations), seem to indicate these two expenditure variables are 
counterproductive, and  these two tax variables are considered either as amenities or 
productive. These results are counterintuitive in that we expect the expenditure variables 
to have either an amenity effect or productivity effect, or both.   
To attain further insights, next we implement sensitivity analysis by replacing the 
effective tax measurement variables with the marginl tax variables (SBSI variables) to 
evaluate the sensitivity of the fiscal effects in the wage and rent equations. The results are 
presented in Table 9. Columns (1)-(3) present the OLS results of three forms of 
specification for the wage equation based on Model 4 and Model 6 as mentioned above. 
Specifically, column (1) is based on Model 4 (corresponding to Equation (20)), and 
column (2) adds four more ERS typology dummy variables (fm, mi, fl, rec) to Column 
(1). Column (3) is based on Model 6. The corresponding results for the rent equation are 
presented in columns (4)-(6). 
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As shown from the rent equation in Table 9, in general the property tax variable is 
found to be positive and statistically significant, and the education and highway variables 
(stl02_firstsecond, stl02_higheredu, cty02education, cty02highway) are found to be 
negative and statistically significant, which are counter to our expectations and similar to 
those found in Tables 7A-7B. The expenditures on cty02safety, cty02naturalrec, and 
cty02sewerage appear to have both amenity and productivity effects, which are consistent 
with prior findings in Tables 7A-7B. In contrast to the earlier estimates, adding SBSI 
variables in Table 8 produced expected results for tate general sales tax (stl02_sales), 
top marginal personal income tax (top_pi), and top marginal corporate income tax 
(top_corporate). For instance, the negative coefficient of op_pi in both the wage and rent 
equations, according to Table 6, implies that high top marginal personal income tax rates 
are unattractive to both households and firms.7  
Meanwhile comparisons are made between the subsamples (N468 and N579) and 
the entire sample. The results are reported in the Appendix Tables 4-5. These results are 
similar to these obtained from using the whole sample (Table 7) which, except that for 
the sample N579, the stl02_highway and stl02_publicsafety variables are found to be 
larger in size than in sample Nall (or N468) and stati ically significant. 
The next two tables (Tables 10-11) present further evidence on state fiscal effects 
in fixed effect regressions where the fixed effects are obtained from the first stage wage 
and rent regression model (equation (19)) in which the explanatory variables include only 
the pure exogenous amenity variables. Table 11 reports the results of corresponding  
                                                
7 Theoretically, another explanation to explain the negative sign in both wage and rent equation is that top 
marginal personal income tax rates (top_pi) are household amenities, but the household amenity ffect 
dominated by the firm disamenity effect. However, the argument that top_pi is a household amenity is hard 
to find supports in reality. 
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Table 9. Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall Considering SBSI Variables, 













stl02_property -0.490 -1.580 5.189** 5.128**
(0.46) (1.57) (5.63) (5.50)
stl02_sales 2.080** 2.070** -1.060 -0.960
(3.12) (3.25) (1.68) (1.53)
top_pi -0.025** -0.023** -0.012** -0.018** -0.019** -0.006*
(5.52) (5.43) (3.44) (5.35) (5.64) (2.50)
top_capitalgains 0.022** 0.019** 0.004 0.016** 0.017** -0.001
(4.38) (4.03) (1.27) (4.29) (4.59) (0.60)
top_corporate 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.012** -0.012** 0.002
(0.90) (1.37) (0.83) (4.06) (3.88) (0.94)
deathtax -0.047** -0.034** -0.022* 0.029* 0.028* 0.037**
(4.06) (3.16) (2.26) (2.57) (2.50) (4.40)
unemptax 0.019** 0.014** 0.013** 0.008* 0.010 -0.001
(4.63) (3.63) (3.61) (2.26) (1.96) (0.18)
utilitiescosts 0.050 0.040 0.001 0.272** 0.252** 0.180**
(1.38) (1.17) (0.03) (6.73) (6.31) (5.63)
compensation -0.020 -0.020 0.019 -0.020 -0.020 -0.037**
(1.35) (1.26) (1.84) (1.73) (1.70) (5.53)
gastax 0.220 0.200 -0.124 0.588** 0.591** 0.214**
(1.83) (1.81) (1.33) (7.39) (7.47) (3.12)
miniwage 0.030 0.020 0.035 0.238** 0.235** 0.183**
(0.81) (0.70) (1.03) (5.74) (5.62) (5.57)
stl02_rest 3.305* 1.250 -0.684 -4.534** -4.442** -0.876
(2.52) (1.05) (0.62) (4.00) (3.91) (1.11)
stl02_firstsecond 2.100 2.747* 3.044 -3.306** -3.348** -4.113**
(1.62) (2.27) (1.63) (3.24) (3.33) (2.98)
stl02_higheredu -2.810 -2.820 -1.890 -2.290
(1.26) (1.36) (1.03) (1.26)
stl02_hospitalhealth -10.026** -8.297** -17.277** -16.911**
(3.73) (3.34) (8.30) (8.21)
stl02_highway -3.596* -3.176* -6.085** 0.980 1.410 0.806
(2.37) (2.26) (5.23) (0.81) (1.16) (0.90)
stl02_publicsafety 7.015* 7.175* 8.822** 4.950 5.020 2.787
(2.14) (2.37) (3.04) (1.79) (1.83) (1.35)
stl02_environhousing -12.602** -8.336* -1.450 -1.560
(3.29) (2.39) (0.46) (0.49)
stl02_govtadmin 2.110 -0.360 13.113** 12.837**
(0.73) (0.13) (6.53) (6.45)
cty02property 0.330 0.220 0.176 0.361** 0.351** 0.433**
(1.75) (1.22) (0.93) (4.33) (4.34) (5.13)
cty02sales -1.000 -2.593* -1.584 2.000 2.000 0.945
(1.08) (2.56) (1.84) (1.84) (1.45) (1.07)
cty02education -0.922** -0.785** -0.851** -0.659** -0.593** -0.646**
(5.52) (5.00) (5.11) (6.32) (5.99) (5.95)
cty02highway -1.958** -1.304** -1.763** -1.079** -0.816* -0.785*
(4.32) (3.00) (4.00) (2.91) (2.28) (2.28)
cty02safety 0.910 0.280 1.437 2.590** 2.411** 2.616**
(1.08) (0.37) (1.49) (2.73) (2.67) (2.63)
cty02naturalrec 0.420 0.430 0.290 0.310
(1.46) (1.56) (0.91) (0.94)
cty02sewerage -0.360 -0.440 0.810 0.860
(0.44) (0.53) (0.87) (0.93)
Constant 8.607** 9.435** 8.553** 5.942** 5.942** 6.257**
(21.71) (25.35) (21.70) (51.27) (51.67) (62.43)
Observations 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.52 0.46 0.66 0.67 0.63
ln(wage2002) ln(rent2002)
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level; Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties; Model 2 adds to Model 1 additional RTW state dummy variable, Census 
dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies as explanatory variables; Model 3 includes additional amenity variables; Model 4 
includes demographic variables; Model 5 replaces state fiscal variables with 47 state dummies; Model 6 is similar to Model 4 except 
including only some major fiscal variables. The four ERS typology dummy variables are fm, mi, fl, rec (see Appendix Table 1 for 




models in Table 10 but instead including additional SBSI variables to the right hand side 
of the model. 
Turning to the results in Table 10, state variables in both equations have a poor 
goodness of fit with low adjusted R-squares. In the rent equation, stl02_property is 
significantly positive and stl02_firstsecond is significantly negative.  stl02_highway 
stl02_publicsafety, and stl02_hospitalhealth variables appear to be positive but 
statistically insignificant. Table 11 generally shows similar results for these expenditure 
group variables from Table 10. But results using SBSI variables in the model 
specification are more promising. The model has slightly better goodness of fit and the 
stl02_sales, top_pi, and top_corporate variables are found to have expected negative sign 
in the rent equation, though statistically insignificant.   
 Furthermore, we conduct the same regression as in Tables 10-11 except that we 
are using the two subsamples, N468 and N579. Detailed results are reported in the 
Appendix Tables 6 and 7, which correspond, respectiv ly, to the Tables 10 and 11. The 
results generally are not sensitive to those made for the whole sample. In brief, most state 
tax variables in the rent are negative but statistically insignificant. The coefficient on 
education variables is negative and the coefficient is positive for the public safety.  
Overall the tax and expenditure variables are shown t  be statistically insignificant, 
which reflects the poor goodness-of-fit of the model with low adjusted R-squares.  
With respect to the state fiscal variables, we next conduct the sensitivity analysis 
to the fixed effects regressions. Appendix Tables 8A-8B present the results of 9 groups of 
fixed effects regression. Column (1) contains the subsample where fixed effects 
corresponding to the first Census division are dropped out. Likewise, Column (9)  
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Table 10. Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Fixed Effects Regression, 
Dependent Variable: Fixed Effects from Estimating the Wage and Rent Equations, 
Respectively 
 
Fixed effects from the wage 
equation 
Fixed effects from the rent 
equation 
stl02_property 3.792 8.125* 
 (1.46) (2.68) 
stl02_sales 1.348 -1.668 
 (0.69) (0.54) 
stl02_individual 1.448 1.259 
 (0.99) (0.46) 
stl02_corporate -0.506 2.231 
 (0.07) (0.21) 
stl02_rest 2.190 -0.803 
 (0.75) (0.15) 
stl02_firstsecond -4.656 -14.089* 
 (1.31) (2.54) 
stl02_higheredu -7.955 -12.797 
 (1.35) (1.15) 
stl02_hospitalhealth -1.493 2.323 
 (0.23) (0.19) 
stl02_highway -2.914 2.380 
 (0.58) (0.23) 
stl02_publicsafety 4.779 15.889 
 (0.67) (1.75) 
stl02_environhousing -5.138 -12.905 
 (0.52) (0.92) 
stl02_govtadmin 2.876 14.154 
 (0.43) (1.02) 
rtw2 -0.014 -0.038 
 (0.42) (0.80) 
Constant 10.278** 6.660** 
 (68.09) (24.77) 
Observations 46 46 
Adjusted R-squared 0.13 0.25 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 
5% level, ** significant at 1% level; Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties; Column 1 are Fixed 
effects from the wage equation which is based on Model 4 where county fiscal variables are dropped out 
from the explanatory variables. Column 2 are Fixed effects from the rent equation which is based on Model 
3 where county fiscal variables are dropped out from the explanatory variables. Wage data are from the 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.08 0.55  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level; Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties; Column 1 are Fixed effects from the wage equation which is based on Model 4 
where county fiscal variables are dropped out from the explanatory variables. Column 2 are Fixed effects from the rent equation which 
is based on Model 3 where county fiscal variables ar  dropped out from the explanatory variables. Wage data are from the BEA and 





contains the subsample that omits the fixed effects corresponding to the ninth Census 
division. Further, we check the robustness of the sate fiscal effects by including SBSI 
variables as additional explanatory variables. Appendix Tables 9A-9B consider additional 
SBSI variables and follow the same structure as Appendix Tables 8A-8B. 
Turning to the results, Appendix Table 8B shows that in the rent equation, 
stl02_sales is found to be negative and statistically insignificant in most cases, 
stl02_highway, stl02_publicsafety are positive and statistically insignificant. According 
to Table 6, if combining the results from the wage equation in Appendix Table 8A, we 
can conclude, as expected, that sales tax is unattractive to both households and firms and  
highway and pubic safety are attractive and productive. On the other hand, the positive 
coefficient on tax variables, tl02_property, stl02_individual, and stl02_corporate and 
the negative coefficients on education variables, stl02_firstsecond and stl02_higheredu 
are counter to our expectation.  
Compared to the estimates from the Appendix Tables 8A-8B, models using SBSI 
variables in the Appendix Tables 9A-9B have better goodness of fit. The coefficient signs 
and significance in the Appendix Tables 9A-9B, eithr expected or unexpected, are 
generally consistent with these found in the Appendix Tables 8A-8B except that we find 
the negative effects of corporate income tax and personal income tax on rent using the 
marginal measurement, which are in accordance with our expectation even though they 
are statistically insignificant. 
The final implementation in this cross-sectional analysis attempts to correct for 
the possible bias that the ordinary least squares suffer  using the instrumental variable 
(IV or 2SLS) estimation method. The 2SLS results are reported in the Appendix Tables 
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10-13 for the sample Nall, N468, and N579. Appendix Table 10 reports the 2SLS results 
from using first set of dependent variables (BEA wage nd HUD rent) and two sets of 
instrumental variables. The first set of instruments (IV1) consist of all fiscal variables in 
1992 value and the second set of instruments (IV2) adds to the first set two additional 
political voting variables, PRES_REP72 and PRES_TO72. For the first case we 
implicitly specify an exactly identified model, while for the second case we specify an 
overidentified model where the overidentification condition is tested. Appendix Table 11 
adjusts the 2SLS results from the previous table by accounting for cluster effects. The 
next two tables (Appendix Tables 12-13) replicate the analysis in the previous two tables 
except we use a second set of dependent variables (Earning and Housing) from the 
Census. 
Turning to the 2SLS results presented in Appendix Tables 10-13, in general we 
find that: 1) the results of the DWH test (Durbin, 1954; Hausman, 1978; Wu, 1973) 
overall show that the fiscal variables in the level equation are endogenously determined, 
implying that the OLS estimates are inconsistent and biased and the 2SLS approach is 
called for. However, the rejection of the null hypothesis in the Sargan test that the 
instruments and the error terms are uncorrelated in most specifications indicates that the 
two instrument sets are invalid, casting doubts on the coefficient estimates; 2) the results 
appear to be consistent from using two sets of instruments and consistent among each 
subsample. In addition, the results of using the Census earning and housing data are 
consistent with these of using the first set of dependent variables. 3) The coefficient signs 
for most fiscal variables of our interest are found to be inconsistent with theory. As 
theory predicts that rents should be higher in areas with higher investment in public 
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services and/or lower taxes, the empirical results fail to support such a theory, which may 
be due to the statistical facts that the instruments chosen are invalid (or the instruments 
themselves are not exogenous) as shown from the Sargan test (1958), or maybe the level 
equation model can not reflect the true process of the local labor and land markets.   
In conclusion, several remarks could be made from the level form analysis in this 
section. First, results from the tax or expenditure group variables are found to be 
inconsistent with each other. Theory predicts that ax variables should have the same 
negative coefficient sign in the rent equation in that taxes are similar in nature and are 
unattractive to both households and firms. Likewise, expenditure variables should be 
positive in the rent equation in that these variables are expected to have either amenity or 
productivity effects, or both.  
Second, the inconsistency among results from either tax or expenditure group 
variables implies directly that some fiscal variables are consistent with theory and some 
are not. For instance, overall, property tax, education, and highway variables are found to 
have the opposite sign to the one predicted by theory, while public safety is consistent 
with the prediction.  
Third, the results are insensitive to alternative measurements of wage and rent and 
are consistent between the entire sample and two subsamples.  
Fourth, the marginal tax variables (top_pi and top_corporate) from the SBSI are 
shown to produce a negative effect on the land market. This is expected and implies that 
marginal tax variables could be better than average effective tax rate variables  in truly 
reflecting the labor and land markets, as the margin l tax rate measures better the 
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incentives of households’ or firms’ location choice and have less measurement error than 
the average tax measures.  
Fifth, using the 2SLS technique fails to generate better results than the OLS. Most 
fiscal variables are shown to have opposite signs to the ones predicted by theory, which 
we believe is because either the instruments chosen are i valid, or the true process of the 
local labor and land markets can not be represented by the level equation model as 
specified. 
 
5.2 Differenced Model Results 
 
This section reports the estimation of the wage and re t model in first-difference form for 
the whole sample of nonmetropolitan counties (Tables 12-17). The differenced model has 
some advantages over the levels model. The differenc d model has the advantage to 
reduce the severity of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2004; p. 367). Most importantly, the 
differenced model implicitly controls for county fixed effects, or omitted variables at the 
county level that bias the level model estimated coefficients. 
The analysis proceeds in three steps. The first step i  to use the OLS approach to 
estimate the differenced wage and rent model. The results are presented in Table 12. The 
second step is to apply the instrumental variables (IV or 2SLS) approach to address 
possible endogeneity problems. The coefficient estimates, along with several test results 
of the endogeneity of fiscal variables and the validity of the instrumental variables, are 
reported in Table 13. The third step is to examine wh ther the results obtained from the 
instrumental variable approach are sensitive to clustered regional effects. The results are 
shown in Table 14. Tables 15-17 follow the same estimation procedures and use the same 
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set of variables as in Tables 12-14, respectively except that we use an alternative set of 
dependent variables from the Census. Furthermore, t examine the consistency of the 
results in Tables 12-17, we conduct the same analysis for two subsamples (N468 and 
N579). The results are presented in corresponding Appendix Tables 14-19. 
Table 12 presents the OLS results of the differenced equation (equation (21)). 
Columns 1-2 are the wage models where the explanatory variables used are based on 
Model 4 (mentioned in Section 5.1, the base model therein) which, except differenced 
fiscal variables and demographic variables, includes additional amenity variables, 
Columns 3-4 are the rent models where the explanatory variables used are based on 
Model 3 which removes demographic variables from Model 4. As seen from Table 12, 
the difference results in the rent equation show that t e state highway variable 
(∆st_highway) is significantly positive as expected. The expenditure variables on safety 
(∆st_safety), environmental housing (∆st_environhousing), county highway 
(∆ct_highway), and sewerage (∆ct_sewerage) appear to have the expected positive signs 
but are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The coefficient on sales taxes is 
positive and the coefficients on first and secondary education and county safety are 
negative, all of which are statistically significant and counter to our expectation. Turning 
to the results of two subsamples (N468 and N579) which are reported in the Appendix 
Table 14, the magnitude and significance from the subsample of N579 (nonmetropolitan 
counties adjacent to a metro area) seem to be more consistent with these from the full 
sample. More variables from the subsample N579, thoug  most are statistically 
insignificant, are shown to have the signs compatible with theoretical predictions. 
Table 13 shows the results from the instrumental variable regressions where we  
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Table 12. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Dependent Variables: 
∆wage and ∆rent  
 ∆wage  ∆rent 
 Base Base+ERS  Base Base+ERS 
∆st_property 0.320 0.600  -0.788 -0.717 
 (0.51) (0.97)  (0.95) (0.86) 
∆st_sales 1.025 1.084  4.733** 4.744** 
 (1.09) (1.16)  (3.54) (3.59) 
∆st_individual -2.369** -2.353**  1.262 1.210 
 (3.31) (3.40)  (1.17) (1.13) 
∆st_corporate 3.628 4.458*  0.693 1.195 
 (1.63) (2.06)  (0.18) (0.30) 
∆st_rest 0.064 0.472  -2.473 -2.174 
 (0.06) (0.46)  (1.52) (1.34) 
∆st_firstsecond 1.250* 0.771  -2.568* -2.852** 
 (2.03) (1.28)  (2.54) (2.82) 
∆st_hospital -1.447 -0.515  -1.635 -1.883 
 (1.21) (0.45)  (1.04) (1.20) 
∆st_highway 0.962 0.383  4.052** 3.923** 
 (1.01) (0.41)  (2.81) (2.74) 
∆st_safety 2.381 1.197  0.887 0.594 
 (1.11) (0.57)  (0.27) (0.18) 
∆st_environhousing -1.138 -0.693  0.919 1.202 
 (0.93) (0.58)  (0.54) (0.70) 
∆st_govtadmin -6.989** -6.212**  -17.241** -16.248** 
 (3.64) (3.35)  (6.17) (5.82) 
∆ct_property 0.058 0.079  0.231 0.255 
 (0.34) (0.48)  (1.20) (1.34) 
∆ct_sales -0.153 -0.013  1.533* 1.593* 
 (0.24) (0.02)  (2.15) (2.32) 
∆ct_education -0.351** -0.356**  -0.144 -0.145 
 (2.58) (2.69)  (1.06) (1.05) 
∆ct_highway 0.908* 0.812  0.268 0.223 
 (1.96) (1.88)  (0.79) (0.66) 
∆ct_safety -1.213* -1.242*  -1.647** -1.672** 
 (2.17) (2.28)  (2.62) (2.67) 
∆ct_naturalrec -0.066 -0.111  0.811 0.857* 
 (0.13) (0.22)  (1.89) (2.01) 
∆ct_sewerage 0.036 0.271  0.426 0.500 
 (0.08) (0.57)  (0.82) (0.97) 
Constant 0.355** 0.371**  -0.055 -0.037 
 (6.29) (5.83)  (0.79) (0.52) 
Observations 1998 1998  1998 1998 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.22  0.28 0.28 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 
5% level, ** significant at 1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. ∆wage=ln(wage2002)-
ln(wage1992) and ∆rent=ln(fmr02_2)-ln(fmr92_2). Column 1 in the wage equation is based on Model 4 in 
the level equation models and Column 2 adds to Column 1 four additional ERS dummy variables (fm, mi, 
fl, rec). Column 3 in the rent equation is based on Model 3 in the level equation models and Column 4 adds 
to Column 3 four additional ERS variables. 
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specify and test two sets of instruments. The results of DWH test confirm that there is 
endogeneity of the differenced fiscal variables in equations for both wages and rents, 
implying that the OLS estimates in the analysis of outcome variables are inconsistent and 
biased. In the first stage, we relate the differenced fiscal variables to their instruments, 
which means we run 18 regressions separately. The first stage results (not shown) 
indicate that in almost all cases that the identifying instruments are jointly statistically 
significant (F-statistic highly above 10 and p-value=0.0000) implying that the 
instruments are not weak. To look forward to the 2SLS results using the second set of 
instruments, we also consider the Sargan (1958) test of over identifying restrictions to 
check the validity of the instruments. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
instruments are valid at the 5% level of significane for the rent model. However the 
instruments only pass the overidentification test at the 1% level for the wage model. 
With regard to the slope coefficients, the two models using two slightly different 
sets of instruments are quite close in magnitude, though we usually find the significance 
of each individual variable is more obvious for thesecond case. Turning to the estimates 
in the differenced rent equation, the coefficients on the tax variables, ∆st_property, 
∆st_individual, ∆ct_sales and are statistically significant and signed as expected 
(∆st_individual is significant only at 10% level). In addition, the ighway expenditure 
variables at both county and state levels are significa t with expected positive signs. The 
positive coefficient on ∆st_safety and ∆ct_education, along with negative coefficients on 
∆cty_safety and ∆st_firstsecond are statistically insignificant. The ∆st_corporate is 




Table 13. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Instrumental 
Variables Estimation, Dependent variable: ∆wage and ∆rent 
 IV1 IV2  IV1 IV2
∆st_property 0.914 -2.556 -12.221** -10.508**
(0.22) (1.25) (2.95) (3.12)
∆st_sales 2.258 0.124 10.164 10.311
(0.40) (0.04) (1.76) (1.90)
∆st_individual -32.673* -10.728* -17.495 -19.000
(2.01) (2.22) (0.88) (1.94)
∆st_corporate 14.413 10.008 44.243* 39.216*
(0.86) (1.05) (2.14) (2.25)
∆st_rest -1.888 -0.546 -7.616 -6.768
(0.33) (0.17) (1.39) (1.30)
∆st_firstsecond 7.469 3.534 -5.098 -4.113
(1.80) (1.83) (1.29) (1.26)
∆st_hospital -39.741* -22.137* -53.855* -51.642**
(2.04) (2.41) (2.20) (3.06)
∆st_highway 6.987 2.361 12.002* 12.105**
(1.25) (0.85) (2.22) (2.65)
∆st_safety 20.710 22.880* 24.355 20.001
(1.23) (2.33) (1.45) (1.24)
∆st_environhousing -6.370 3.039 16.185 12.345
(0.68) (0.73) (1.67) (1.86)
∆st_govtadmin -21.942 -21.490** -23.187 -22.759
(1.79) (2.98) (1.85) (1.92)
∆ct_property -6.237 -0.551 2.299 1.295
(1.42) (0.38) (0.43) (0.48)
∆ct_sales -18.447 -6.672* -12.938 -14.282*
(1.95) (1.99) (1.02) (2.09)
∆ct_education 2.616 1.119 1.793 1.944
(1.61) (1.46) (0.62) (1.10)
∆ct_highway 3.895* 1.934* 2.543 2.632*
(2.15) (2.51) (1.28) (2.00)
∆ct_safety 3.766 -1.510 -5.947 -4.647
(0.77) (0.74) (1.08) (1.31)
∆ct_naturalrec -1.098 -0.423 -3.678 -3.787*
(0.63) (0.43) (1.87) (2.22)
∆ct_sewerage 0.078 0.008 -0.389 -0.352
(0.06) (0.01) (0.26) (0.25)
Constant 0.209 0.344** -0.113 -0.123
(1.45) (5.06) (0.99) (1.14)
F statistics (All endog. vars. 
=0)
3.94[0.000] 3.72[0.000] 8.77[0.000] 8.33[0.000]
DWH test for endogeneity 56.51[0.000]46.69[0.000] 125.92[0.000]124.77[0.000]
Sargan test of exogeneity of 
the instruments
NA 6.97[0.031] NA 2.42[0.298]
Observations 1998 1996 1998 1996
∆wage ∆rent
 
Notes: Absolute t statistics are in parenthesis are. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% 
level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. ∆wage=ln(wage2002)-ln(wage1992) and ∆rent=ln(fmr02_2)-ln(fmr92_2). Column 
1 in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, 
rec). Column 3 in the rent equation is based on the benchmark Model 3 and Column 4 adds to Column 3 four additional ERS 
variables. IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same as IV1 but instead adding two more 




To further assess the role of these fiscal variables, the negative slope coefficients 
of property tax (∆st_property) for the both rent (-10.508) and wage (-2.556) models 
indicates the property tax has to fall into the case in Column (2) of Table 6, implying that 
property tax is unattractive to firms and has adverse effects on firm productivity (negative 
firm effect). If the property tax is unattractive to households (disamenity effect), this 
would exert downward pressure on the land price, but wo ld produce ambiguous effects 
on the wage depending on the relative magnitude of movement of labor supply and labor 
demand. To be consistent with the negative coefficint found in the wage model, the 
negative firm effect has to dominate the disamenity effect. Similarly, given the positive 
coefficients on highway and safety in both wage and rent models we can infer that these 
two expenditure variables are productive and the productivity effect has to dominate the 
positive amenity effect. In contrast to the earlier findings from the OLS estimates, these 
effects are stronger in magnitude from the 2SLS estimates though some variables have 
the wrong signs. 
Next we apply the same analysis for the two subsamples of nonmetropolitan 
counties. The results are reported in Appendix Table 15. In contrast to the full sample, the 
coefficients of the fiscal variables in Table 13 do not hold for the two subsamples in that 
most of them either fail to retain signs or statistical significance. The inconsistent results  
could be explained by the following two possible reasons: either the instruments are 
invalid as reflected by their failure to pass the ov ridentification test in the rent equation 
when using second set of instrument lists (Column (8) in Appendix Table 15), or the 
instruments are weak as reflected in first stage reressions, the F-statistic (not shown in 
table) for each single endogenous regressor is quite low, lower than 10 for most cases. 
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Table 14 reports the 2SLS results while taking intra-cluster correlation into 
account, which can directly be compared to the results in Table 13. Similarly the results 
of Appendix Table 16 can be directly compared to these from the Appendix Table 15. 
Surprisingly we find almost all variables in 2SLS within cluster correlation model are 
statistically insignificant, which implies the varince of the clustered estimator is found to 
be larger than previous one. We propose two possible explanations for this puzzling 
result. First, the weak aspect of the clustering method is that it takes an arbitrary form of 
correlation. In other words, we do not know the exact form of correlation. The estimation 
of the standard errors could be wrong if the modeling of the correlation caused by 
clustering is not correct. Second, it is because of the high correlation between the 
residuals and the regressors (Sribney, 2007), which leads to larger variance estimates and 
causes most of the coefficient estimates in Table 13 to be insignificant.  
The next three tables (Tables 15-17) respectively repeat the structure and 
methodology as Tables 12-14 using a second set of dependent variables from the Census. 
In other words, the median county households earnings for employed residents from the 
Census is used to replace the average wage per job from the BEA. Meanwhile, the 
imputed housing cost data from the Census is used to replace the fair rent of standardized 
two-bedroom housing unit from the HUD.8 
Table 15 reports the OLS estimates of the differenced wage and rent equation for 
the whole sample (Nall). In contrast to the results from Table12, Table 15 has higher 
adjusted R-squares, indicating a better model fit. In he rent model, the coefficients on 
∆st_individual and ∆st_corporate become negative and statistically significant. 
  
                                                
8 More details on how to calculate the ousing variable can be found in Section 4.1 in the data source. 
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Table 14. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Instrumental 
Variables Estimation with Clustering Method, Dependent variable: ∆wage and 
∆rent 
IV1,cluster  IV2,cluster IV1,cluster  IV2,cluster
∆st_property 0.914 -2.556 -12.221 -10.508
(0.11) (0.80) (1.30) (1.26)
∆st_sales 2.258 0.124 10.164 10.311
(0.20) (0.02) (0.76) (0.86)
∆st_individual -32.673 -10.728 -17.495 -19.000
(1.14) (1.44) (0.36) (0.77)
∆st_corporate 14.413 10.008 44.243 39.216
(0.38) (0.57) (0.88) (0.93)
∆st_rest -1.888 -0.546 -7.616 -6.768
(0.17) (0.10) (0.65) (0.63)
∆st_firstsecond 7.469 3.534 -5.098 -4.113
(1.02) (1.08) (0.60) (0.58)
∆st_hospital -39.741 -22.137 -53.855 -51.642
(0.98) (1.41) (0.80) (1.15)
∆st_highway 6.987 2.361 12.002 12.105
(0.68) (0.54) (0.90) (1.19)
∆st_safety 20.710 22.880 24.355 20.001
(0.55) (1.24) (0.55) (0.50)
∆st_environhousing -6.370 3.039 16.185 12.345
(0.37) (0.48) (0.90) (0.95)
∆st_govtadmin -21.942 -21.490 -23.187 -22.759
(0.74) (1.62) (0.68) (0.71)
∆ct_property -6.237 -0.551 2.299 1.295
(0.89) (0.25) (0.26) (0.32)
∆ct_sales -18.447 -6.672 -12.938 -14.282
(1.08) (1.30) (0.47) (0.97)
∆ct_education 2.616 1.119 1.793 1.944
(0.91) (0.98) (0.32) (0.58)
∆ct_highway 3.895 1.934 2.543 2.632
(1.34) (1.91) (0.66) (1.26)
∆ct_safety 3.766 -1.510 -5.947 -4.647
(0.47) (0.56) (0.72) (1.05)
∆ct_naturalrec -1.098 -0.423 -3.678 -3.787
(0.47) (0.33) (0.76) (0.87)
∆ct_sewerage 0.078 0.008 -0.389 -0.352
(0.05) (0.01) (0.19) (0.19)
Constant 0.209 0.344** -0.113 -0.123
(0.90) (3.62) (0.48) (0.53)
F statistics (All endog. vars. 
=0)
3.87[0.000] 2.30[0.002] 3.94[0.000] 3.77[0.000]
DWH test for endogeneity 33.08[0.016] 25.49[0.112] 32.86[0.017] 32.38[0.020]
Sargan test of exogeneity of 
the instruments
NA 3.91[0.142] NA 1.27[0.530]
Observations 1998 1996 1998 1996
∆wage ∆rent
                                                                                                                   
Notes: Absolute t statistics are in parenthesis are. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% 
level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. ∆wage=ln(wage2002)-ln(wage1992) and ∆rent=ln(fmr02_2)-ln(fmr92_2). Column 
1 in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, 
rec). Column 3 in the rent equation is based on the benchmark Model 3 and Column 4 adds to Column 3 four additional ERS 
variables. IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same as IV1 but instead adding two more 
political voting behavior variables (PRES_REP72, PRES_TO72) as instruments. Standard errors are clustered by BEA defined 





Meanwhile the ∆st_safety variable becomes statistically significant while retaining the 
expected positive sign. The ∆st_highway variable is no longer statistically significant. 
The significance of the unexpected signs on ∆st_firstsecond and ∆ct_sales in Table 12 
vanishes in Table 15. The coefficient on ∆st_sales remains statistically significant with 
unexpected positive sign. In addition, the coefficient on ∆st_property appears to be 
positive and statistically significant, which is contrary to our expectations.  
Table 16 presents the 2SLS results of the differenced wage and rent equation. The 
F-statistic on testing the joint significance of theexcluded instruments in the first stage 
IV regression is high (above 10), indicating that these instruments are strong. However, 
the second set of instruments which includes two political voting variables can not pass 
the overidentification test (p<0.000) in using the C nsus earning and housing cost data, 
casting doubts on the validity of this set of instruments. Turning to the fiscal variables of 
our interest, ∆st_highway and ∆st_safety are positive in both wage and rent equations and 
statistically significant in the rent equation, whic  is consistent with the predictions of 
theory that public investment highway and safety are enjoyed by households and 
contributes positively to firm productivity. The property tax, general sales tax, highway, 
and safety variables at the county level all are found to have the expected sign, but 
statistically insignificant.  
Compared to the OLS estimates in Table 15, the 2SLS approach in Table 16 
produces relatively larger coefficient estimates. Among the major variables of interest, in 
Table 16 the ∆st_highway variable becomes positive and significant and ∆st_safety 
retains its positive sign and is statistically significant. The tax variables, ∆st_individual 
and ∆st_corporate are no longer statistically significant. In addition, the unexpected 
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positive and statistically significant coefficients on ∆st_property and ∆st_sales no longer 
exist. 
Table 17 is the same as Table 16 except that we reported standard errors of the 
coefficient estimates clustered by 174 BEA economic areas. Almost all variables are 
found to be statistically insignificant, the same pattern as we can see in Table 14 when 
using the first set of dependent variables. 
  Next we replicate our analysis in Tables 15-17 using data from the two 
subsamples, N468 and N579. The corresponding results are presented in Appendix 
Tables 17-19. In brief, the OLS results from using the subsample of the nonmetropolitan 
counties nonadjacent to a metro area (N579) are genrally more consistent than with 
these for the full sample (Nall) than the subsample of the nonmetropolitan counties 
adjacent to a metro area (N468). Similarly the 2SLS results from using the subsample of 
N579 are more consistent with these from the full sample than subsample N468. As a 
matter of fact, the 2SLS results from using sample N579 might be better as more fiscal 
variables such as ∆st_property and ∆st_individual reflect better of our expectations, 
though the model using sample N579 faces the same difficulty as that using the full 
sample in satisfying the instrument validity condition.  
 In conclusion, the findings from estimating the differenced equation models in 
this section can be summarized as follows. First, the tax variables, ∆st_individual and 
∆st_rest (selective, license, and other taxes) are found to be consistently significant at 5% 
or 10% with expected negative coefficients by applying the 2SLS techniques to both 
different sets of dependent variables (one from BEA wage and HUD rent and the other 
from Census earning and Census housing cost).  
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Table 15. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Dependent Variables: 
∆earning and ∆housing 
 ∆earning  ∆housing 
 Base Base+ERS  Base Base+ERS 
∆st_property 0.353 0.870  2.160* 2.492* 
 (0.36) (0.93)  (2.00) (2.42) 
∆st_sales 1.530 3.636**  4.001* 4.234** 
 (1.09) (2.62)  (2.56) (2.78) 
∆st_individual -3.423** -3.480**  -6.244** -6.238** 
 (3.24) (3.42)  (5.40) (5.39) 
∆st_corporate 6.250 5.130  -29.373** -27.118** 
 (1.67) (1.43)  (6.92) (6.50) 
∆st_rest -6.217** -4.687**  -8.621** -7.549** 
 (3.75) (2.91)  (5.58) (5.01) 
∆st_firstsecond -0.380 -0.190  1.724 0.666 
 (0.38) (0.19)  (1.62) (0.63) 
∆st_hospital 0.460 -0.310  2.786 3.394 
 (0.26) (0.18)  (1.37) (1.72) 
∆st_highway 1.940 2.260  -0.348 -0.946 
 (1.30) (1.59)  (0.23) (0.65) 
∆st_safety 15.274** 11.283**  11.233** 8.465* 
 (4.57) (3.43)  (3.22) (2.47) 
∆st_environhousing 1.480 0.130  9.635** 9.553** 
 (0.79) (0.07)  (5.25) (5.25) 
∆st_govtadmin -3.400 -2.520  -18.905** -17.064** 
 (1.24) (0.96)  (6.30) (5.71) 
∆ct_property 0.330 0.330  0.297 0.338 
 (0.96) (1.24)  (1.04) (1.13) 
∆ct_sales -2.124* -2.084*  -0.678 -0.421 
 (2.01) (2.17)  (0.57) (0.30) 
∆ct_education -0.170 -0.100  -0.170 -0.130 
 (0.75) (0.45)  (0.74) (0.56) 
∆ct_highway 0.630 0.000  0.120 -0.143 
 (0.91) (0.01)  (0.19) (0.24) 
∆ct_safety 0.650 0.450  -0.124 -0.072 
 (0.95) (0.64)  (0.12) (0.07) 
∆ct_naturalrec 0.000 0.050  -0.177 -0.182 
 0.00  (0.14)  (0.34) (0.37) 
∆ct_sewerage 0.120 0.220  -0.114 0.317 
 (0.16) (0.33)  (0.17) (0.50) 
Constant 0.292** -0.010  0.750** 0.713** 
 (3.27) (0.13)  (7.62) (7.20) 
Observations 1998 1998  1998 1998 
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.54  0.50 0.53 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, 
** significant at 1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. Data for wage and rent are from the Census. 
∆earning=ln(earning00)-ln(earning90) and ∆housing=ln(housing00)-ln(housing90). Column 1 in the wage equation is 
based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, rec). 






Table 16. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Instrumental 
Variables Estimation, Dependent variable: ∆earning and ∆housing 
IV1 IV2  IV1 IV2
∆st_property 6.434 0.108 9.566 -7.346
(1.25) (0.04) (0.46) (1.74)
∆st_sales 9.543 6.526 15.246 6.350
(1.35) (1.51) (0.57) (0.95)
∆st_individual -37.014 -5.209 -158.842 -27.354
(1.83) (0.81) (1.56) (1.92)
∆st_corporate 18.393 17.364 81.357 6.694
(0.88) (1.38) (0.79) (0.30)
∆st_rest -2.598 -1.753 -36.256 -26.485**
(0.37) (0.40) (1.35) (3.99)
∆st_firstsecond 4.810 -1.796 15.680 -4.277
(0.93) (0.70) (0.74) (1.02)
∆st_hospital -28.992 -6.703 -217.869 -66.048*
(1.20) (0.55) (1.52) (2.50)
∆st_highway 6.274 0.023 37.339 26.440**
(0.91) (0.01) (1.58) (4.59)
∆st_safety 11.216 17.719 107.282 54.322*
(0.54) (1.36) (1.06) (2.27)
∆st_environhousing -11.622 4.726 1.855 28.691**
(1.00) (0.86) (0.05) (3.28)
∆st_govtadmin -4.870 -3.784 -72.578 -45.631**
(0.32) (0.40) (1.11) (2.81)
∆ct_property -8.692 0.103 -35.833 -0.389
(1.59) (0.05) (1.31) (0.10)
∆ct_sales -19.466 -2.018 -94.509 -12.761
(1.66) (0.46) (1.42) (1.25)
∆ct_education 4.170* 2.090* 19.438 4.158
(2.07) (2.06) (1.44) (1.78)
∆ct_highway -1.189 -3.963** 12.271 0.709
(0.53) (3.88) (1.21) (0.40)
∆ct_safety 13.126* 4.632 36.111 1.334
(2.15) (1.70) (1.22) (0.28)
∆ct_naturalrec -0.361 0.594 -10.456 -3.607
(0.17) (0.45) (1.09) (1.66)
∆ct_sewerage 1.275 1.171 -0.120 -0.827
(0.73) (1.07) (0.02) (0.47)
Constant 0.108 0.319** 0.300 0.606**
(0.60) (3.54) (0.51) (4.30)
F statistics (All endog. vars. 
=0)
5.34[0.000] 5.62[0.000] 22.98[0.000] 21.68[0.000]
DWH test for endogeneity 115.28[0.000] 123.75[0.000] 329.77[0.000] 227.01[0.000]
Sargan test of exogeneity of 
the instruments
NA 13.23[0.000] NA 35.88[0.000]
Observations 1998 1996 1998 1996
∆housing∆earning
 
Notes: Absolute t statistics are in parenthesis. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant 
at 1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. Data for wage and rent are from the Census. 
∆earning=ln(earning00)-ln(earning90) and ∆housing=ln(housing00)-ln(housing90). Column 1 in the wage equation is 
based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, rec). 
Column 3 in the rent equation is based on the benchmark Model 3 and Column 4 adds to Column 3 four additional ERS 
variables. IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same as IV1 but instead adding 




Table 17. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, Instrumental Variables 
Estimation with Clustering Method, Dependent variable: ∆earning and ∆housing 
IV1,cluster IV2,cluster IV1,cluster IV2,cluster
∆st_property 6.434 0.108 9.566 -7.346
(0.77) (0.03) (0.27) (0.86)
∆st_sales 9.543 6.526 15.246 6.350
(0.82) (1.02) (0.30) (0.39)
∆st_individual -37.014 -5.209 -158.842 -27.354
(1.13) (0.46) (0.81) (0.78)
∆st_corporate 18.393 17.364 81.357 6.694
(0.48) (0.93) (0.36) (0.13)
∆st_rest -2.598 -1.753 -36.256 -26.485
(0.22) (0.28) (0.69) (1.70)
∆st_firstsecond 4.810 -1.796 15.680 -4.277
(0.58) (0.41) (0.41) (0.47)
∆st_hospital -28.992 -6.703 -217.869 -66.048
(0.66) (0.33) (0.70) (0.94)
∆st_highway 6.274 0.023 37.339 26.440*
(0.56) 0.00 (0.82) (2.26)
∆st_safety 11.216 17.719 107.282 54.322
(0.27) (1.03) (0.44) (0.83)
∆st_environhousing -11.622 4.726 1.855 28.691
(0.67) (0.64) (0.02) (1.30)
∆st_govtadmin -4.870 -3.784 -72.578 -45.631
(0.15) (0.26) (0.40) (0.89)
∆ct_property -8.692 0.103 -35.833 -0.389
(0.94) (0.04) (0.79) (0.05)
∆ct_sales -19.466 -2.018 -94.509 -12.761
(1.07) (0.24) (0.80) (0.57)
∆ct_education 4.170 2.090 19.438 4.158
(1.27) (1.26) (0.82) (0.78)
∆ct_highway -1.189 -3.963* 12.271 0.709
(0.28) (2.12) (0.66) (0.22)
∆ct_safety 13.126 4.632 36.111 1.334
(1.22) (1.15) (0.76) (0.17)
∆ct_naturalrec -0.361 0.594 -10.456 -3.607
(0.13) (0.34) (0.64) (0.79)
∆ct_sewerage 1.275 1.171 -0.120 -0.827
(0.65) (0.94) (0.02) (0.37)
Constant 0.108 0.319* 0.300 0.606**
(0.39) (2.54) (0.30) (2.67)
F statistics (All endog. vars. 
=0)
3.33[0.000] 3.35[0.000] 7.09[0.000] 6.71[0.000]
DWH test for endogeneity 30.51[0.03] 26.79[0.083] 34.91[0.010] 17.34[0.500]
Sargan test of exogeneity of the 
instruments
NA 7.41[0.025] NA 8.11[0.017]
Observations 1998 1996 1998 1996
∆earning ∆housing
 
Notes: Absolute t statistics are in parenthesis. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant 
at 1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. Data for wage and rent are from the Census. 
∆earning=ln(earning00)-ln(earning90) and ∆housing=ln(housing00)-ln(housing90). Column 1 in the wage equation is 
based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, rec). 
Column 3 in the rent equation is based on the benchmark Model 3 and Column 4 adds to Column 3 four additional ERS 
variables. IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same as IV1 but instead adding 
two more political voting behavior variables (PRES_REP72, PRES_TO72) as instruments. Standard errors are 
clustered by BEA defined economic areas. NA stands for not applicable. Number of Clusters is 174. 
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Second, the 2SLS coefficient magnitudes are generally larger than those from 
OLS. In addition, the 2SLS estimates appear to be bett r than the OLS estimates in both 
cases as mentioned, not only because more variables me t our expectation, but also 
because the 2SLS approach in this study accounts for possible endogeneity bias arising 
from the OLS approach. 
Third, when taking into account of intra-cluster corelation, the significance of 
almost all coefficient estimates vanishes, which could be due to the two reasons as 
mentioned before. The first is that we do not know the exact form of correlation, as a 
result, the estimation of the standard errors could be wrong if the modeling of the 
correlation caused by clustering is not correct. The second reason is that there exists a 
high correlation between the residuals and the regressors.9 
Fourth, the differenced equation estimates in this section are found to be better 
than the level estimates in Section 5.2, not only because it takes the endogeneity issue 
into consideration, but also because, as mentioned earlier, there are several advantages in 
using the differenced equation approach: (1) it eliminates possible county fixed effects 
that bias our coefficients, (2) it reduces severity of multicollinearity among explanatory 
variables. 
Fifth, turning to the differenced equation model in this section, using the 
measurement of wage and rent from the Census seems to provide us better results. This is 
possible and reasonable if we recognize the nature of the labor and land markets in the 
nonmetropolitan areas. Our focus is on nonmetropolitan counties and noticing that in 
                                                
9 Error spatial dependence is often interpreted as a nuisance (Anselin, 1988), which reflects spatial 
autocorrelation in measurement errors. Correlations in residuals can arise because of we treat the counties 
with arbitrary boundaries into separate jurisdiction units, however, these counties may share common 




nonmetropolitan areas, we observe that household usually has earnings from more than 
one job, the Census measures the wage (or earning) of each household by adding together 
the earnings of each job, while the BEA measures th wage on a per job basis. Therefore, 
Census earning data could be better in reflecting the nonmetropolitan labor market. 
Similarly the Census rent data (based on housing value) could be better than the HUD 
rent data (based on apartment rent) in reflecting nonmetropolitan land market, as 
nonmetropolitan households generally have a higher homeownership rate and there are 
relatively few rental activities going on in the nonmetropolitan areas. 
   
5.3 Growth Model Results 
 
This section reports the regression results of a regional growth model of wages and rents 
using mainly equation (31), where the dependent variable is defined as growth from 
1992-2002 and the explanatory variables are mainly initial period fiscal policy variables.  
We conduct the regression analysis in four major steps and the coefficient 
estimates are reported in Tables 18A-31B: 1) Tables 18A-B are the results for the wage 
and rent equations, respectively, which are followed by Tables 19A-B that present how 
the previous results are robust to the cluster method. 2) Tables 20A-21B replicate the 
processes in the first step by using alternative measurements of wages and rent from the 
Census earning and housing value data. 3) Tables 22-29 follow the same processes in 
step 1 and 2 while considering SBSI variables as additional explanatory variables. 4) 
Tables 30A-31B present the corresponding results done in step 3 by breaking up the 




As the results of Chow test (Appendix Table 20) from Tables 18-29 all uniformly 
indicate that the calculated F statistic is greater than the critical value at the 5% 
significance level, which justifies our implementations of running subsample regressions 
as well as the full sample regression. 
Table 18A presents the OLS results of the wage growth model for the entire 
sample (Nall) and two subsamples (N468 and N579), respectively. Columns 1 (3, or 5) 
uses the explanatory variables based on Model 4 (mentioned in Section 5.1, the base 
model therein) which, except initial fiscal variables, includes additional amenity 
variables, Census dummies and initial demographic variables. Similarly, Column 2 (4, or 
6) includes additional four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, rec) to the base model. 
The same structures are followed in the rent equation specification in Table 18B, except 
the base model used is based on Model 3 (i.e., removing the demographic variables from 
Model 4 in the rent equation). 
 Turning to the results in both Tables 18A-18B, the models for wages and rent are 
found to have low adjusted R-squares, indicating low goodness of fit. The state t x 
variables are generally found to be negative and statistically significant as expected in the 
rent equation (Table 18B) and consistent within samples. In addition, state expenditures 
on education, highway, and public safety (stl92_firstsecond, stl92_highway, 
stl92_publicsafety) appear to have the expected positive sign but statistic lly 
insignificant. With respect to county fiscal variables, the coefficient on education is 
generally statistically significant signed as positive and expected. However the negative 
and statistically significant coefficient on cty92highway contradicts our expectation, 
which can not be explained simply as that households r firms do not prefer highway 
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investment by county government. In contrast to the estimates from the rent model, the 
coefficient estimates in the wage model (Table 18A) are less convincing. The major fiscal 
variables of interest are found to be statistically insignificant, even though the state tax 
variables are generally found to be consistently negative and state expenditure variables 
are consistently positive. The above results generally hold when taking into consideration 
intra-cluster correlation as shown in Tables 19A-19B, implying that the clustered and 
unclustered variance estimators are approximately th  same, which also implies that it is 
appropriate to apply the OLS method to the growth equation.  
 Next we conduct the above analysis using Census earning and housing data to 
examine the sensitivity of the results to different ou come variable measurements. The 
corresponding results are presented in Tables 20A and 20B for wage and rent 
respectively. In contrast to the earlier results in Tables 18A-18B, models in Tables 20A-
20B using the Census earning and housing data as depen nt variables consistently have 
better model fit as reflected by the higher R-squares.  
Compared to the rent model in Table 18B, state tax variables retain their expected 
negative sign and significance in Table 20B. In addition, state expenditure variables such 
as stl92_firstsecond, stl92_highway, and stl92_publicsafety become statistically 
significant positive. The statistically significant positive cty92sales becomes negative and 
no longer significant. However, the coefficient on cty92safety is found to be negative and 
statistically significant, which is not accordance with our prediction. 
Compared to the wage model in Table 18A, state tax variables retain their 
negative sign in Table 20A. In addition, state general sales tax and individual income tax  
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Table 18A. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 
Respectively, Dependent variable: ∆wage/ln(wage1992) 
  Nall   N468   N579 
  Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS 
stl92_property 0.019 0.033  0.040 0.058  -0.046 -0.025 
 (0.34) (0.63)  (0.52) (0.80)  (0.55) (0.30) 
stl92_general_sales -0.065 -0.021  -0.128 -0.105  -0.060 0.007 
 (0.99) (0.33)  (1.38) (1.17)  (0.58) (0.07) 
stl92_individual_income -0.070 -0.050  -0.148* -0.144*  -0.030 0.010 
 (1.64) (1.20)  (2.13) (2.18)  (0.47) (0.10) 
stl92_corporate_income -0.179 -0.233  -0.111 -0.123  -0.268 -0.376 
 (1.13) (1.51)  (0.55) (0.64)  (0.95) (1.33) 
stl92_rest -0.341** -0.215*  -0.429** -0.317*  -0.215 -0.066 
 (3.98) (2.56)  (3.14) (2.51)  (1.71) (0.54) 
stl92_firstsecond 0.140 0.100  0.170 0.140  0.090 0.010 
 (1.85) (1.32)  (1.45) (1.28)  (0.77) (0.11) 
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.175 0.091  0.056 0.022  0.630* 0.463 
 (1.19) (0.63)  (0.28) (0.11)  (2.53) (1.89) 
stl92_highway 0.182 0.116  0.199 0.211  0.215 0.077 
 (1.75) (1.10)  (1.24) (1.33)  (1.48) (0.55) 
stl92_publicsafety 0.150 0.050  -0.090 -0.190  0.53 0.460 
 (0.93) (0.30)  (0.39) (0.92)  (1.95) (1.76) 
stl92_environhousing 0.087 0.140  0.160 0.215  0.117 0.231 
 (0.71) (1.19)  (0.91) (1.27)  (0.58) (1.21) 
stl92_govtadmin -0.957** -0.731**  -0.767* -0.687  -1.661** -1.246** 
 (3.42) (2.67)  (2.08) (1.91)  (3.64) (2.85) 
cty92property -0.030 -0.010  -0.058* -0.050  0.000 0.020 
 (1.80) (0.67)  (2.15) (1.61)  (0.09) (0.79) 
cty92sales -0.001 0.009  -0.041 -0.031  -0.011 0.015 
 (0.01) (0.17)  (0.54) (0.38)  (0.11) (0.17) 
cty92education 0.008 -0.001  -0.007 -0.011  0.024 0.011 
 (0.58) (0.09)  (0.33) (0.49)  (1.20) (0.54) 
cty92highway -0.060 -0.060  0.060 0.060  -0.040 -0.05  
 (1.07) (1.21)  (1.16) (1.18)  (0.60) (0.85) 
cty92safety 0.016 0.047  0.018 0.034  -0.233 -0.152 
 (0.20) (0.59)  (0.19) (0.38)  (1.71) (1.13) 
cty92naturalrec 0.080 0.077  0.019 0.022  0.156 0.144 
 (0.60) (0.57)  (0.20) (0.21)  (0.69) (0.64) 
cty92sewerage 0.010 0.000  -0.030 -0.030  0.130 0.130 
 (0.14) (0.02)  (0.38) (0.41)  (1.30) (1.36) 
Constant 0.110** 0.083**  0.076* 0.039  0.167** 0.136** 
 (4.12) (3.09)  (2.08) (1.03)  (4.47) (3.63) 
Observations 1998 1998  1040 1040  958 958 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.22   0.16 0.20   0.19 0.25 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4. Column 2 (4, or 6) adds to Column 1 four 





 Table 18B. Growth Equation Model Resutls for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 
Respectively, Dependent variable: ∆rent/ln(rent1992) 
  Nall   N468   N579 
  Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS 
stl92_property -0.040 -0.044  -0.381* -0.396*  0.251 0.268 
 (0.39) (0.42)  (2.44) (2.53)  (1.75) (1.87) 
stl92_general_sales -0.305* -0.268*  -0.340 -0.324  -0.328 -0.273 
 (2.25) (1.97)  (1.59) (1.52)  (1.66) (1.40) 
stl92_individual_income -0.414** -0.387**  -0.532** -0.516**  -0.410** -0.379** 
 (4.73) (4.43)  (3.41) (3.32)  (3.69) (3.44) 
stl92_corporate_income -1.116** -1.157**  -1.339** -1.312**  -1.049* -1.129* 
 (3.28) (3.40)  (2.73) (2.69)  (2.20) (2.39) 
stl92_rest -1.097** -1.027**  -1.273** -1.260**  -1.024** -0.911** 
 (6.44) (6.04)  (4.67) (4.63)  (4.43) (3.94) 
stl92_firstsecond 0.290 0.250  0.547* 0.515*  -0.05 -0.120 
 (1.72) (1.51)  (2.11) (1.99)  (0.22) (0.55) 
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.366 0.316  0.076 0.050  0.606 0.484 
 (1.09) (0.94)  (0.17) (0.11)  (1.11) (0.88) 
stl92_highway 0.135 0.088  -0.232 -0.255  0.658* 0.588 
 (0.58) (0.38)  (0.63) (0.70)  (2.04) (1.83) 
stl92_publicsafety 0.560 0.490  0.900 0.840  0.330 0.270 
 (1.52) (1.33)  (1.69) (1.58)  (0.61) (0.51) 
stl92_environhousing -0.141 -0.123  0.695 0.736  -0.831** -0.813* 
 (0.57) (0.50)  (1.73) (1.86)  (2.58) (2.53) 
stl92_govtadmin 2.033** 2.211**  2.855** 2.995**  1.239 1.529 
 (3.57) (3.89)  (3.58) (3.75)  (1.40) (1.73) 
cty92property -0.020 -0.010  0.030 0.030  -0.020 -0.01  
 (0.67) (0.32)  (0.74) (0.85)  (0.69) (0.46) 
cty92sales 0.311 0.298  0.172 0.143  0.392 0.392 
 (1.73) (1.70)  (0.84) (0.71)  (1.44) (1.49) 
cty92education 0.064** 0.066**  0.062 0.062  0.070** 0.073** 
 (3.03) (3.15)  (1.82) (1.84)  (2.67) (2.81) 
cty92highway -0.117* -0.112*  -0.306** -0.309**  -0. 30 -0.040 
 (2.32) (2.21)  (2.87) (2.88)  (0.57) (0.68) 
cty92safety 0.129 0.140  0.027 0.047  0.361 0.386 
 (0.76) (0.81)  (0.11) (0.20)  (1.64) (1.65) 
cty92naturalrec -0.020 -0.021  0.084 0.093  -0.233 -0.244 
 (0.11) (0.11)  (0.40) (0.45)  (0.94) (0.96) 
cty92sewerage 0.180 0.170  0.040 0.040  0.380 0.360 
 (1.24) (1.17)  (0.22) (0.22)  (1.88) (1.81) 
Constant -0.024 -0.024  -0.039 -0.033  -0.007 -0.014 
 (1.71) (1.67)  (1.89) (1.56)  (0.41) (0.78) 
Observations 1998 1998  1040 1040  958 958 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28   0.29 0.29   0.29 0.29 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 3. Column 2 (4, or 6) 1 adds to Column 1 four 






Table 19A. Growth Equation Model Results with Clustering Method for Sample 
Nall, N468, and N579 Respectively, Dependent variable: ∆wage/ln(wage1992) 
  Nall   N468   N579 
  Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS 
stl92_property 0.019 0.033  0.040 0.058  -0.046 -0.025 
 (0.30) (0.57)  (0.44) (0.75)  (0.53) (0.29) 
stl92_general_sales -0.065 -0.021  -0.128 -0.105  -0.060 0.007 
 (0.80) (0.28)  (1.17) (1.10)  (0.55) (0.06) 
stl92_individual_income -0.071 -0.050  -0.148 -0.144*  -0.030 0.006 
 (1.41) (1.10)  (1.95) (2.18)  (0.45) (0.11) 
stl92_corporate_income -0.179 -0.233  -0.111 -0.123  -0.268 -0.376 
 (1.09) (1.50)  (0.53) (0.62)  (1.04) (1.49) 
stl92_rest -0.341** -0.215*  -0.429** -0.317*  -0.215 -0.066 
 (3.59) (2.31)  (2.87) (2.40)  (1.73) (0.52) 
stl92_firstsecond 0.144 0.098  0.171 0.142  0.091 0.012 
 (1.70) (1.32)  (1.16) (1.13)  (0.84) (0.13) 
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.175 0.091  0.056 0.022  0.630** 0.463 
 (1.17) (0.60)  (0.28) (0.11)  (2.72) (1.97) 
stl92_highway 0.182 0.116  0.199 0.211  0.215 0.077 
 (1.38) (0.85)  (1.07) (1.17)  (1.57) (0.59) 
stl92_publicsafety 0.151 0.046  -0.088 -0.193  0.531 0.460 
 (0.79) (0.26)  (0.35) (0.87)  (1.80) (1.66) 
stl92_environhousing 0.087 0.140  0.160 0.215  0.117 0.231 
 (0.73) (1.13)  (1.02) (1.39)  (0.64) (1.28) 
stl92_govtadmin -0.957** -0.731*  -0.767 -0.687  -1.661** -1.246** 
 (2.77) (2.21)  (1.97) (1.86)  (3.57) (2.87) 
cty92property -0.029 -0.011  -0.058 -0.047  0.002 0.017 
 (1.95) (0.73)  (1.97) (1.46)  (0.11) (1.01) 
cty92sales -0.001 0.009  -0.041 -0.031  -0.011 0.015 
 (0.01) (0.16)  (0.50) (0.35)  (0.13) (0.18) 
cty92education 0.008 -0.001  -0.007 -0.011  0.024 0.011 
 (0.55) (0.09)  (0.35) (0.53)  (1.15) (0.52) 
cty92highway -0.057 -0.057*  0.059 0.059  -0.042 -0.051 
 (1.83) (2.20)  (1.03) (1.03)  (0.97) (1.54) 
cty92safety 0.016 0.047  0.018 0.034  -0.233 -0.152 
 (0.19) (0.59)  (0.20) (0.40)  (1.59) (1.07) 
cty92naturalrec 0.080 0.077  0.019 0.022  0.156 0.144 
 (0.61) (0.59)  (0.20) (0.21)  (0.71) (0.66) 
cty92sewerage 0.008 0.001  -0.030 -0.034  0.129 0.131 
 (0.14) (0.02)  (0.39) (0.42)  (1.27) (1.38) 
Constant 0.110** 0.083**  0.076* 0.039  0.167** 0.136** 
 (4.06) (2.96)  (2.19) (1.06)  (4.20) (3.23) 
Observations 1998 1998  1040 1040  958 958 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.22   0.16 0.20   0.19 0.25 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4. Column 2 (4, or 6) adds to Column 1 four 






Table 19B. Growth Equation Model Results with Clustering Method for Sample 
Nall, N468, and N579 Respectively, Dependent variable: ∆rent/ln(rent1992) 
  Nall   N468   N579 
  Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS 
stl92_property -0.040 -0.044  -0.381* -0.396*  0.251 0.268 
 (0.27) (0.28)  (2.01) (2.08)  (1.34) (1.46) 
stl92_general_sales -0.305 -0.268  -0.340 -0.324  -0.328 -0.273 
 (1.30) (1.14)  (1.30) (1.24)  (1.24) (1.06) 
stl92_individual_income -0.414** -0.387*  -0.532** -0.516**  -0.410* -0.379* 
 (2.71) (2.52)  (2.90) (2.81)  (2.19) (2.05) 
stl92_corporate_income -1.116* -1.157*  -1.339* -1.312*  -1.049 -1.129 
 (2.10) (2.20)  (2.36) (2.33)  (1.44) (1.57) 
stl92_rest -1.097** -1.027**  -1.273** -1.260**  -1.024** -0.911* 
 (3.66) (3.38)  (4.05) (3.97)  (2.84) (2.44) 
stl92_firstsecond 0.285 0.249  0.547 0.515  -0.047 -0.117 
 (1.11) (0.99)  (1.64) (1.56)  (0.16) (0.42) 
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.366 0.316  0.076 0.050  0.606 0.484 
 (0.71) (0.60)  (0.13) (0.09)  (0.73) (0.57) 
stl92_highway 0.135 0.088  -0.232 -0.255  0.658 0.588 
 (0.29) (0.20)  (0.49) (0.54)  (1.14) (1.03) 
stl92_publicsafety 0.556 0.485  0.902 0.844  0.334 0.269 
 (0.80) (0.70)  (1.27) (1.20)  (0.36) (0.29) 
stl92_environhousing -0.141 -0.123  0.695 0.736  -0.831 -0.813 
 (0.34) (0.30)  (1.56) (1.68)  (1.61) (1.58) 
stl92_govtadmin 2.033 2.211*  2.855* 2.995**  1.239 1.529 
 (1.91) (2.10)  (2.59) (2.73)  (0.88) (1.09) 
cty92property -0.016 -0.008  0.027 0.032  -0.022 -0.014 
 (0.60) (0.29)  (0.60) (0.68)  (0.83) (0.57) 
cty92sales 0.311* 0.298*  0.172 0.143  0.392* 0.392* 
 (2.24) (2.15)  (0.74) (0.63)  (2.56) (2.52) 
cty92education 0.064* 0.066*  0.062 0.062  0.070* 0.073* 
 (2.48) (2.50)  (1.69) (1.69)  (2.46) (2.48) 
cty92highway -0.117* -0.112*  -0.306** -0.309**  -0. 29 -0.035 
 (2.09) (1.99)  (2.70) (2.67)  (0.56) (0.68) 
cty92safety 0.129 0.140  0.027 0.047  0.361 0.386 
 (0.69) (0.74)  (0.11) (0.19)  (1.64) (1.62) 
cty92naturalrec -0.020 -0.021  0.084 0.093  -0.233 -0.244 
 (0.10) (0.11)  (0.42) (0.47)  (0.95) (0.98) 
cty92sewerage 0.183 0.173  0.039 0.040  0.383 0.358 
 (1.33) (1.25)  (0.23) (0.23)  (1.68) (1.65) 
Constant -0.024 -0.024  -0.039 -0.033  -0.007 -0.014 
 (1.09) (1.11)  (1.57) (1.35)  (0.28) (0.54) 
Observations 1998 1998  1040 1040  958 958 
Adjusted R-squared 0.28 0.28   0.29 0.29   0.29 0.29 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 3. Column 2 (4, or 6) 1 adds to Column 1 four 







Table 20A. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 
Respectively, Dependent variable: ∆earning/ln(earning1990) 
  Nall   N468   N579 
  Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS 
stl92_property -0.097 -0.084  -0.080 -0.058  -0.073 -0.050 
 (1.39) (1.24)  (0.84) (0.62)  (0.67) (0.47) 
stl92_general_sales -0.310** -0.247**  -0.497** -0.420**  -0.210 -0.132 
 (3.57) (2.93)  (4.18) (3.75)  (1.54) (0.98) 
stl92_individual_income -0.138* -0.106  -0.209* -0.158  -0.141 -0.106 
 (2.30) (1.83)  (2.26) (1.80)  (1.60) (1.28) 
stl92_corporate_income -0.229 -0.319  -0.256 -0.282  0.048 -0.173 
 (1.11) (1.61)  (1.02) (1.15)  (0.12) (0.47) 
stl92_rest -0.602** -0.437**  -0.588** -0.424**  -0.602** -0.421* 
 (5.05) (3.66)  (3.72) (2.76)  (3.13) (2.18) 
stl92_firstsecond 0.159 0.138  0.492** 0.451**  -0.334 -0.347 
 (1.53) (1.38)  (3.82) (3.70)  (1.82) (1.94) 
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.018 -0.096  0.191 0.007  -0.08  -0.269 
 (0.09) (0.47)  (0.75) (0.03)  (0.20) (0.70) 
stl92_highway 0.460** 0.261  0.478* 0.319  0.549* 0.294 
 (3.05) (1.75)  (2.06) (1.43)  (2.19) (1.22) 
stl92_publicsafety 0.252 0.166  0.652* 0.547*  0.06 0.019 
 (1.15) (0.80)  (2.31) (2.01)  (0.15) (0.05) 
stl92_environhousing 0.034 0.184  -0.034 0.110  0.418 0.606* 
 (0.20) (1.09)  (0.13) (0.45)  (1.46) (2.12) 
stl92_govtadmin -0.873* -0.444  -1.833** -1.458**  -0.317 0.280 
 (2.28) (1.20)  (3.91) (3.26)  (0.48) (0.45) 
cty92property -0.043 -0.014  -0.097** -0.065*  0.006 0.025 
 (1.91) (0.64)  (3.94) (2.31)  (0.19) (0.79) 
cty92sales 0.049 0.092  0.122 0.187  -0.060 -0.005 
 (0.68) (1.26)  (1.22) (1.85)  (0.51) (0.04) 
cty92education 0.008 -0.012  0.045 0.032  0.008 -0.016 
 (0.36) (0.59)  (1.64) (1.15)  (0.26) (0.53) 
cty92highway 0.147** 0.134*  0.133* 0.066  0.199** 0.185** 
 (3.00) (2.40)  (2.15) (1.08)  (3.46) (2.90) 
cty92safety -0.193 -0.123  -0.263* -0.217*  -0.329 -0.181 
 (1.88) (1.23)  (2.57) (2.21)  (1.79) (1.00) 
cty92naturalrec 0.017 0.000  0.060 0.068  -0.130 -0.152 
 (0.23) 0.00   (0.91) (0.91)  (0.89) (0.97) 
cty92sewerage -0.120 -0.107  -0.128 -0.115  -0.034 -0.026 
 (1.37) (1.27)  (1.44) (1.37)  (0.21) (0.16) 
Constant 0.189** 0.135**  0.161** 0.106*  0.231** 0.161** 
 (4.87) (3.49)  (3.36) (2.14)  (4.01) (2.82) 
Observations 1998 1998  1040 1040  958 958 
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.61   0.56 0.59   0.58 0.61 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4. Column 2 (4, or 6) adds to Column 1 four 






Table 20B. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 
Respectively, Dependent variable: ∆housing/ln(housing1990) 
  Nall   N468   N579 
  Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS 
stl92_property -0.384** -0.324*  -0.309 -0.266  -0.745** -0.631** 
 (2.87) (2.44)  (1.72) (1.53)  (3.45) (2.93) 
stl92_general_sales -0.619** -0.510**  -0.809** -0.718**  -0.752** -0.611* 
 (3.81) (3.13)  (3.73) (3.35)  (2.86) (2.32) 
stl92_individual_income -0.262* -0.222*  -0.452** -0.405*  -0.117 -0.068 
 (2.32) (1.97)  (2.74) (2.50)  (0.68) (0.41) 
stl92_corporate_income -1.851** -2.005**  -1.238** -1.318**  -3.718** -3.944** 
 (4.93) (5.36)  (2.86) (3.02)  (5.31) (5.69) 
stl92_rest -1.525** -1.313**  -1.070** -0.866**  -2.523** -2.254** 
 (7.86) (6.85)  (4.12) (3.36)  (8.33) (7.50) 
stl92_firstsecond 1.044** 0.980**  1.115** 1.098**  1.342** 1.152** 
 (5.33) (5.06)  (4.46) (4.50)  (4.36) (3.85) 
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.132 0.064  -0.521 -0.547  2.738** 2.430** 
 (0.34) (0.17)  (1.21) (1.28)  (4.01) (3.60) 
stl92_highway 0.754** 0.715**  0.580 0.593  1.466** 1.335** 
 (2.76) (2.67)  (1.44) (1.49)  (3.40) (3.14) 
stl92_publicsafety 1.724** 1.473**  1.118* 0.855  2.312** 2.003** 
 (4.11) (3.58)  (2.04) (1.59)  (3.14) (2.82) 
stl92_environhousing -2.435** -2.403**  -2.424** -2.348**  -2.450** -2.405** 
 (8.00) (8.05)  (5.51) (5.47)  (5.18) (5.29) 
stl92_govtadmin -1.512* -1.387*  -2.305* -2.322**  -3.419** -2.795* 
 (2.15) (1.98)  (2.58) (2.62)  (2.95) (2.46) 
cty92property -0.083 -0.060  -0.173** -0.146**  0.035 0.040 
 (1.96) (1.33)  (3.71) (3.29)  (0.58) (0.62) 
cty92sales -0.004 0.034  0.242 0.312  -0.391 -0.333 
 (0.03) (0.19)  (1.29) (1.63)  (1.59) (1.34) 
cty92education -0.021 -0.012  0.105* 0.120**  -0.127** -0.113* 
 (0.65) (0.36)  (2.46) (2.86)  (2.96) (2.58) 
cty92highway 0.191 0.171  0.679** 0.627**  0.093 0.038 
 (1.66) (1.58)  (5.46) (5.18)  (0.72) (0.31) 
cty92safety -0.520* -0.471*  -0.799** -0.759**  -0.466 -0.324 
 (2.20) (2.03)  (3.64) (3.53)  (1.16) (0.86) 
cty92naturalrec 0.205 0.200  0.168 0.189  0.096 0.075 
 (1.19) (1.22)  (0.81) (1.00)  (0.31) (0.24) 
cty92sewerage 0.288 0.216  0.098 0.055  0.315 0.211 
 (1.75) (1.40)  (0.42) (0.26)  (1.47) (0.99) 
Constant 0.213** 0.176*  0.207* 0.175  0.284** 0.219* 
 (2.94) (2.30)  (2.22) (1.72)  (2.63) (2.01) 
Observations 1998 1998  1040 1040  958 958 
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.58   0.61 0.63   0.53 0.54 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 3. Column 2 (4, or 6) 1 adds to Column 1 four 






(stl92_general_sales, stl92_individual_income) appear to be statistically significant. On 
the other hand, state expenditures on education, highway, and public safety 
(stl92_firstsecond, stl92_highway, stl92_publicsafety) retain their positive signs. In 
addition, state level and county level highway expenditures are shown to have positive 
and statistical effects on wage growth. 
The next two tables (Tables 21A-21B) replicate the analysis done in Tables 20A-
20B by accounting for spatial cluster effects. The results from both wage and rent models 
using the second set of measurement of dependent variables is found to be more sensitive 
to specification of intra-cluster correlation than the first one. For instance, the statistical 
significance of the fiscal variables such as stl92_property, stl92_general_sales, 
stl92_individual_income, stl92_highway vanishes when the cluster method is applied. 
Furthermore, we conduct additional analyses to check whether the corresponding 
results from the above Tables 18A-21B are robust to including additional SBSI and ERS 
variables. These results are reported in Tables 22-29. Briefly, we find that: 1) including 
additional SBSI and ERS variables does not produce bett r results. 2) The coefficient 
estimates from the models using Census earning and housing data are generally better 
than using the set of BEA wage and HUD rent data being consistent with the theoretical 
predictions. For instance, the negative coefficients i  the rent model and positive 
coefficients in the wage model for the two tax variables, stl92_property, 
stl92_general_sales and top_pi are consistent with the prediction that neither firms nor 
households prefer higher taxes and in equilibrium, households should be compensated by 
locating in an area with higher taxes, ceteris paribus. 3) The variance estimators using the 
clustered method overall are larger than these using the unclustered one. This implies that  
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Table 21A. Growth Equation Model Results with Clustering Method for Sample 
Nall, N468 and N579 Respectively, Dependent variable: ∆earning/ln(earning1990) 
  Nall   N468   N579 
  Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS 
stl92_property -0.097 -0.084  -0.080 -0.058  -0.073 -0.050 
 (0.96) (0.85)  (0.72) (0.57)  (0.54) (0.39) 
stl92_general_sales -0.310* -0.247*  -0.497** -0.420**  -0.210 -0.132 
 (2.52) (2.03)  (3.39) (3.06)  (1.19) (0.81) 
stl92_individual_income -0.138 -0.106  -0.209 -0.158  -0.141 -0.106 
 (1.45) (1.15)  (1.79) (1.48)  (1.06) (0.90) 
stl92_corporate_income -0.229 -0.319  -0.256 -0.282  0.048 -0.173 
 (0.82) (1.24)  (0.85) (0.99)  (0.10) (0.38) 
stl92_rest -0.602** -0.437*  -0.588** -0.424*  -0.602* -0.421 
 (3.07) (2.20)  (2.80) (2.11)  (2.54) (1.77) 
stl92_firstsecond 0.159 0.138  0.492** 0.451**  -0.334 -0.347 
 (1.14) (1.06)  (3.23) (3.31)  (1.59) (1.74) 
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.018 -0.096  0.191 0.007  -0.08  -0.269 
 (0.05) (0.28)  (0.56) (0.02)  (0.14) (0.50) 
stl92_highway 0.460 0.261  0.478 0.319  0.549 0.294 
 (1.63) (0.95)  (1.53) (1.07)  (1.38) (0.83) 
stl92_publicsafety 0.252 0.166  0.652 0.547  0.060 0.019 
 (0.72) (0.51)  (1.77) (1.59)  (0.10) (0.04) 
stl92_environhousing 0.034 0.184  -0.034 0.110  0.418 0.606 
 (0.13) (0.69)  (0.12) (0.38)  (1.05) (1.56) 
stl92_govtadmin -0.873 -0.444  -1.833** -1.458*  -0.317 0.280 
 (1.35) (0.73)  (2.91) (2.49)  (0.35) (0.34) 
cty92property -0.043 -0.014  -0.097** -0.065*  0.006 0.025 
 (1.71) (0.58)  (3.64) (2.34)  (0.21) (0.81) 
cty92sales 0.049 0.092  0.122 0.187  -0.060 -0.005 
 (0.46) (0.87)  (1.09) (1.68)  (0.33) (0.03) 
cty92education 0.008 -0.012  0.045 0.032  0.008 -0.016 
 (0.35) (0.61)  (1.64) (1.18)  (0.28) (0.57) 
cty92highway 0.147* 0.134  0.133* 0.066  0.199** 0.185* 
 (2.18) (1.65)  (2.37) (1.13)  (3.06) (2.15) 
cty92safety -0.193 -0.123  -0.263* -0.217*  -0.329* -0.181 
 (1.91) (1.27)  (2.53) (2.19)  (2.06) (1.19) 
cty92naturalrec 0.017 0.000  0.060 0.068  -0.130 -0.152 
 (0.26) 0.00   (0.85) (0.87)  (1.14) (1.35) 
cty92sewerage -0.120 -0.107  -0.128 -0.115  -0.034 -0.026 
 (1.36) (1.26)  (1.43) (1.40)  (0.23) (0.18) 
Constant 0.189** 0.135**  0.161** 0.106  0.231** 0.161** 
 (4.74) (3.58)  (2.84) (1.90)  (4.36) (3.00) 
Observations 1998 1998  1040 1040  958 958 
Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.61   0.56 0.59   0.58 0.61 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4. Column 2 (4, or 6) adds to Column 1 four 






Table 21B. Growth Equation Model Results with Clustering Method for Sample 
Nall, N468 and N579 Respectively, Dependent variable: ∆housing/ln(housing1990) 
  Nall   N468   N579 
  Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS   Base Base+ERS 
stl92_property -0.384 -0.324  -0.309 -0.266  -0.745* -0.631 
 (1.48) (1.29)  (1.20) (1.07)  (2.20) (1.90) 
stl92_general_sales -0.619 -0.510  -0.809* -0.718*  -0.752 -0.611 
 (1.79) (1.50)  (2.52) (2.29)  (1.71) (1.40) 
stl92_individual_income -0.262 -0.222  -0.452 -0.405  -0.117 -0.068 
 (1.07) (0.93)  (1.96) (1.80)  (0.37) (0.22) 
stl92_corporate_income -1.851** -2.005**  -1.238 -1.3 8  -3.718** -3.944** 
 (2.65) (2.91)  (1.81) (1.95)  (3.74) (4.02) 
stl92_rest -1.525** -1.313**  -1.070** -0.866*  -2.523** -2.254** 
 (4.55) (3.93)  (2.77) (2.23)  (5.90) (5.37) 
stl92_firstsecond 1.044** 0.980**  1.115** 1.098**  1.342** 1.152* 
 (2.78) (2.70)  (2.85) (2.97)  (2.70) (2.36) 
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.132 0.064  -0.521 -0.547  2.738** 2.430** 
 (0.22) (0.11)  (0.90) (0.96)  (3.12) (2.81) 
stl92_highway 0.754 0.715  0.580 0.593  1.466* 1.335* 
 (1.56) (1.48)  (1.02) (1.02)  (2.48) (2.37) 
stl92_publicsafety 1.724* 1.473*  1.118 0.855  2.31* 2.003* 
 (2.29) (2.00)  (1.37) (1.09)  (2.49) (2.25) 
stl92_environhousing -2.435** -2.403**  -2.424** -2.348**  -2.450** -2.405** 
 (4.10) (4.10)  (3.69) (3.68)  (3.18) (3.28) 
stl92_govtadmin -1.512 -1.387  -2.305 -2.322  -3.419 -2.795 
 (0.95) (0.89)  (1.74) (1.77)  (1.63) (1.37) 
cty92property -0.083 -0.060  -0.173** -0.146**  0.035 0.040 
 (1.94) (1.28)  (3.95) (3.14)  (0.64) (0.64) 
cty92sales -0.004 0.034  0.242 0.312  -0.391 -0.333 
 (0.02) (0.18)  (0.97) (1.22)  (1.83) (1.69) 
cty92education -0.021 -0.012  0.105* 0.120**  -0.127** -0.113* 
 (0.53) (0.30)  (2.56) (2.93)  (2.63) (2.32) 
cty92highway 0.191 0.171  0.679** 0.627**  0.093 0.038 
 (1.54) (1.48)  (4.88) (4.94)  (0.66) (0.29) 
cty92safety -0.520* -0.471  -0.799** -0.759**  -0.466 -0.324 
 (2.07) (1.90)  (3.58) (3.56)  (1.23) (0.90) 
cty92naturalrec 0.205 0.200  0.168 0.189  0.096 0.075 
 (1.18) (1.25)  (0.82) (1.01)  (0.36) (0.29) 
cty92sewerage 0.288 0.216  0.098 0.055  0.315 0.211 
 (1.77) (1.43)  (0.43) (0.27)  (1.61) (1.07) 
Constant 0.213** 0.176**  0.207** 0.175**  0.284* 0.219 
 (3.52) (2.78)  (3.78) (3.03)  (2.55) (1.79) 
Observations 1998 1998  1040 1040  958 958 
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.58   0.61 0.63   0.53 0.54 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 3. Column 2 (4, or 6) 1 adds to Column 1 four 






Table 22. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 respectively Considering 
SBSI Variables, Dependent variable: ∆wage/ln(wage1992) and ∆rent/ln(rent1992) 
wage rent wage rent wage rent
stl92_property -0.044 0.203 0.015 -0.084 -0.155 0.471
(0.70) (1.41) (0.17) (0.42) (1.51) (1.85)
stl92_general_sales -0.070 0.084 -0.062 0.148 -0.114 0.041
(1.09) (0.51) (0.69) (0.68) (1.04) (0.14)
top_pi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.99) (0.35) (0.92) (0.47) (0.37) (0.02)
top_capitalgains 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(1.47) (0.69) (0.33) (0.19) (1.46) (0.67)
top_corporate 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.001*
(1.07) (3.75) (0.94) (3.48) (1.47) (2.19)
deathtax 0.001* 0.005** 0.001 0.006** 0.003* 0.006*
(1.97) (3.55) (1.36) (2.80) (2.26) (2.11)
unemptax 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002**
(0.41) (3.64) (0.22) (1.78) (0.71) (2.94)
utilitiescosts 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.001
(0.23) (0.63) (0.61) (0.20) (0.71) (0.14)
compensation -0.002** -0.005** -0.003** -0.007** -0.002 -0.004
(3.18) (3.57) (2.79) (3.32) (1.61) (1.77)
gastax -0.008 0.020 -0.010 -0.004 -0.007 0.024
(1.07) (1.40) (1.00) (0.20) (0.56) (0.92)
miniwage 0.000 0.010* 0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.018*
(0.26) (2.14) (0.77) (1.18) (1.20) (2.12)
stl92_rest -0.279** -0.540* -0.264 -0.509 -0.221 -0.439
(2.74) (2.42) (1.83) (1.67) (1.33) (1.19)
stl92_firstsecond 0.257* -0.151 0.247 0.196 0.207 -0.491
(2.52) (0.67) (1.71) (0.58) (1.25) (1.42)
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.327 0.268 0.038 -0.343 0.865* 0.619
(1.65) (0.64) (0.13) (0.62) (2.42) (0.92)
stl92_highway 0.053 -0.142 0.087 -0.535 0.084 0.360
(0.47) (0.59) (0.47) (1.40) (0.50) (1.02)
stl92_publicsafety -0.155 -0.695 -0.447 -0.493 0.136 -0.705
(0.73) (1.45) (1.57) (0.76) (0.36) (0.80)
stl92_environhousing 0.228 0.912** 0.362 1.646** 0.426 0.378
(1.50) (2.87) (1.71) (3.37) (1.71) (0.73)
stl92_govtadmin -0.850** 2.542** -0.572 3.516** -1.536** 1.536
(2.88) (4.41) (1.39) (3.96) (3.39) (1.77)
cty92property -0.021 -0.014 -0.047 0.038 0.006 -0.027
(1.32) (0.62) (1.73) (1.04) (0.27) (0.98)
cty92sales 0.006 0.005 -0.065 -0.176 -0.020 0.182
(0.09) (0.03) (0.73) (0.80) (0.20) (0.68)
cty92education 0.002 0.059** -0.016 0.062 0.023 0.062**
(0.16) (2.98) (0.74) (1.86) (1.13) (2.61)
cty92highway -0.053 -0.094* 0.063 -0.240* -0.040 -0.029
(0.99) (1.99) (1.21) (2.25) (0.57) (0.61)
cty92safety 0.006 0.210 0.019 0.085 -0.251 0.471*
(0.08) (1.30) (0.21) (0.38) (1.83) (2.22)
cty92naturalrec 0.069 -0.047 -0.001 0.071 0.149 -0.252
(0.52) (0.24) (0.01) (0.31) (0.66) (1.01)
cty92sewerage -0.015 0.157 -0.052 -0.014 0.111 0.347
(0.26) (1.12) (0.62) (0.08) (1.12) (1.77)
Constant 0.119** -0.018 0.074 -0.034 0.179** -0.020
(4.35) (1.01) (1.94) (1.43) (4.58) (0.77)
Observations 1998 1998 1040 1040 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.18 0.32 0.20 0.34
Nall N468 N579
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4. Column 2 (4, or 6) in the wage equation is 
based on the benchmark Model 3. Wage and Rent data are from the BEA and HUD, respectively.  
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Table 23. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579  respectively 
Considering SBSI plus ERS Variables, Dependent variable: ∆wage/ln(wage1992) and 
∆rent/ln(rent1992) 
 
wage rent wage rent wage rent
stl92_property -0.051 0.188 0.033 -0.109 -0.169 0.466
(0.84) (1.30) (0.37) (0.54) (1.68) (1.82)
stl92_general_sales -0.052 0.101 -0.048 0.150 -0.093 0.075
(0.84) (0.61) (0.55) (0.68) (0.87) (0.25)
top_pi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.42) (0.41) (1.07) (0.43) (0.88) (0.22)
top_capitalgains 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.98) (0.54) (0.02) (0.19) (1.10) (0.28)
top_corporate 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.001*
(1.07) (3.74) (0.95) (3.56) (1.69) (2.19)
deathtax 0.001 0.005** 0.001 0.006** 0.002* 0.005
(1.59) (3.51) (1.32) (2.78) (1.98) (1.96)
unemptax 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002**
(0.51) (3.72) (0.24) (1.70) (0.15) (3.05)
utilitiescosts 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.005 -0.003
(0.20) (0.81) (0.28) (0.25) (0.98) (0.24)
compensation -0.002** -0.005** -0.002* -0.007** -0.002 -0.0 4
(3.22) (3.51) (2.44) (3.24) (1.90) (1.73)
gastax -0.009 0.017 -0.011 -0.006 -0.008 0.024
(1.34) (1.18) (1.14) (0.29) (0.64) (0.91)
miniwage 0.001 0.010* 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.018*
(0.36) (1.96) (0.77) (0.92) (0.86) (2.04)
stl92_rest -0.181 -0.497* -0.166 -0.522 -0.136 -0.386
(1.82) (2.24) (1.19) (1.76) (0.85) (1.05)
stl92_firstsecond 0.247* -0.168 0.214 0.162 0.211 -0.539
(2.54) (0.74) (1.57) (0.48) (1.32) (1.54)
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.169 0.207 -0.027 -0.366 0.502 0.386
(0.88) (0.49) (0.10) (0.67) (1.47) (0.56)
stl92_highway -0.007 -0.175 0.112 -0.550 -0.035 0.336
(0.06) (0.74) (0.61) (1.45) (0.21) (0.95)
stl92_publicsafety -0.168 -0.705 -0.460 -0.520 0.205 -0.656
(0.83) (1.48) (1.64) (0.80) (0.55) (0.74)
stl92_environhousing 0.291* 0.957** 0.453* 1.703** 0.522* 0.450
(1.99) (3.01) (2.18) (3.51) (2.18) (0.87)
stl92_govtadmin -0.681* 2.601** -0.626 3.635** -1.134** 1.740*
(2.35) (4.53) (1.53) (4.04) (2.58) (2.01)
cty92property -0.004 -0.005 -0.036 0.044 0.020 -0.017
(0.24) (0.23) (1.24) (1.19) (0.89) (0.61)
cty92sales 0.016 -0.021 -0.072 -0.211 0.014 0.150
(0.26) (0.11) (0.76) (0.99) (0.16) (0.57)
cty92education -0.007 0.062** -0.018 0.063 0.011 0.066**
(0.49) (3.16) (0.81) (1.91) (0.52) (2.85)
cty92highway -0.053 -0.084 0.066 -0.235* -0.048 -0.024
(1.11) (1.76) (1.28) (2.19) (0.80) (0.50)
cty92safety 0.041 0.219 0.037 0.097 -0.176 0.458*
(0.53) (1.33) (0.41) (0.44) (1.30) (2.07)
cty92naturalrec 0.066 -0.046 0.008 0.078 0.141 -0.261
(0.49) (0.24) (0.08) (0.35) (0.62) (1.04)
cty92sewerage -0.021 0.147 -0.054 -0.006 0.115 0.323
(0.35) (1.04) (0.62) (0.03) (1.20) (1.70)
Constant 0.091** -0.014 0.042 -0.024 0.146** -0.023
(3.34) (0.75) (1.10) (0.98) (3.71) (0.90)
Observations 1998 1998 1040 1040 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.32 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.34
Nall N468 N579
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4 plus four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, 
rec). Column 2 (4, or 6) in the wage equation is baed on the benchmark Model 3 plus corresponding ERS variables. Wage and Rent 
data are from the BEA and HUD, respectively.  
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Table 24. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 respectively Considering 
SBSI Variables and Clustering Method, Dependent variable: ∆wage/ln(wage1992) and 
∆rent/ln(rent1992) 
 
wage rent wage rent wage rent
stl92_property -0.044 0.203 0.015 -0.084 -0.155 0.471
(0.72) (0.98) (0.17) (0.35) (1.58) (1.86)
stl92_general_sales -0.070 0.084 -0.062 0.148 -0.114 0.041
(0.98) (0.38) (0.69) (0.60) (1.07) (0.16)
top_pi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.03) (0.22) (1.02) (0.41) (0.36) (0.02)
top_capitalgains 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(1.40) (0.42) (0.33) (0.16) (1.36) (0.55)
top_corporate 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.001
(0.91) (2.88) (0.82) (3.90) (1.41) (1.80)
deathtax 0.001* 0.005* 0.001 0.006* 0.003* 0.006
(2.00) (2.20) (1.45) (2.22) (2.45) (1.47)
unemptax 0.000 -0.002* 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002*
(0.37) (2.00) (0.21) (1.46) (0.69) (2.13)
utilitiescosts 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.001
(0.24) (0.44) (0.55) (0.17) (0.77) (0.11)
compensation -0.002** -0.005* -0.003** -0.007** -0.002 -0.0 4
(2.96) (2.50) (2.84) (3.19) (1.51) (1.43)
gastax -0.008 0.020 -0.010 -0.004 -0.007 0.024
(1.14) (1.00) (1.10) (0.17) (0.60) (0.87)
miniwage 0.000 0.010* 0.002 0.005 -0.003 0.018**
(0.29) (2.49) (0.75) (1.17) (1.19) (3.87)
stl92_rest -0.279* -0.540 -0.264 -0.509 -0.221 -0.439
(2.60) (1.81) (1.77) (1.53) (1.40) (1.31)
stl92_firstsecond 0.257* -0.151 0.247 0.196 0.207 -0.491
(2.57) (0.38) (1.68) (0.46) (1.32) (1.05)
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.327 0.268 0.038 -0.343 0.865* 0.619
(1.42) (0.40) (0.13) (0.49) (2.27) (0.67)
stl92_highway 0.053 -0.142 0.087 -0.535 0.084 0.360
(0.41) (0.34) (0.44) (1.15) (0.58) (0.76)
stl92_publicsafety -0.155 -0.695 -0.447 -0.493 0.136 -0.705
(0.73) (0.95) (1.95) (0.68) (0.37) (0.68)
stl92_environhousing 0.228 0.912 0.362 1.646** 0.426 0.378
(1.66) (1.78) (1.89) (2.83) (1.85) (0.58)
stl92_govtadmin -0.850* 2.542* -0.572 3.516** -1.536** 1.536
(2.60) (2.38) (1.48) (3.05) (3.25) (1.26)
cty92property -0.021 -0.014 -0.047 0.038 0.006 -0.027
(1.41) (0.56) (1.57) (0.86) (0.33) (1.25)
cty92sales 0.006 0.005 -0.065 -0.176 -0.020 0.182
(0.09) (0.03) (0.68) (0.76) (0.24) (0.90)
cty92education 0.002 0.059** -0.016 0.062 0.023 0.062*
(0.15) (2.62) (0.78) (1.72) (1.08) (2.49)
cty92highway -0.053 -0.094 0.063 -0.240* -0.040 -0.029
(1.66) (1.89) (1.08) (2.03) (0.94) (0.63)
cty92safety 0.006 0.210 0.019 0.085 -0.251 0.471*
(0.08) (1.15) (0.22) (0.35) (1.66) (2.10)
cty92naturalrec 0.069 -0.047 -0.001 0.071 0.149 -0.252
(0.53) (0.24) (0.01) (0.33) (0.66) (1.00)
cty92sewerage -0.015 0.157 -0.052 -0.014 0.111 0.347
(0.25) (1.20) (0.64) (0.08) (1.09) (1.61)
Constant 0.119** -0.018 0.074* -0.034 0.179** -0.020
(4.31) (0.64) (2.12) (1.28) (4.19) (0.54)
Observations 1998 1998 1040 1040 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.32 0.18 0.32 0.20 0.34
N579Nall N468
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4. Column 2 (4, or 6) in the wage equation is 
based on the benchmark Model 3. Wage and Rent data are from the BEA and HUD, respectively. Numbers of Clusters for Nall, N468, 
and N579 are 174, 167, and 129, respectively.  
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Table 25. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 respectively Considering 
SBSI plus ERS Variables and Clustering Method, Dependent variable: ∆wage/ln(wage1992) and 
∆rent/ln(rent1992) 
wage rent wage rent wage rent
stl92_property -0.051 0.188 0.033 -0.109 -0.169 0.466
(0.87) (0.91) (0.40) (0.47) (1.74) (1.83)
stl92_general_sales -0.052 0.101 -0.048 0.150 -0.093 0.075
(0.78) (0.45) (0.57) (0.60) (0.90) (0.29)
top_pi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.47) (0.26) (1.18) (0.38) (0.84) (0.20)
top_capitalgains 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.97) (0.33) (0.02) (0.16) (1.04) (0.22)
top_corporate 0.000 -0.001** 0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.001
(0.88) (2.84) (0.82) (4.03) (1.64) (1.77)
deathtax 0.001 0.005* 0.001 0.006* 0.002* 0.005
(1.65) (2.18) (1.42) (2.27) (2.07) (1.36)
unemptax 0.000 -0.002* 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002*
(0.49) (2.07) (0.23) (1.40) (0.14) (2.15)
utilitiescosts 0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.005 -0.003
(0.22) (0.56) (0.27) (0.22) (1.08) (0.19)
compensation -0.002** -0.005* -0.002* -0.007** -0.002 -0.004
(3.01) (2.53) (2.43) (3.24) (1.68) (1.41)
gastax -0.009 0.017 -0.011 -0.006 -0.008 0.024
(1.40) (0.83) (1.26) (0.26) (0.67) (0.87)
miniwage 0.001 0.010* 0.002 0.004 -0.002 0.018**
(0.43) (2.29) (0.76) (0.93) (0.88) (3.65)
stl92_rest -0.181 -0.497 -0.166 -0.522 -0.136 -0.386
(1.65) (1.65) (1.16) (1.60) (0.82) (1.15)
stl92_firstsecond 0.247** -0.168 0.214 0.162 0.211 -0.539
(2.66) (0.43) (1.58) (0.38) (1.42) (1.15)
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.169 0.207 -0.027 -0.366 0.502 0.386
(0.71) (0.30) (0.09) (0.52) (1.35) (0.40)
stl92_highway -0.007 -0.175 0.112 -0.550 -0.035 0.336
(0.05) (0.42) (0.54) (1.20) (0.25) (0.70)
stl92_publicsafety -0.168 -0.705 -0.460* -0.520 0.205 -0.656
(0.82) (0.98) (2.00) (0.71) (0.55) (0.64)
stl92_environhousing 0.291* 0.957 0.453* 1.703** 0.522* 0.450
(1.99) (1.89) (2.42) (3.03) (2.24) (0.69)
stl92_govtadmin -0.681* 2.601* -0.626 3.635** -1.134* 1.740
(2.21) (2.45) (1.66) (3.14) (2.52) (1.42)
cty92property -0.004 -0.005 -0.036 0.044 0.020 -0.017
(0.25) (0.21) (1.11) (0.98) (1.13) (0.81)
cty92sales 0.016 -0.021 -0.072 -0.211 0.014 0.150
(0.26) (0.11) (0.73) (0.94) (0.17) (0.69)
cty92education -0.007 0.062** -0.018 0.063 0.011 0.066**
(0.46) (2.72) (0.87) (1.74) (0.50) (2.62)
cty92highway -0.053 -0.084 0.066 -0.235 -0.048 -0.024
(1.96) (1.67) (1.12) (1.95) (1.43) (0.53)
cty92safety 0.041 0.219 0.037 0.097 -0.176 0.458
(0.52) (1.19) (0.43) (0.41) (1.20) (1.87)
cty92naturalrec 0.066 -0.046 0.008 0.078 0.141 -0.261
(0.52) (0.24) (0.08) (0.38) (0.64) (1.05)
cty92sewerage -0.021 0.147 -0.054 -0.006 0.115 0.323
(0.34) (1.12) (0.65) (0.03) (1.23) (1.58)
Constant 0.091** -0.014 0.042 -0.024 0.146** -0.023
(3.14) (0.49) (1.17) (0.90) (3.19) (0.64)
Observations 1998 1998 1040 1040 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.32 0.22 0.33 0.25 0.34
Nall N468 N579
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4 plus four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, 
rec). Column 2 (4, or 6) in the wage equation is baed on the benchmark Model 3 plus corresponding ERS variables. Wage and Rent 
data are from the BEA and HUD, respectively. Numbers of Clusters for Nall, N468, and N579 are 174, 167, and 129, respectively.  
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Table 26. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 
respectively Considering SBSI Variables, Dependent variable: 
∆earning/ln(earning1990) and ∆housing/ln(housing1990) 
earning housing earning housing earning housing
stl92_property 0.162 -0.681** 0.254* -0.279 0.028 -1.257**
(1.84) (4.03) (2.44) (1.16) (0.19) (4.70)
stl92_general_sales 0.011 -0.860** -0.075 -0.621* -0.036-1.292**
(0.12) (4.35) (0.68) (2.49) (0.21) (4.21)
top_pi 0.001** -0.003** 0.001** -0.003* 0.002 -0.002
(3.22) (3.64) (2.91) (2.44) (1.92) (1.81)
top_capitalgains -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002* -0.003**
(3.06) (1.55) (1.84) (0.94) (2.46) (3.00)
top_corporate -0.001** 0.001** -0.001** -0.001 0.000 0.003**
(3.03) (3.00) (3.96) (1.26) (0.78) (3.94)
deathtax 0.003** 0.001 0.004** 0.003 0.004* 0.002
(3.77) (0.57) (3.59) (1.53) (2.41) (0.82)
unemptax 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.28) (1.47) (1.08) (1.00) (0.97) (0.74)
utilitiescosts 0.003 -0.028** 0.007 -0.019 0.009 -0.034**
(0.71) (3.92) (1.45) (1.96) (1.36) (2.79)
compensation -0.003** -0.005** -0.003** -0.005* -0.003 -0.0 5
(3.48) (2.85) (2.93) (2.13) (1.76) (1.92)
gastax 0.011 0.095** -0.008 0.044 -0.004 0.116**
(1.01) (4.54) (0.58) (1.50) (0.21) (3.68)
miniwage 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.006
(0.69) (1.15) (0.13) (0.47) (0.62) (0.76)
stl92_rest -0.187 -2.039** -0.055 -1.103* -0.163 -2.896**
(1.28) (6.58) (0.33) (2.58) (0.67) (7.46)
stl92_firstsecond -0.232 1.187** 0.089 1.011** -0.517* 1.552**
(1.79) (4.87) (0.57) (3.06) (2.11) (3.88)
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.207 1.103* -0.007 -0.613 0.464 4.116**
(0.70) (2.29) (0.02) (1.01) (0.81) (4.43)
stl92_highway 0.143 0.946** 0.002 0.512 0.259 1.615**
(0.83) (2.92) (0.01) (1.04) (0.96) (3.40)
stl92_publicsafety -0.934** 2.187** -0.714* 1.036 -1.158* 3.176**
(3.22) (3.60) (2.05) (1.37) (2.22) (3.34)
stl92_environhousing 0.246 -2.323** 0.328 -1.703** 0.587-1.856**
(1.13) (5.98) (1.01) (2.99) (1.60) (2.99)
stl92_govtadmin 0.020 -0.632 -0.637 -1.471 0.035 -3.175**
(0.05) (0.80) (1.17) (1.33) (0.05) (2.60)
cty92property -0.037 -0.065 -0.087** -0.146** 0.009 0.032
(1.63) (1.56) (3.56) (3.13) (0.28) (0.54)
cty92sales 0.022 -0.097 0.100 -0.064 -0.063 -0.396
(0.28) (0.51) (0.92) (0.28) (0.49) (1.58)
cty92education 0.003 -0.050 0.032 0.085* 0.008 -0.143**
(0.13) (1.58) (1.19) (2.03) (0.25) (3.35)
cty92highway 0.147** 0.145 0.135* 0.717** 0.212** 0.066
(2.93) (1.34) (2.20) (5.64) (3.54) (0.54)
cty92safety -0.201* -0.461 -0.257* -0.757** -0.355 -0.554
(2.05) (1.85) (2.58) (3.39) (1.92) (1.33)
cty92naturalrec 0.007 0.102 0.032 0.096 -0.110 0.007
(0.09) (0.53) (0.56) (0.43) (0.75) (0.02)
cty92sewerage -0.108 0.173 -0.093 -0.007 -0.062 0.222
(1.23) (1.15) (1.08) (0.04) (0.38) (1.03)
Constant 0.188** 0.203** 0.161** 0.213* 0.230** 0.288*
(4.74) (2.72) (3.29) (2.36) (3.81) (2.57)
Observations 1998 1998 1040 1040 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.58 0.55
Nall N468 N579
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4. Column 2 (4, or 6) in the wage equation is 
based on the benchmark Model 3. Wage and Rent data are from the Census.  
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Table 27. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 
respectively Considering SBSI plus ERS Variables, Dependent Variable: 
∆earning/ln(earning1990) and ∆housing/ln(housing1990) 
earning housing earning housing earning housing
stl92_property 0.122 -0.658** 0.217* -0.222 0.006 -1.233**
(1.42) (3.91) (2.14) (0.93) (0.04) (4.72)
stl92_general_sales 0.017 -0.813** -0.063 -0.557* -0.037-1.276**
(0.17) (4.15) (0.60) (2.28) (0.21) (4.26)
top_pi 0.001** -0.003** 0.001** -0.002* 0.001 -0.003**
(2.96) (3.93) (2.70) (2.36) (1.41) (2.63)
top_capitalgains -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.002*
(2.91) (1.18) (1.75) (1.04) (2.20) (2.32)
top_corporate -0.001** 0.001** -0.001** -0.001 0.000 0.003**
(2.95) (3.01) (3.48) (1.23) (0.76) (3.93)
deathtax 0.003** 0.000 0.003** 0.003 0.003 0.001
(3.17) (0.23) (3.02) (1.47) (1.96) (0.43)
unemptax 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(1.11) (1.47) (1.22) (0.82) (0.17) (0.48)
utilitiescosts 0.004 -0.030** 0.005 -0.024* 0.012 -0.033**
(1.17) (4.30) (1.13) (2.49) (1.84) (2.86)
compensation -0.003** -0.004* -0.003** -0.004 -0.003* -0.0 4
(3.87) (2.56) (3.00) (1.83) (2.04) (1.61)
gastax 0.005 0.089** -0.005 0.036 -0.007 0.115**
(0.51) (4.31) (0.40) (1.26) (0.44) (3.70)
miniwage 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.007
(1.16) (1.18) (0.20) (0.39) (1.30) (0.88)
stl92_rest -0.062 -1.883** 0.013 -0.886* -0.068 -2.858**
(0.43) (6.17) (0.08) (2.11) (0.28) (7.50)
stl92_firstsecond -0.138 1.171** 0.104 0.978** -0.354 1.517**
(1.11) (4.88) (0.69) (3.05) (1.48) (3.84)
stl92_hospitalhealth -0.050 0.924* -0.140 -0.619 -0.179 3.309**
(0.18) (1.97) (0.42) (1.05) (0.33) (3.73)
stl92_highway -0.067 0.929** -0.100 0.508 0.011 1.604**
(0.40) (2.92) (0.40) (1.05) (0.04) (3.44)
stl92_publicsafety -0.909** 2.173** -0.653* 0.959 -0.9473.457**
(3.26) (3.66) (1.96) (1.30) (1.86) (3.83)
stl92_environhousing 0.335 -2.250** 0.394 -1.585** 0.668-1.676**
(1.58) (5.89) (1.29) (2.86) (1.83) (2.79)
stl92_govtadmin 0.394 -0.737 -0.333 -1.770 0.634 -2.800*
(0.97) (0.95) (0.64) (1.63) (0.96) (2.34)
cty92property -0.009 -0.042 -0.054 -0.120** 0.025 0.040
(0.38) (0.95) (1.96) (2.72) (0.79) (0.63)
cty92sales 0.098 -0.068 0.167 -0.006 0.038 -0.354
(1.26) (0.35) (1.51) (0.03) (0.31) (1.36)
cty92education -0.017 -0.041 0.021 0.101* -0.016 -0.131**
(0.82) (1.27) (0.76) (2.48) (0.52) (3.01)
cty92highway 0.135* 0.130 0.069 0.667** 0.198** 0.018
(2.36) (1.26) (1.11) (5.39) (3.05) (0.16)
cty92safety -0.135 -0.407 -0.213* -0.718** -0.225 -0.427
(1.42) (1.65) (2.18) (3.28) (1.24) (1.08)
cty92naturalrec -0.008 0.101 0.039 0.126 -0.125 -0.004
(0.11) (0.56) (0.62) (0.63) (0.80) (0.01)
cty92sewerage -0.096 0.105 -0.081 -0.045 -0.048 0.130
(1.14) (0.74) (0.99) (0.25) (0.30) (0.60)
Constant 0.130** 0.173* 0.112* 0.190 0.145* 0.221
(3.28) (2.22) (2.23) (1.96) (2.39) (1.94)
Observations 1998 1998 1040 1040 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.62 0.60 0.61 0.65 0.62 0.56
Nall N468 N579
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4 plus four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, 
rec). Column 2 (4, or 6) in the wage equation is baed on the benchmark Model 3 plus corresponding ERS variables. Wage and Rent 
data are from the Census.  
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Table 28. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 respectively Considering 
SBSI Variables and Clustering Method, Dependent Variable: ∆earning/ln(earning1990) and 
∆housing/ln(housing1990) 
earning housing earning housing earning housing
stl92_property 0.162 -0.681* 0.254* -0.279 0.028 -1.257**
(1.45) (2.33) (2.10) (0.88) (0.16) (3.40)
stl92_general_sales 0.011 -0.860* -0.075 -0.621 -0.036 -1.292**
(0.09) (2.51) (0.64) (1.74) (0.18) (3.25)
top_pi 0.001* -0.003* 0.001** -0.003 0.002 -0.002
(2.49) (2.08) (2.80) (1.76) (1.71) (1.29)
top_capitalgains -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002* -0.003*
(2.18) (0.85) (1.86) (0.64) (2.07) (2.45)
top_corporate -0.001 0.001 -0.001** -0.001 0.000 0.003**
(1.97) (1.81) (2.99) (0.92) (0.64) (2.86)
deathtax 0.003** 0.001 0.004** 0.003 0.004* 0.002
(3.02) (0.33) (3.49) (1.14) (2.28) (0.66)
unemptax 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.20) (0.97) (0.94) (0.75) (0.85) (0.55)
utilitiescosts 0.003 -0.028** 0.007 -0.019 0.009 -0.034*
(0.59) (2.61) (1.29) (1.59) (1.15) (2.27)
compensation -0.003* -0.005 -0.003* -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(2.52) (1.76) (2.56) (1.61) (1.31) (1.41)
gastax 0.011 0.095* -0.008 0.044 -0.004 0.116**
(0.69) (2.55) (0.51) (0.95) (0.18) (2.73)
miniwage 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.003 0.006
(0.75) (0.79) (0.12) (0.41) (0.67) (0.60)
stl92_rest -0.187 -2.039** -0.055 -1.103 -0.163 -2.896**
(0.93) (4.14) (0.27) (1.71) (0.70) (5.87)
stl92_firstsecond -0.232 1.187** 0.089 1.011* -0.517 1.552**
(1.54) (2.85) (0.52) (2.28) (1.89) (2.73)
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.207 1.103 -0.007 -0.613 0.464 4.116**
(0.41) (1.51) (0.02) (0.74) (0.58) (3.51)
stl92_highway 0.143 0.946 0.002 0.512 0.259 1.615**
(0.49) (1.82) (0.01) (0.71) (0.72) (2.67)
stl92_publicsafety -0.934* 2.187* -0.714 1.036 -1.158 3.176*
(2.41) (1.99) (1.78) (0.90) (1.79) (2.52)
stl92_environhousing 0.246 -2.323** 0.328 -1.703* 0.587 -1.856*
(0.83) (3.42) (0.93) (2.03) (1.35) (2.36)
stl92_govtadmin 0.020 -0.632 -0.637 -1.471 0.035 -3.175
(0.03) (0.38) (1.00) (0.90) (0.04) (1.58)
cty92property -0.037 -0.065 -0.087** -0.146** 0.009 0.032
(1.44) (1.58) (3.27) (3.38) (0.31) (0.61)
cty92sales 0.022 -0.097 0.100 -0.064 -0.063 -0.396*
(0.18) (0.53) (0.89) (0.21) (0.32) (2.16)
cty92education 0.003 -0.050 0.032 0.085* 0.008 -0.143**
(0.13) (1.30) (1.20) (2.10) (0.28) (3.03)
cty92highway 0.147* 0.145 0.135* 0.717** 0.212** 0.066
(2.17) (1.24) (2.50) (5.06) (3.16) (0.48)
cty92safety -0.201* -0.461 -0.257* -0.757** -0.355* -0.554
(2.07) (1.80) (2.56) (3.46) (2.15) (1.42)
cty92naturalrec 0.007 0.102 0.032 0.096 -0.110 0.007
(0.11) (0.57) (0.49) (0.43) (0.99) (0.03)
cty92sewerage -0.108 0.173 -0.093 -0.007 -0.062 0.222
(1.24) (1.17) (1.07) (0.03) (0.40) (1.17)
Constant 0.188** 0.203** 0.161** 0.213** 0.230** 0.288**
(4.80) (3.42) (2.87) (3.68) (4.07) (2.65)
Observations 1998 1998 1040 1040 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.63 0.58 0.55
Nall N468 N579
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4. Column 2 (4, or 6) in the wage equation is 
based on the benchmark Model 3. Wage and Rent data are from the Census. Numbers of Clusters for Nall, 468, and N579 are 174, 
167, and 129, respectively.  
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Table 29. Growth Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579 respectively Considering 
SBSI plus ERS Variables and Clustering Method, Dependent Variable: ∆earning/ln(earning1990) 
and ∆housing/ln(housing1990) 
earning housing earning housing earning housing
stl92_property 0.122 -0.658* 0.217 -0.222 0.006 -1.233**
(1.12) (2.24) (1.91) (0.70) (0.03) (3.25)
stl92_general_sales 0.017 -0.813* -0.063 -0.557 -0.037 -1.276**
(0.14) (2.39) (0.56) (1.59) (0.18) (3.20)
top_pi 0.001* -0.003* 0.001** -0.002 0.001 -0.003
(2.34) (2.21) (2.61) (1.71) (1.28) (1.84)
top_capitalgains -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.002
(2.13) (0.65) (1.73) (0.72) (2.04) (1.93)
top_corporate -0.001 0.001 -0.001* -0.001 0.000 0.003**
(1.84) (1.82) (2.57) (0.89) (0.62) (2.88)
deathtax 0.003* 0.000 0.003** 0.003 0.003 0.001
(2.57) (0.13) (2.92) (1.07) (1.87) (0.37)
unemptax 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.84) (0.99) (1.07) (0.62) (0.15) (0.35)
utilitiescosts 0.004 -0.030** 0.005 -0.024* 0.012 -0.033*
(0.94) (2.82) (1.11) (2.01) (1.52) (2.34)
compensation -0.003** -0.004 -0.003** -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(2.84) (1.58) (2.64) (1.36) (1.52) (1.17)
gastax 0.005 0.089* -0.005 0.036 -0.007 0.115**
(0.34) (2.44) (0.35) (0.82) (0.36) (2.72)
miniwage 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.007
(1.18) (0.78) (0.19) (0.34) (1.45) (0.66)
stl92_rest -0.062 -1.883** 0.013 -0.886 -0.068 -2.858**
(0.30) (3.83) (0.06) (1.40) (0.27) (5.73)
stl92_firstsecond -0.138 1.171** 0.104 0.978* -0.354 1.517*
(0.99) (2.81) (0.66) (2.28) (1.38) (2.61)
stl92_hospitalhealth -0.050 0.924 -0.140 -0.619 -0.179 3.309**
(0.10) (1.35) (0.35) (0.77) (0.25) (3.10)
stl92_highway -0.067 0.929 -0.100 0.508 0.011 1.604**
(0.23) (1.78) (0.31) (0.69) (0.03) (2.73)
stl92_publicsafety -0.909* 2.173* -0.653 0.959 -0.947 3.457**
(2.47) (2.03) (1.67) (0.86) (1.48) (2.88)
stl92_environhousing 0.335 -2.250** 0.394 -1.585 0.668 -1.676*
(1.08) (3.36) (1.13) (1.96) (1.54) (2.19)
stl92_govtadmin 0.394 -0.737 -0.333 -1.770 0.634 -2.800
(0.62) (0.45) (0.55) (1.09) (0.74) (1.41)
cty92property -0.009 -0.042 -0.054 -0.120** 0.025 0.040
(0.35) (0.95) (1.97) (2.77) (0.82) (0.67)
cty92sales 0.098 -0.068 0.167 -0.006 0.038 -0.354*
(0.86) (0.37) (1.49) (0.02) (0.21) (2.14)
cty92education -0.017 -0.041 0.021 0.101* -0.016 -0.131**
(0.85) (1.06) (0.79) (2.60) (0.55) (2.72)
cty92highway 0.135 0.130 0.069 0.667** 0.198* 0.018
(1.67) (1.18) (1.20) (5.23) (2.31) (0.14)
cty92safety -0.135 -0.407 -0.213* -0.718** -0.225 -0.427
(1.42) (1.60) (2.17) (3.41) (1.45) (1.12)
cty92naturalrec -0.008 0.101 0.039 0.126 -0.125 -0.004
(0.13) (0.62) (0.56) (0.63) (1.14) (0.01)
cty92sewerage -0.096 0.105 -0.081 -0.045 -0.048 0.130
(1.16) (0.77) (1.03) (0.25) (0.32) (0.66)
Constant 0.130** 0.173** 0.112* 0.190** 0.145* 0.221
(3.41) (2.76) (2.00) (3.13) (2.51) (1.90)
Observations 1998 1998 1040 1040 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.62 0.6 0.61 0.65 0.62 0.56
Nall N468 N579
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. Column 1 (3, or 5) in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4 plus four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, 
rec). Column 2 (4, or 6) in the wage equation is baed on the benchmark Model 3 plus corresponding ERS variables. Wage and Rent 




t-statistics without accounting for spatial effect are smaller. The difference of the t-
statistics between the clustered method and unclustered one could also imply that spatial 
correlation simply exists for the data in analysis.   
The last empirical implementation is to break up the full sample into nine sub-
samples and examine how the effects of local fiscal variables are robust to sample 
heterogeneity and whether results are consistent with every subsample and the sample as 
a whole. The results are reported in Tables 30A-31B. In brevity, compared to the full 
sample models with SBSI variables included (Tables 23 and 27), the coefficient signs of 
the fiscal variables of interest in the subsamples generally are consistent with those in the 
full sample. Compared to the full sample which uses th  first set of dependent variables 
from the BEA wage and HUD rent (Table 23), the sub-region which has urban population 
of 2500 to 20000 that is adjacent to a metro area (corresponding to Beale code 6) tends to 
produce results better in accordance with our expectation (see for example, the 
stl92_property and top_pi tax variables are found negative and statistically significant at 
the 10% level in the rent equation). However, the sub-region which has urban population 
of at least 20000 that is not adjacent to a metro area (corresponding to Beale code 5) 
tends to produce counterintuitive and negative coeffici nt signs for expenditure variables, 
stl92_publicsafety and stl92_highway, in the rent equation. In addition, compared to the 
full sample which uses the second set of dependent variables from the Census earning 
and housing cost data (Table 27), the nine subsamples generally do not produce better 
results than the full sample. For example, the statistically significant negative 
stl92_property loses its statistical significance in all the nonmetropolitan subsamples in 
the rent equation. The negative sign on stl92_general_sales and positive sign on  
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Table 30A. Growth Equation Model Results for 9 Subsamples Considering SBSI and ERS Variables, 
Dependent Variable: ∆wage/ln(wage1992) 
UR=1 UR=2 UR=3 UR=4 UR=5 UR=6 UR=7 UR=8 UR=9
stl92_property -0.042 -0.151 0.085 -0.011 -0.027 0.033 -0.156 -0.524 0.604
(0.22) (0.81) (0.71) (0.06) (0.03) (0.32) (1.36) (1.35) (1.40)
stl92_general_sales -0.173 -0.150 0.091 -0.156 0.454 -0.088 -0.079 -1.021* 0.831*
(0.88) (0.89) (0.76) (1.04) (0.76) (0.83) (0.60) (2.14) (2.17)
top_pi 0.000 -0.002* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002
(0.54) (2.21) (0.66) (0.32) (0.02) (1.89) (0.61) (1.41) (1.34)
top_capitalgains 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.18) (1.48) (1.56) (2.12) (0.56) (0.66) (1.35) (0.28) (0.91)
top_corporate 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.98) (0.16) (0.39) (0.37) (0.41) (0.41) (1.34) (0.96) (0.68)
deathtax 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004
(0.10) (0.98) (0.16) (0.68) (0.79) (0.56) (0.86) (1.35) (0.90)
unemptax 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002* 0.001
(0.43) (0.11) (0.19) (0.03) (0.11) (0.42) (0.32) (2.13) (1.02)
utilitiescosts 0.006 0.011 -0.001 0.010 -0.005 -0.004 0.005 0.003 -0.013
(0.90) (1.60) (0.15) (1.88) (0.18) (0.85) (0.83) (0.23) (0.69)
compensation 0.000 -0.002 -0.003* 0.000 -0.003 -0.003* -0.001 0.002 -0.003
(0.08) (1.09) (2.41) (0.27) (0.48) (2.25) (0.80) (0.48) (0.71)
gastax -0.032 0.012 0.012 0.018 -0.090 -0.006 -0.015 0.019 0.006
(1.90) (0.57) (0.82) (0.74) (1.02) (0.41) (1.04) (0.58) (0.12)
miniwage 0.000 0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.030** -0.124**
(0.05) (1.54) (1.09) (1.35) (0.32) (0.81) (0.38) (3.55) (2.75)
stl92_rest 0.166 -0.153 -0.133 0.039 1.148 -0.429* -0.169 -1.333* 0.714
(0.94) (0.55) (0.78) (0.16) (1.16) (2.30) (0.92) (2.18) (1.57)
stl92_firstsecond 0.607* 0.679 -0.225 0.100 -0.360 0.189 0.26 1.439 -0.676
(2.57) (1.77) (1.09) (0.41) (0.56) (1.37) (1.34) (1.76) (1.07)
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.327 -0.357 0.411 0.970* 0.772 0.279 0.623 -0.979 0.568
(0.54) (0.83) (1.03) (2.51) (0.31) (0.71) (1.54) (1.03) (0.70)
stl92_highway -0.440 0.532 0.122 -0.285 -2.010 0.426 -0.174 -0.864 -0.072
(0.57) (1.55) (0.43) (0.89) (1.54) (1.67) (0.85) (1.54) (0.10)
stl92_publicsafety -0.403 -0.271 -0.470 -1.261* -4.283 0.109 0.113 0.585 -0.494
(0.46) (0.44) (1.18) (2.29) (1.64) (0.32) (0.25) (0.52) (0.28)
stl92_environhousing 0.891 -0.259 -0.346 0.719 -0.183 0.033 0.360 0.828 0.053
(1.46) (0.58) (1.01) (1.47) (0.12) (0.11) (1.07) (0.96) (0.09)
stl92_govtadmin -1.479 -1.146 1.355 -0.948 2.254 -0.523 -1.172* 0.054 -1.644
(1.33) (1.22) (1.92) (1.22) (0.89) (1.07) (2.25) (0.04) (1.00)
cty92property -0.100 -0.130* -0.083 -0.084 -0.008 -0.006 -0.023 -0.082 0.060*
(1.31) (2.59) (1.58) (1.32) (0.07) (0.20) (0.72) (1.36) (2.13)
cty92sales -0.109 -0.163 -0.180 0.025 0.574 -0.219* -0.054-0.137 0.067
(0.70) (1.25) (1.46) (0.16) (1.48) (2.07) (0.65) (0.42) (0.31)
cty92education -0.016 0.062 0.063 0.024 0.197 -0.028 0.051-0.078 -0.038
(0.23) (1.54) (1.32) (0.45) (1.85) (0.98) (1.84) (1.76) (1.36)
cty92highway 0.329 0.790** -0.064 0.118 0.142 0.045 -0.027-0.034 -0.041
(1.88) (3.09) (0.42) (0.67) (0.41) (0.69) (0.32) (0.29) (0.58)
cty92safety -0.106 -0.002 -0.108 0.105 -1.028 0.106 -0.0490.197 -0.226
(0.58) (0.01) (0.92) (0.44) (1.88) (0.74) (0.29) (1.11) (0.89)
cty92naturalrec 0.069 -0.709 0.158 -0.373 0.602 0.019 0.078 0.014 0.124
(0.63) (1.67) (0.56) (1.16) (1.02) (0.21) (0.47) (0.04) (0.44)
cty92sewerage -0.369* -0.018 0.017 -0.040 0.022 -0.302* 0.135 0.531** 0.157
(2.32) (0.08) (0.11) (0.47) (0.07) (2.57) (1.10) (2.80) (0.94)
Constant 0.072 0.030 -0.005 0.195* 0.016 -0.024 0.122* -0.074 0.331**
(0.59) (0.27) (0.08) (2.18) (0.07) (0.52) (2.49) (0.72) (3.59)
Observations 387 318 340 214 101 598 439 228 418
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.29 0.30 0.24 0.21  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 




Table 30B. Growth Equation Model Results for 9 Subsamples Considering SBSI and ERS Variables, 
Dependent Variable: ∆rent/ln(rent1992) 
UR=1 UR=2 UR=3 UR=4 UR=5 UR=6 UR=7 UR=8 UR=9
stl92_property -0.888 -0.411 0.413 0.511 -0.614 -0.771** -0.491 -0.098 0.838
(1.54) (0.81) (1.31) (0.88) (0.40) (2.77) (1.66) (0.18) (1.85)
stl92_general_sales -1.478* -0.259 0.682 0.553 2.237 -0.150 -0.783* -0.642 -0.371
(2.18) (0.52) (1.62) (0.93) (1.86) (0.57) (2.29) (0.99) (0.88)
top_pi 0.000 -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002-0.002
(0.01) (0.84) (1.60) (1.14) (0.68) (1.96) (1.66) (0.73) (1.57)
top_capitalgains -0.003 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.015* 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.003
(1.21) (1.91) (0.69) (0.13) (2.22) (0.14) (0.61) (0.54) (1.73)
top_corporate 0.003** -0.001 -0.003** -0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.003** -0.003**
(2.94) (0.98) (3.60) (1.60) (0.29) (0.62) (0.65) (2.72) (2.80)
deathtax -0.013** 0.005 0.003 0.015** -0.018 0.000 -0.001 0.005 -0.001
(3.13) (0.93) (0.78) (2.98) (1.51) (0.07) (0.24) (0.97) (0.25)
unemptax 0.006* 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.008* -0.003* -0.004**0.000 -0.001
(2.36) (0.14) (1.09) (0.98) (2.27) (2.18) (2.79) (0.06) (0.78)
utilitiescosts 0.036 0.005 0.021 -0.023 -0.132* 0.003 0.025 -0.039* -0.028
(1.79) (0.25) (1.31) (1.02) (2.66) (0.26) (1.85) (2.15) (1.09)
compensation 0.010 -0.007 -0.006 0.004 -0.003 -0.008** -0.005 -0.005 0.005
(1.43) (1.50) (1.56) (0.78) (0.28) (2.89) (1.52) (1.19) (1.08)
gastax -0.078 0.033 -0.009 -0.160* -0.216 -0.001 0.008 0.022 0.121*
(1.31) (0.45) (0.21) (2.52) (1.14) (0.04) (0.23) (0.51) (2.01)
miniwage 0.004 0.001 0.013 0.014 0.002 0.012 0.013 -0.017 0.137**
(0.41) (0.05) (1.68) (1.48) (0.10) (1.41) (1.26) (1.67) (2.70)
stl92_rest -1.568** -0.852 -0.629 0.694 2.244 -0.941* -1.086* -1.370 -1.510**
(2.89) (0.86) (1.38) (0.88) (1.13) (2.14) (2.11) (1.76) (2.63)
stl92_firstsecond 2.384* 1.651* -0.632 0.611 -2.105 0.4870.337 0.509 -0.764
(2.58) (2.32) (1.05) (0.66) (1.58) (1.21) (0.76) (0.49) (1.23)
stl92_hospitalhealth 2.428 -0.162 0.191 -0.334 11.425** -1.125 -0.950 0.472 -0.023
(1.26) (0.12) (0.18) (0.20) (3.01) (1.47) (0.98) (0.51) (0.02)
stl92_highway 4.268** -0.239 -0.747 -2.554* -7.646** -0.117 0.800 1.142 1.897**
(3.01) (0.20) (0.96) (2.44) (5.53) (0.24) (1.62) (1.75) (2.68)
stl92_publicsafety 5.277* 0.953 -3.391* 0.852 -13.336** 0.424 1.167 0.799 3.728*
(2.34) (0.67) (2.54) (0.47) (3.55) (0.47) (0.99) (0.46) (2.03)
stl92_environhousing -6.767** 0.150 1.288 1.188 1.896 1.785* 0.624 1.564 0.745
(4.27) (0.10) (1.33) (0.75) (0.72) (2.56) (0.87) (1.69) (0.74)
stl92_govtadmin -8.725* -2.765 4.351* 1.069 13.918** 4.021** 2.431 0.229 -1.059
(2.14) (1.28) (2.47) (0.39) (4.73) (3.07) (1.90) (0.14) (0.63)
cty92property 0.007 -0.130 0.077 0.077 0.270 0.046 0.033 -0.039 -0.033
(0.04) (0.93) (0.49) (0.32) (1.40) (0.63) (0.54) (0.92) (0.98)
cty92sales 0.171 -0.176 -0.344 0.080 0.099 0.019 -0.135 -0.144 0.492
(0.30) (0.41) (0.83) (0.19) (0.11) (0.07) (0.44) (0.33) (0.65)
cty92education -0.258* -0.048 0.123 0.017 0.126 0.115* 0.051 0.108* 0.081**
(2.03) (0.60) (1.16) (0.18) (1.14) (2.13) (1.00) (2.37) (2.94)
cty92highway -0.636 -0.783 -0.078 -0.039 0.437 -0.189 -0.39 * -0.052 -0.001
(0.96) (1.55) (0.19) (0.07) (0.52) (1.25) (2.24) (0.37) (0.02)
cty92safety 0.406 1.192 -0.136 -0.168 0.556 0.096 0.276 0.173 0.494
(1.01) (1.58) (0.52) (0.23) (0.41) (0.23) (0.71) (0.64) (1.47)
cty92naturalrec -0.150 -2.122 -0.192 -1.622 -0.293 0.164 0.554 0.397 -0.359
(0.64) (1.58) (0.21) (1.80) (0.20) (1.04) (1.11) (1.04) (1.09)
cty92sewerage -0.385 0.237 0.492 -0.195 -0.056 -0.022 0.318 -0.181 0.248
(1.05) (0.38) (0.81) (0.77) (0.07) (0.07) (1.01) (0.29) (1.11)
Constant 0.046 -0.041 0.023 -0.013 0.204* -0.029 -0.034 0.007 -0.256**
(0.79) (0.52) (0.44) (0.17) (2.08) (0.86) (0.85) (0.15) (3.06)
Observations 387 318 340 214 101 598 439 228 418
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.29 0.20 0.25 0.39 0.38 0.31 0.52 0.43  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. UR stands for rural-urban continuum code r Beale code. Rent data are from the HUD.  
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Table 31A. Growth Equation Model Results for 9 Subsamples Considering SBSI and ERS Variables, 
Dependent Variable: earning/ln(earning1990) 
UR=1 UR=2 UR=3 UR=4 UR=5 UR=6 UR=7 UR=8 UR=9
stl92_property 0.236 -0.549** 0.223 0.295 0.838 0.307* 0.047 -0.170 0.604
(1.54) (2.85) (1.32) (1.18) (0.69) (2.21) (0.25) (0.52) (1.18)
stl92_general_sales -0.141 -0.844** 0.102 0.023 1.087 0.127 -0.156 -0.849 0.552
(0.85) (3.65) (0.58) (0.12) (1.35) (0.93) (0.67) (1.77) (1.09)
top_pi 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.003** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.72) (0.85) (0.71) (3.08) (0.03) (1.84) (0.94) (0.25) (1.50)
top_capitalgains 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002* 0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002
(0.55) (0.20) (1.50) (2.52) (0.19) (0.79) (2.15) (0.58) (0.85)
top_corporate 0.001 -0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.00-0.002* -0.002
(1.56) (3.13) (0.41) (0.46) (0.66) (1.54) (0.82) (2.39) (1.41)
deathtax 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.017 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.005
(1.73) (0.88) (0.65) (1.33) (2.00) (1.84) (0.51) (1.90) (0.98)
unemptax 0.001 0.000 -0.002* 0.003* 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.0010.000
(1.55) (0.35) (2.43) (2.56) (1.13) (1.04) (0.88) (0.87) (0.02)
utilitiescosts 0.007 0.027** -0.009 -0.002 0.004 -0.005 0.002 0.015 0.009
(0.94) (2.64) (1.18) (0.23) (0.10) (0.78) (0.26) (1.19) (0.40)
compensation 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.022* -0.005** 0.00 0.002 -0.004
(0.55) (0.68) (1.88) (0.51) (2.29) (3.12) (0.08) (0.56) (0.93)
gastax -0.018 0.010 0.042* -0.012 -0.070 0.012 0.013 -0.049-0.026
(1.19) (0.48) (2.08) (0.39) (0.49) (0.64) (0.61) (1.30) (0.48)
miniwage 0.006* 0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.002 -0.084
(2.21) (0.62) (0.42) (0.12) (0.73) (0.10) (1.45) (0.20) (1.51)
stl92_rest 0.175 -0.559 0.013 0.465 1.192 0.012 -0.652* -1.029 0.760
(1.22) (1.81) (0.05) (1.64) (0.77) (0.06) (2.31) (1.47) (1.28)
stl92_firstsecond 0.120 0.817* -0.184 -0.031 -0.733 0.054-0.400 0.422 -0.907
(0.53) (2.36) (0.68) (0.11) (0.69) (0.29) (1.44) (0.71) (1.27)
stl92_hospitalhealth 0.230 -1.364* 0.644 0.311 -2.560 0.083 0.011 -0.766 0.013
(0.44) (2.49) (1.29) (0.48) (0.60) (0.19) (0.02) (0.82) (0.01)
stl92_highway -0.381 0.234 0.595 -1.333** -2.016 -0.101 0.253 0.476 0.401
(0.70) (0.59) (1.41) (3.49) (1.06) (0.35) (0.72) (0.79) (0.52)
stl92_publicsafety -0.920 1.617* -0.081 -0.908 -7.160 -0.552 -0.260 0.819 -1.067
(1.53) (2.19) (0.14) (1.37) (1.83) (1.26) (0.41) (0.69) (0.58)
stl92_environhousing 1.457** 0.472 -0.404 1.345* -3.750 -0.136 -0.059 1.184 0.228
(3.04) (0.99) (0.85) (2.24) (1.45) (0.34) (0.12) (1.15) (0.32)
stl92_govtadmin -2.926** -2.503* -1.267 -0.894 6.096 0.011 1.923* -1.473 -1.718
(3.05) (2.25) (1.47) (0.80) (1.68) (0.01) (2.43) (0.99) (0.97)
cty92property 0.054 -0.115 0.017 0.017 -0.126 -0.051 -0.069 -0.091 0.037
(0.71) (1.95) (0.31) (0.21) (0.71) (1.29) (1.87) (1.57) (0.82)
cty92sales 0.182 -0.293 -0.157 0.396 0.775 -0.076 -0.109 0.214 0.277
(1.32) (1.37) (0.97) (1.93) (1.14) (0.53) (0.85) (0.52) (0.86)
cty92education 0.069 0.049 0.035 -0.090 0.341 -0.009 -0.003 0.081 -0.050
(1.21) (0.97) (0.58) (1.46) (1.80) (0.26) (0.09) (1.39) (1.20)
cty92highway -0.030 0.404* 0.210 0.132 0.336 0.174* 0.233*-0.070 0.167*
(0.19) (2.05) (1.12) (0.59) (0.65) (2.03) (2.03) (0.43) (2.11)
cty92safety -0.248 0.210 -0.575** -0.225 -1.219 -0.288 -0.106 -0.185 -0.024
(1.27) (0.75) (3.50) (0.76) (1.36) (1.88) (0.49) (0.72) (0.07)
cty92naturalrec -0.099 0.304 -0.564 -0.348 1.425 0.088 0.110 0.413 -0.236
(0.95) (0.71) (1.44) (0.84) (1.55) (1.53) (0.48) (0.96) (1.34)
cty92sewerage -0.208 0.403 0.115 -0.077 -0.278 -0.182 -0.070 0.500 -0.079
(1.80) (1.40) (0.55) (0.74) (0.43) (1.26) (0.42) (1.56) (0.24)
Constant -0.027 -0.161 0.058 0.072 0.423 0.143* 0.292** 0.072 0.191
(0.33) (1.74) (0.70) (0.72) (1.31) (2.32) (4.02) (0.60) (1.51)
Observations 387 318 340 214 101 598 439 228 418
Adjusted R-squared 0.56 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.68 0.56 0.58 0.53 0.53  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. UR stands for rural-urban continuum code r Beale code. Earning data are from the Census.  
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Table 31B. Growth Equation Model Results for 9 Subsamples Considering SBSI and ERS Variables, 
Dependent Variable: ∆housing/ln(housing1990) 
UR=1 UR=2 UR=3 UR=4 UR=5 UR=6 UR=7 UR=8 UR=9
stl92_property -1.204** 0.040 -0.076 -0.176 -0.610 -0.097-0.250 -0.538 -1.410
(3.31) (0.14) (0.26) (0.39) (0.53) (0.35) (0.81) (0.79) (1.59)
stl92_general_sales -2.758** -0.693* -0.657* -0.617 -0.920 -0.622* -0.381 -0.379 -0.906
(6.38) (2.05) (2.20) (1.44) (0.86) (2.26) (1.04) (0.50) (0.98)
top_pi -0.003 -0.003* -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.003* -0.002 -0.006* 0.000
(1.61) (2.55) (1.78) (0.02) (0.54) (2.51) (1.70) (2.19) (0.01)
top_capitalgains -0.004* 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001-0.001 0.002 -0.007*
(2.07) (0.88) (0.67) (0.72) (0.11) (1.18) (0.56) (1.25) (2.44)
top_corporate 0.004** -0.002** -0.001 -0.003** 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004*
(4.69) (3.24) (1.66) (2.62) (1.45) (0.47) (1.15) (1.86) (2.05)
deathtax 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.005 0.009
(0.12) (0.34) (0.86) (1.04) (0.10) (1.06) (0.82) (1.05) (1.14)
unemptax 0.008** 0.002 -0.001 0.004* -0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.001
(4.49) (1.58) (1.18) (2.04) (0.41) (1.95) (1.79) (1.01) (0.65)
utilitiescosts -0.026 -0.031* -0.008 -0.009 -0.012 -0.029* -0.057** -0.044 -0.013
(1.56) (2.37) (0.69) (0.58) (0.26) (2.49) (4.02) (1.91) (0.31)
compensation 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 0.003 -0.006 -0.013*
(0.39) (1.69) (1.16) (0.52) (0.96) (0.57) (0.89) (1.23) (2.04)
gastax -0.127** 0.105** 0.031 0.024 0.034 0.037 0.131** 0.146** 0.008
(3.60) (3.10) (0.98) (0.41) (0.19) (0.92) (3.27) (2.63) (0.09)
miniwage -0.002 -0.022** -0.001 -0.011 0.025 0.016* 0.019*0.056** -0.135
(0.28) (3.74) (0.18) (1.66) (1.34) (2.21) (2.47) (3.94) (1.18)
stl92_rest -2.142** -1.361** -1.012* -0.505 -0.554 -1.121* -2.581** -2.142* -1.472
(5.47) (2.86) (2.36) (0.86) (0.30) (2.37) (5.49) (2.16) (1.46)
stl92_firstsecond 2.607** -0.369 1.044* 0.227 1.186 0.950* 0.767 1.595 1.872
(5.53) (0.75) (2.35) (0.34) (0.99) (2.48) (1.74) (1.33) (1.54)
stl92_hospitalhealth 5.077** -1.264 -1.846* -1.991 -1.785 -0.842 2.233 0.402 5.766**
(4.42) (1.75) (2.20) (1.89) (0.46) (1.04) (1.89) (0.37) (3.18)
stl92_highway 5.751** 2.010** 1.060 -0.595 -0.682 0.219 1.352* 0.616 0.546
(5.10) (3.20) (1.59) (0.80) (0.37) (0.39) (2.27) (0.69) (0.45)
stl92_publicsafety 7.256** 0.734 0.486 -1.232 0.494 2.043* .547** 2.032 -0.584
(5.37) (0.70) (0.47) (0.74) (0.13) (2.50) (2.93) (1.13) (0.21)
stl92_environhousing -6.108** -0.450 -1.625* 0.007 0.031-2.439** -1.557* -1.579 -2.684
(6.07) (0.55) (2.17) (0.01) (0.01) (3.60) (2.01) (1.19) (1.89)
stl92_govtadmin -11.042** -2.730 0.206 0.179 1.574 0.099 -2.735 -2.996 -2.990
(5.27) (1.55) (0.15) (0.07) (0.37) (0.07) (1.69) (0.99) (1.10)
cty92property -0.283* -0.292** -0.076 -0.396** 0.013 -0.244** -0.050 0.024 0.065
(2.11) (3.34) (0.75) (2.64) (0.05) (4.01) (0.65) (0.34) (0.78)
cty92sales 0.160 -0.019 0.182 0.109 0.552 0.059 0.007 -0.380 -0.632
(0.56) (0.06) (0.72) (0.28) (0.75) (0.20) (0.02) (0.61) (1.28)
cty92education 0.013 0.089 -0.026 0.309** 0.109 0.029 -0.129 -0.037 -0.200**
(0.12) (1.17) (0.33) (3.30) (0.43) (0.53) (1.94) (0.46) (3.39)
cty92highway 1.444** 0.698 0.374 0.941 0.834 0.653** 0.480* -0.157 -0.045
(4.84) (1.95) (1.28) (1.81) (1.13) (4.63) (2.28) (0.56) (0.33)
cty92safety -1.512** -0.430 0.015 0.653 -3.504** 0.058 -0.329 -0.587 0.004
(3.30) (0.96) (0.05) (0.96) (3.05) (0.20) (0.69) (1.31) (0.01)
cty92naturalrec -0.056 0.891 -0.749 -1.951** 1.446 0.411** -0.786 -0.863 -0.005
(0.27) (1.06) (1.39) (3.39) (1.33) (2.64) (1.23) (1.26) (0.01)
cty92sewerage -0.530** 0.247 0.358 -0.188 0.242 -0.315 0.044 0.562 0.200
(2.67) (0.61) (1.03) (1.16) (0.30) (1.16) (0.18) (1.21) (0.53)
Constant 0.545** 0.412* 0.172 0.259* 0.261 0.278** -0.089 -0.439** 0.583*
(3.12) (2.36) (1.59) (2.27) (0.65) (4.54) (0.52) (2.94) (2.34)
Observations 387 318 340 214 101 598 439 228 418
Adjusted R-squared 0.79 0.84 0.74 0.76 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.49  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. UR stands for rural-urban continuum code r Beale code. Housing data are from the Census.  
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stl92_firstsecond, stl92_highway in the rent equation for the full sample, all of which are 
expected, are shown to lose significance for almost all of nonmetropolitan cases. 
However, we do see a positive and statistically significant coefficient on cty92highway in 
both wage and rent equations for the sub-region (Beale code 6 or 7) that has urban 
population of 2500-20000, adjacent or nonadjacent to a metro area. Overall, using the 
Census earning and housing value data as the dependent variables (Tables 31A-31B) 
generally produces better results than using the BEA wage and HUD rent data (Tables 
30A-30B). For instance, the stl92_general_sales, top_pi and stl92_property tax variables 
and the highway expenditure variables at both state and county levels are generally found 
to perform better in complying with our expectations.  
To conclude, the findings from estimating the growth equation models in this 
section can be summarized as follows. First, we generally find consistent results for the 
state tax variables using either set of outcome measur ments. In addition, the second 
measurement using Census earning and housing data turns out to be better for the state 
expenditure variables in terms of statistical signif cance, implying using Census earning 
and housing data could be better in reflecting local labor and land markets as mentioned 
before. 
Second, using either set of measurements of dependent variables we generally 
find little role of county fiscal variables played on affecting wage and rent growth. 
Third, the coefficient estimates are also found to be consistent between the full 




Fourth, we find models including additional SBSI variables do not produce better 
results than models without them regardless of which set of dependent variables we use, 
which could be partially due to the fact that the SBSI variables are not measured in initial 
1992 values and their usage is somewhat inconsistent with the specification in the growth 
model context. 
Fifth, the variance coefficient estimates are found to be insensitive to accounting 






































The main findings drawn from this study are summarized below. The policy implications, 
limitations and opportunities for future research are lso discussed. 
 
6.1 Summary                                                                                                                                                                                         
The purpose of this study is to explore how state and local fiscal policies explain wage 
differentials and rent differentials among the U.S. nonmetropolitan counties. We consider 
comprehensively the government budget constraint, sample heterogeneity, fixed effects, 
endogeneity, and spatial correlation in modeling.  
 Nonmetropolitan counties differ in the local fiscal onditions, i.e., government 
spending and taxes. Government spending can act as both an unpaid factor of production 
and household amenity, while taxes can act as both a curb of productivity of certain 
factors of production and household disamenity. These fiscal conditions are formally 
evaluated in the equilibrium model of the labor and land markets of the Roback (1982) 
framework to explain the inter-county wage differenc s which remained after accounting 
for human capital differences and other labor attribu es, and inter-county rent differences 
which remained after accounting for housing characteristics. According to the 
framework, if a county-specific desirable attribute can be reflected in both labor and land 
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markets, such a county should have higher rents than otherwise similar counties, and 
lower wages if the households are compensated for fiscal differences. 
In addition, we model the wage and rent equations in three different forms: the 
levels form, the differenced form, and the growth form, each of which is under slightly 
different assumption of labor and land market processes. Specifically, the levels form 
model assumes an equilibrium of labor and land markets of the Roback (1982) 
framework. The differenced form model does not assume the equilibrium condition. 
Rather it is applied to examine the contemporaneous ffects of the changes in 
government tax and expenditure variables on the changes of local wages and rents. The 
growth form model, extended from the Roback framework, assumes by some means that 
there are disequilibrium forces in the current period, and there are some disequilibrium 
innovations going on that affect current levels andsubsequent changes. Theoretically we 
do not know how the true process of the labor and lmarkets works until we 
empirically implement the three forms of models. 
 Turning to the results of the levels form regression , generally we find that either 
the tax group or the expenditure group variables ar not consistent with each other, as we 
expect that each variable in the tax group or in the expenditure group should have the 
same coefficient sign, in addition, the tax group variables should have opposite signs to 
these in the expenditure group. Specifically, we find that the property tax, education, and 
highway variables have the opposite signs to the ones predicted by theory, and the sign 
on public safety is consistent with the prediction. However, we obtain better results in 
accordance with the theoretical predictions using the marginal tax variables (top marginal 
personal income tax and top marginal corporate income tax) than those using average 
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effective tax measurements. We argue that marginal tax variables could be better than 
average effective tax rates in truly reflecting the labor and land markets, as the marginal 
tax rate measures better the incentives of households’ r firms’ location choice and have 
less measurement error than the average tax measures. Using the two stage least squares 
(2SLS) techniques in an attempt to mitigate possible endogeneity bias fails to produce 
better results than the OLS estimates, which we beli ve either is due to the instrument 
sets chosen being invalid, or the true process of the labor and land markets can not be 
represented by the levels form model as specified. 
 With regard to the results of differenced model, using the Census earning and 
housing cost data seems to provide us better results than the first set of data from the 
BEA and HUD, which we have argued that the Census earnings and housing data may be 
better in reflecting the nonmetropolitan labor and land markets. In addition, using the 
2SLS technique appears to produce better results and larger coefficient estimates than the 
OLS approach. It is better not only because most fiscal variables are consistent with the 
theoretical predictions, but also because it accounts for possible endogeneity bias 
associated with the OLS approach. Using the 2SLS method, we find the tax variables, 
∆st_individual and ∆st_rest (selective, license, and other taxes) are statistically 
significant with expected negative signs, and the expenditure variables, ∆st_safety and 
∆st_environhousing are statistically significant with expected positive signs. Taking into 
consideration the negative coefficient of these two tax variables and the positive 
coefficient of these two expenditure variables in the wage equation, it appears that the 
public safety and environment and housing have bothproductivity and amenity effects, 
with the productivity effect dominating the amenity effect. On the other hand, individual 
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income tax and selective, license taxes appear to be household disamenities and inhibit 
productivity. 
 Turning next to the growth model results, similarly as found in the differenced 
equation model, using the Census earnings and housing cost data provides us better 
results than the first set of data from the BEA andHUD. Briefly, the state tax variables 
(general sales tax, individual income tax, corporate income tax, selective and license 
taxes) are generally found to be negative both in te wage and rent equation and 
statistically significant in the rent equation, reflecting the households’ disamenity and 
firms’ counter-productivity effects. This result is expected as greater taxes increase 
business cost and discourage labor supply. Furthermor , the state expenditures on first-
secondary education, highway, and public safety are found to be positive in the both 
equations and statistically significant in the rent quation. According to the hedonic 
compensation theory, this indicates that education, highway, and public safety have both 
amenity and productivity effects. In addition, the productivity effects of these the 
expenditure variables would have to dominate their amenity effects to be consistent with 
the positive sign in the wage model. These results indicate the fact both households and 
firms prefer more investment in education, highway, and public safety, which is expected 
as more government spending can increase the productivity of certain factors of 
production. For instance, more government spending on education can reduce business 
costs through increasing the marginal product of labor. 
 This study fills the gap in the hedonic literature by addressing the state and local 
fiscal policy effects at the nonmetropolitan level. The findings of this study should be of 





6.2 Policy Implications 
 
Do fiscal policies matter in affecting local economic performance? The answer to this 
question seems an unambiguous “yes!”, but only for the state-wide fiscal policies, 
county-level fiscal policies generally do not. One possible explanation is that a county is 
a small economy that cannot affect land and labor markets that may extend beyond 
county boundaries. 
 The empirical results indicate that the education, public safety, and highway play 
the role as a household amenity and the role as a productive amenity while personal 
income tax and property income tax act as household disamenity and firm disamenity. 
Thus, policy makers should be aware of the dual role of taxes and public services before 
conducting any government project. 
 In addition, the theoretical and empirical analysis show that taxes and spending 
affect local wage and rent growth in opposite direct ons. Therefore, examining the effects 
of fiscal policy requires that both components of fiscal policy, i.e., taxes and 
expenditures, be considered simultaneously. For instance, as the empirical results from 
the preferred growth model using Census earning and housing data indicate, when the 
revenue from state taxes (stl92_property, stl92_general_sales, stl92_individual_income, 
stl92_corporate_income, stl92_rest) is used to pay for the non-general expenditures 
(liquor store, utility, or insurance trust expenditure), they have a negative effect on 
economic development. When the taxes such as stl92_property, stl92_general_sales, and 
stl92_individual_income are used to fund the local education, public safety, and highway 
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valued by firms and households, they seem to increase local economic performance. This 
is important and implies that taxes should be used with caution. 
 In brief, a county’s ability to attract household in-migration and business is 
significantly affected by its pattern of both taxation and public services, either one can 
not be studied alone. Households and firms consider the personal income tax and 
corporate income tax as negative, hence, in order to fur her the economic development of 
nonmetropolitan territories, it is better for the state governments to lower the personal 
income tax and corporate income tax while still being able to maintain the education, 
public safety and highway expenditures on a high level. 
 
6.3 Limitations and Future Studies 
 
The findings of this study provide some, though limited, insights into differences in local 
labor and land markets. However this study is also subject to some limitations which 
require us to interpret the results with caution. First, the hedonic approach suffers from 
several analytical problems arising from choices of m del specification and selection of 
explanatory variables (see the review by Malpezzi (2003) and Sheppard (1999)). 
Therefore, the employment of classical linear regression models in this study may raise 
some concerns about the linearity assumption and variable selection. In future study we 
could specify some more flexible functional forms for the hedonic model using the 
generalized Box-Cox (1964) transformation. This technique poses no (linear) restrictions 




Second, spatial correlation has not been satisfactorily explored in this study. 
Spatial correlation has not been tested in this study, neither does the necessity for a 
clustering.10 We simply assume that it exists. In other words, we assume the error terms 
are correlated within clusters, but not across clusters. In addition, the way of grouping 
clusters are somewhat arbitrary. The econometric analysis in this study can be compared 
with alternative clustering routines such as K-means clustering, where we can use the 
fiscal variables of our interest to group the sample counties in this study with similar 
characteristics instead of using the way that BEA does. Furthermore, this study may be 
improved by specifying a spatial econometric model. For instance, we may experiment 
with a spatial contiguity-based model, or we can define a spatial model which assumes 
that the spatial weights follow a decay function of the distance between two counties 
subject to some upper and lower bounds on the distance, beyond the bound the spatial 
weight or county correlation is assumed to be zero. However, as we might notice that the 
choice of the bounds is arbitrary and ought to be verified empirically. 
Third, the problem of endogeneity may not be addressed and corrected properly. 
The methodology using instruments in the form of lagged endogenous variables can be 
inappropriate if the instruments under consideration are autocorrelated (Green, 2000, 
p.689). However, finding good quality instruments posits a significant challenge in the 
macroeconomics literature. Ideally, the instruments should correlate strongly with the 
endogenous variables and not correlate with the depndent variable. Future study may be 
necessary to search for valid and strong instruments. 
                                                
10 Herrin (2002) provides the STATA modules to test for clustering. Also, Kezdi (2005) provides a test for 
clustering in the spirit of the White (1980) test for heteroscedasticity.  
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Fourth, the panel data approach is not applied in this study as we do not have a 
complete dataset for more than two time periods. Future regional study can apply the 
panel approach because it provides several advantages in correcting for problem of 
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Appendix A. Detailed Calculations for Section 3.1 
 
This appendix is presenting some detailed steps of calculation to get the equations in 
Section 3.1. 
Total differentiating both sides of equations (2) and (3), 
VsrwV =);,(                                   (2) 














































































      
 
The next calculation involves using equations (5)-(8) to obtain equation (9a). The 
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)(−=  (substitution using equation (7)) 






dw −−  (substitution using equation (6)) 















−−  (substitution using 
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=  , 
w
rL
k hl ≡                                           (9b) 
 
As dlnr/ds is not directly estimable, first we need r lated it to dlnph/ds from 
equation (10) 
 
























h ln1)/(11ln ====                           (11). 








h lnln = , substituting it into equation (9b), 
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pp −=        (12). 
 





























wd h−             (12b). 
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(601.0 +=                                                          (13b). 
 
The amenity component and productivity component of dr/ds is calculated as 
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1−=   (substitution using equation (7)) 



















dr +−=  (substitution using equation (8)). 



































































h lnln =  
from equation (11) and 
w
rL
k hl ≡  
from equation (9b)) 




















 (Noticing that whpk hh /=  and     
equilibrium conditions for land 
and labor imply Np=N and 
LLNL ph =+ ) 































hl −=                                                    (14) 





















pd h −=                                                             (14b) 
( 05.0≡lk . 088.0/ ≡wNrL ; 27.0≡hk  following Beeson and Eberts (1989). 


























































































pd h +=                                                    (15b) 
The four equations (12b), (13b), (14b), (15b) form the basis on empirically 
identifying the decomposition of the interregional wage differential and rent differential 
presented in the results section. 
 
Appendix B. Detailed Calculations for Section 3.2 
 
This appendix is presenting some detailed steps of calculation to get the equations in 
Section 3.2. 
Starting from equation (21) 




ZKANY  subject to ZPKWNC Z++= 1 , we set up the Lagrange 
Multiplier function: )(1 ZPKWNCZKPANL Z−−−+=
−− λγβγβ . The first order 










. Setting these two equations respectively to zero and solving 








































ZNAW         (22). 
 To obtain the indirect utility function in equation (24), we maximize utility in 
equation (23) ααθ −= 1CHU subject to a budget constraint CHPW H 1+= . Setting up the 
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Lagrange Multiplier function gives )(1 CHPWCHL H −−+=
− λθ αα . The first order 
conditions on H and C give us: HPCHH
L λθα αα −=
∂






)1( . Setting 





α1* = .  WC )1(* α−=       (22a). 
Substituting H* and C* back into utility function (equation (23)), we have the following 
indirect utility function: 
VWPH =−
− θαα αα 1)1(          (24). 
 To derive the housing price equation (equation (27)), starting with a developer’s 
total housing supply function (equation (25), hLQH = ) and his/her cost function (housing 
structure cost, LHc δ0  plus and land cost, LPL ), the profit facing a developer thus is:  
)()( 0 LPLhchLP LH +−=











h H                  (21a), 









          (21b). 
 This total housing supply must be equal to total housing demand, i.e., the total number of 
















δ =−  and solving 













cPH             (22). 
 The following calculations are performed to generate results in equations (28a-
28c) by linking together equation (22) (labor demand equation), equation (24) (indirect 
utility equation), and equation (27) (housing price equation). The final goal is to solve 
these three equations for three unknowns (population N, income W, and housing price 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CP        (28c). 
where CN, CW, CP are constant terms that differ across regions but not within a region. 
Assuming innovations to productivity, region specific characteristics (amenity or fiscal 














L εφ ++=+ )ln( 1 , where CA, 
Cθ, and CL are constants, θφφ ,A  and Lφ  are coefficients, θεε ,A  and Lε  are error terms, 
and S is a region specific variable. 















P εφγββφφδτ θ +−−−+−+= ∆+ ]})1()[1{()ln( 1      (29c) 
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where 1)]1()1([ −−+−−= δαβγβδτ . Hence if letting PWN ΒΒΒ ˆ,ˆ,ˆ represent the 
estimated coefficients on S variable from estimating the population, wage and housing 
price change equations (29a-c), i.e. letting  
]})1()[1(){(ˆ LAN φδαδφγφαδαδτ θ −+−+−+=Β                            (29i) 
]})1()[1()1{(ˆ LAW φδαδφγβαφδτ θ −+−−−−=Β      (29ii) 
]})1()[1{(ˆ LAP φγββφφδτ θ −−−+−=Β       (29iii). 














)1( AWANL , solving for Aφ  gives 
us: 
WNA Β−+Β−−= ˆ)1(ˆ)1( γγβφ          (30a). 














































Β PW , solving for θφ gives us: 
WP Β−Β= ˆˆαφθ          (30b) 
134 
 



































































Appendix C. Appendix Tables 1-20 
 
Appendix Table 1. Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Source Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent Variables     
ln(wage2002) Log of average wage per job in 2002 (in dollars) for the employed over 16 BEA 10.086 0.151 
ln(wage92) Log of average wage per job in 1992 (in dollars) for the employed over 16 BEA 9.755 0.174 
ln(rent2002) Log of rent (in dollars) in 2002 for house with 2 bedroom HUD 6.070 0.142 
ln(rent2002) Log of rent (in dollars) in 1992 for house with 2 bedroom HUD 5.946 0.164 
ln(earning2000) Log of annual median earnings (in dollars) in 1999 for the employed over 16 2000 Census 9.819 0.142 
ln(housing2000) 
Log of weighted average median gross house rent ($/month) of owner and 
renter occupied housing units in 2000 using shares of owner and renter 
occupied houses as weights. For owner occupied units, annual rent is imputed 
as 7.85% of median house value. 
2000 Census 6.156 0.316 
ln(earning1990) Log of annual median earnings (in dollars) in 1989 for the employed over 16 1990 Census 9.647 0.188 
ln(housing1990) 
Log of weighted average median gross house rent ($/month) of owner and 
renter occupied housing units in 1990 using shares of owner and renter 
occupied houses as weights. For owner occupied units, annual rent is imputed 
as 7.85% of median house value. 
1990 Census 5.731 0.302 
County Fiscal Variables (2002)     
cty02property Revenue from property tax 2002 COG 0.035 0.032 
cty02sales Revenue from sales tax 2002 COG 0.004 0.005 
cty02highway Expenditure on highway - charges on highway 2002 COG 0.011 0.009 
cty02safety Expenditure on public safety (police + fire protection) 2002 COG 0.007 0.004 
cty02naturalrec Expenditure on natural resource and p rks recreation - corresponding charges 2002 COG 0.003 0.007 
cty02sewerage Expenditure on sewerage and waste management - corresponding charges 2002 COG 0.001 0.003 
cty02education Expenditure on first and secondary education 2002 COG 0.071 0.029 
County Fiscal Variables (1992)     
cty92property Revenue from property tax 1992 COG 0.035 0.026 
cty92sales Revenue from sales tax 1992 COG 0.003 0.005 
cty92highway Expenditure on highway - charges on highway 1992 COG 0.010 0.009 
cty92safety Expenditure on public safety (police + fire protection) 1992 COG 0.006 0.004 
cty92naturalrec Expenditure on natural resource and parks recreation - corresponding charges 1992 COG 0.002 0.003 
cty92sewerage Expenditure on sewerage and waste management - corresponding charges 1992 COG 0.001 0.003 
cty92education Expenditure on first and secondary education 1992 COG 0.063 0.023 
State Fiscal Variables (2002)     
stl02_property Revenue from property tax 2002 COG 0.030 0.008 
stl02_sales Revenue from sales tax 2002 COG 0.026 0.008 
stl02_rest Revenue from selective, license, and other taxes 2002 COG 0.021 0.006 
stl02_individual Revenue from individual income tax 2002 COG 0.020 0.011 
stl02_corporate Revenue from corporate income tax  2002 COG 0.002 0.002 
stl02_firstsecond 
Expenditure on elementary & secondary - School lunch saleson elementary & 
secondary 
2002 COG 0.046 0.005 
stl02_higheredu Expenditure on Higher education - corresponding charges 2002 COG 0.013 0.003 
stl02_hospitalhealth Expenditure on hospitals - corresponding charges 2002 COG 0.008 0.002 
stl02_highway Expenditure on highway - corresponding charges 2002 COG 0.016 0.005 
stl02_publicsafety 
Expenditure on public safety (police, fire, correction, etc) - corresponding 
charges 
2002 COG 0.016 0.003 
stl02_environhousing 
Expenditure on natural resources, parks recreation., h using and 
communitydevelopment, sewerage, solid waste management - corresponding 
charges 
2002 COG 0.009 0.002 
stl02_govtadmin 
Expenditure on government administration (Financial administration + 
Judicialand legal + General public buildings + Other_governmental 
administration) 
2002 COG 0.010 0.003 
State Fiscal Variables (1992)     
stl92_property Revenue from property tax 1992 COG 0.031 0.010 
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stl92_general_sales Revenue from sales tax 1992 COG 0.025 0.008 
stl92_rest Revenue from selective, license, and other taxes 1992 COG 0.022 0.006 
stl92_individual_income Revenue from individual income tax  1992 COG 0.019 0.011 
stl92_corporate_income Revenue from corporate income tax  1992 COG 0.003 0.002 
stl92_firstsecond Expenditure on elementary & secondary - School lunch sales  1992 COG 0.043 0.005 
stl92_hospitalhealth Expenditure on hospitals - corresponding charges 1992 COG 0.008 0.002 
stl92_highway Expenditure on highway - corresponding charges 1992 COG 0.016 0.005 
stl92_publicsafety 
Expenditure on public safety (police, fire, correction, etc) - corresponding 
charges 
1992 COG 0.013 0.003 
stl92_environhousing 
Expenditure on natural resources, parks recreation., h using and community 
development, sewerage, solid waste management - corresp nding charges 
1992 COG 0.009 0.003 
stl92_govtadmin 
Expenditure on government administration (Financial administration + 
Judicial and legal + General public buildings + Other_governmental 
administration) 
1992 COG 0.009 0.002 
Small Business Survival Index (2002)    
top_pi State’s top personal income tax rate 2002 SBEC 4.872 2.753 
top_capitalgains State’s top capital gains tax rate on individuals 2002 SBEC 4.588 2.893 
top_corporate State’s top corporate income tax rate 2002 SBEC 6.311 2.377 
deathtax 
State death taxes(states levying death taxes receive a score of “1” and states 
that do not receive a score of “0”) 
2002 SBEC 0.344 0.475 
unemptax Unemployment tax rate 2002 SBEC 2.496 1.443 
utilitiescosts State’s electricity utility cost index 2002 SBEC 0.879 0.178 
compensation State workers’ compensation benefits per $100 of covered wages 2002 SBEC 0.976 0.497 
gastax State gas tax (dollars per gallon) 2002 SBEC 0.201 0.045 
miniwage State minimum wage minus the federal minimum wage 2002 SBEC 0.063 0.303 
Demographic Variables (2000)     
Married00  Percent of 2000 population(15 years over) that are married 2000 Census 0.610 0.050 
Female00  Percent of 2000 population that are femal 2000 Census 0.503 0.021 
Disability00  Percent of 2000 Civilian non-institutonalized population 16 to 64 years  2000 Census 0.126 0.035 
    with a work disability   0.016 0.032 
Lingisolation00     Percent of 2000 households with linguistic isolation prob.  2000 Census 0.078 0.148 
African00  Percent of 2000 population African-American   2000 Census 0.019 0.071 
Native00  Percent of 2000 population that are Native American  2000 Census 0.078 0.148 
Asianpacific00  Percent of 2000 population Asian and Pacific islands origin   2000 Census 0.025 0.050 
Other00  Percent of 2000 pop. with other race background   2000 Census 0.060 0.128 
Hispanic00  Percent of 2000 population Hispanic   2000 Census 0.359 0.059 
Highschool00  Percent of 2000 population 25 years and over that are high school graduates   2000 Census 0.201 0.046 
Somecollege00  Percent of 2000 population 25 years and over that have some college degree   2000 Census 0.055 0.021 
Associate00  Percent of 2000 population 25 years and over that have an associate degree   2000 Census 0.097 0.039 
bachelor00  Percent of 2000 population 25 years and over that are 4-year college graduates   2000 Census 0.166 0.021 
Age7_1700  Percent of 2000 population 7-17 years   2000 Census 0.085 0.033 
Age18_2400  Percent of 2000 population 18-24 years   2000 Census 0.400 0.032 
Age25_5400  Percent of 2000 population 25-54 years   2000 Census 0.053 0.009 
Age55_5900  Percent of 2000 population 55-59 years   2000 Census 0.048 0.010 
Age60_6400  Percent of 2000 population 60-64 years   2000 Census 0.161 0.039 
Age65up00  Percent of 2000 population over 65 years   2000 Census 0.610 0.050 
Demographic Variables (1990)     
Female   Percent of 1990 population that are female 1990 Census 0.510 0.017 
Married   Percent of 1990 population that are married 1990 Census 0.491 0.043 
Disability  Percent of 1990 16- 4 pop with a work disability 1990 Census 0.100 0.031 
Lingisolation  Percent of 1990 population with linguistic isolation problem 1990 Census 0.014 0.034 
African  Percent of 1990 population African-American  1990 Census 0.076 0.147 
Native  Percent of 1990 population that are Native American  1990 Census 0.018 0.068 
Asian  Percent of 1990 population Asian and Pacific islands origin   1990 Census 0.003 0.004 
Other  Percent of 1990 pop. with other race background   1990 Census 0.018 0.049 
Hispanic  Percent of 1990 population Hispanic   1990 Census 0.044 0.119 
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Highschool  Percent of 1990 population 25 years and over that are high school graduates   1990 Census 0.226 0.044 
Somecollege  Percent of 1990 population 25 years and over that have some college degree   1990 Census 0.101 0.030 
Associate  Percent of 1990 population 25 years and over that have an associate degree   1990 Census 0.033 0.015 
Bachelor  Percent of 1990 population 25 years and over that are 4-year college graduates   1990 Census 0.052 0.022 
Age7_17  Percent of 1990 population 7-17 years  1990 Census 0.171 0.023 
age18_24  Percent of 1990 population 18-24 years  1990 Census 0.086 0.033 
Age25_54  Percent of 1990 population 25-54 years   1990 Census 0.385 0.032 
Age55_59  Percent of 1990 population 55-59 years  1990 Census 0.047 0.008 
Age60_64  Percent of 1990 population 60-64 years   1990 Census 0.049 0.010 
Age65up  Percent of 1990 population over 65 years   1990 Census 0.163 0.041 
Amenity Variables      
Census_division 1-9 ERS, USDA 5.237 1.886 
2003 Rural Urban Continuum Code 1-9 ERS, USDA 6.811 1.543 
1993 Rural Urban Continuum Code 0-9 ERS, USDA 6.998 1.587 
TempJan_ Mean temperature for January, 1941-71 ERS, USDA 31.476 12.279 
SunJan_ Mean hours of sunlight for January, 1941-71 ERS, USDA 153.103 33.639 
TempJul_ Mean temperature for July, 1941-70 ERS, USDA 75.560 5.623 
HumidJul_ Mean relative humidity for July, 1941-71 ERS, USDA 54.184 14.873 
Topography_ 
Topography score ranging from 1-21, where 1 represents flat plain and 
21represents most mountainous land 
ERS, USDA 9.109 6.634 
Waterpct Percent of county area covered by water ERS, USDA 3.466 9.757 
Business Cycle Variable     
RTW2  Right to work law dummy variable NRTW 0.560 0.497 
Notes: BEA=Bureau of Economic Analysis, REIS. SBEC=Small Business & Entrepreneurship Council. COG=Census of Government. ERS, 
USDA=Economic Research Services, U.S. Department of Agriculture. HUD=U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 










Appendix Table 2A. Level Equation Model Results for Sample N468, Dependent 
variables: ln(wage2002) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
stl02_property 3.084** -0.900 -0.862 -0.210
(3.30) (0.68) (0.65) (0.17)
stl02_sales 2.774** 1.820* 2.090** 1.937*
(3.30) (2.32) (2.60) (2.47)
stl02_individual 2.275** 0.160 1.170 0.010
(3.58) (0.20) (1.12) (0.01)
stl02_corporate 12.720** -2.380 -0.430 -0.690
(3.90) (0.67) (0.12) (0.20)
stl02_rest 2.070 4.592** 6.222** 5.106**
(1.84) (3.29) (3.75) (3.06)
stl02_firstsecond -0.880 2.870* 3.168* 1.980
(0.67) (2.07) (2.28) (1.50)
stl02_higheredu 0.160 0.270 -1.800 0.790
(0.07) (0.09) (0.50) (0.24)
stl02_hospitalhealth -3.630 -7.371* -7.225* -5.825*
(1.29) (2.50) (2.49) (2.21)
stl02_highway -9.543** -9.599** -9.233** -8.672**
(5.22) (4.97) (4.75) (4.48)
stl02_publicsafety -4.140 -1.300 -1.650 1.500
(1.68) (0.40) (0.52) (0.44)
stl02_environhousing 7.749* 0.520 -1.710 -1.910
(2.07) (0.13) (0.44) (0.53)
stl02_govtadmin 9.113** 2.700 0.500 0.210
(3.11) (0.88) (0.15) (0.06)
cty02property 1.149** 1.518** 1.495** 0.724* 0.840**
(3.96) (4.92) (4.87) (2.23) (2.69)
cty02sales -1.930 0.590 0.570 -1.120 -0.110
(1.50) (0.41) (0.40) (0.80) (0.05)
cty02education -1.333** -0.862** -0.824** -0.527* -0.632**
(5.54) (3.59) (3.38) (2.13) (2.64)
cty02highway -4.236** -3.560** -3.480** -2.120* -2.223*
(6.02) (3.67) (3.61) (2.22) (2.15)
cty02safety 5.089* 1.470 1.180 -0.810 -0.280
(2.45) (0.80) (0.62) (0.43) (0.15)
cty02naturalrec 0.850 0.905* 0.961* 0.738* 0.616*
(1.52) (2.07) (2.21) (2.39) (2.38)
cty02sewerage -3.631* -1.900 -1.860 -0.770 -1.590
(2.43) (1.32) (1.30) (0.55) (1.04)
Constant 10.016** 10.112** 10.087** 9.030** 9.300**
(147.32) (69.25) (70.06) (14.46) (15.06)
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.30 0.31 0.43 0.47  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. N468 stands for all nonmetropolitan counties adjacent to a metro area. Model 2 adds to Model 1 additional RTW state 
dummy variable, Census dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies as explanatory variables. Model3 includes additional amenity 
variables. Model 4 includes demographic variables. Model 5 replaces state fiscal variables with 47 state dummies. Model 6 is similar 





Appendix Table 2B. Level Equation Model Results for Sample N468, Dependent 
variables: ln(rent2002) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5
stl02_property 8.884** 4.003** 4.010**
(12.78) (4.04) (4.04)
stl02_sales -1.450 0.290 0.340
(1.64) (0.40) (0.46)
stl02_individual 1.160 0.300 0.500
(1.82) (0.44) (0.54)
stl02_corporate 6.860 4.410 4.790
(1.76) (1.28) (1.35)
stl02_rest -0.050 0.470 0.790
(0.05) (0.40) (0.49)
stl02_firstsecond -7.651** -4.576** -4.518**
(6.95) (4.49) (4.38)
stl02_higheredu -3.698* -1.640 -2.040
(1.98) (0.76) (0.74)
stl02_hospitalhealth -5.631** -1.750 -1.720
(2.65) (0.81) (0.79)
stl02_highway -1.770 -4.155* -4.084*
(1.02) (2.37) (2.30)
stl02_publicsafety 13.670** 6.010* 5.942*
(6.06) (2.41) (2.41)
stl02_environhousing -0.030 -0.790 -1.220
(0.01) (0.31) (0.42)
stl02_govtadmin 14.422** 4.250 3.820
(6.00) (1.79) (1.42)
cty02property 0.310 0.240 0.240 0.505**
(1.81) (1.86) (1.83) (3.83)
cty02sales 2.668* 0.510 0.500 2.994**
(2.17) (0.48) (0.47) (2.96)
cty02education -0.710** -0.547** -0.539** -0.622**
(3.80) (3.64) (3.51) (3.90)
cty02highway -2.454** -0.710 -0.700 -1.987**
(4.10) (1.37) (1.32) (4.31)
cty02safety 7.432** 2.180 2.120 1.730
(4.45) (1.46) (1.38) (1.17)
cty02naturalrec 0.000 0.230 0.240 0.160
0.00 (0.78) (0.84) (0.60)
cty02sewerage -0.930 -0.850 -0.840 -1.010
(0.57) (0.69) (0.68) (0.98)
Constant 5.923** 6.663** 6.658** 6.413**
(100.56) (49.53) (49.28) (60.72)
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040
Adjusted R-squared 0.40 0.62 0.62 0.74  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. N468 stands for all nonmetropolitan counties adjacent to a metro area. Model 2 adds to Model 1 additional RTW state 
dummy variable, Census dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies as explanatory variables. Model3 includes additional amenity 
variables. Model 4 includes demographic variables. Model 5 replaces state fiscal variables with 47 state dummies. Model 6 is similar 







Appendix Table 3A. Level Equation Model Results for Sample N579, Dependent 
variables: ln(wage2002) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
stl02_property 3.084** -0.900 -0.862 -0.210
(3.30) (0.68) (0.65) (0.17)
stl02_sales 2.774** 1.820* 2.090** 1.937*
(3.30) (2.32) (2.60) (2.47)
stl02_individual 2.275** 0.160 1.170 0.010
(3.58) (0.20) (1.12) (0.01)
stl02_corporate 12.720** -2.380 -0.430 -0.690
(3.90) (0.67) (0.12) (0.20)
stl02_rest 2.070 4.592** 6.222** 5.106**
(1.84) (3.29) (3.75) (3.06)
stl02_firstsecond -0.880 2.870* 3.168* 1.980
(0.67) (2.07) (2.28) (1.50)
stl02_higheredu 0.160 0.270 -1.800 0.790
(0.07) (0.09) (0.50) (0.24)
stl02_hospitalhealth -3.630 -7.371* -7.225* -5.825*
(1.29) (2.50) (2.49) (2.21)
stl02_highway -9.543** -9.599** -9.233** -8.672**
(5.22) (4.97) (4.75) (4.48)
stl02_publicsafety -4.140 -1.300 -1.650 1.500
(1.68) (0.40) (0.52) (0.44)
stl02_environhousing 7.749* 0.520 -1.710 -1.910
(2.07) (0.13) (0.44) (0.53)
stl02_govtadmin 9.113** 2.700 0.500 0.210
(3.11) (0.88) (0.15) (0.06)
cty02property 1.149** 1.518** 1.495** 0.724* 0.840**
(3.96) (4.92) (4.87) (2.23) (2.69)
cty02sales -1.930 0.590 0.570 -1.120 -0.110
(1.50) (0.41) (0.40) (0.80) (0.05)
cty02education -1.333** -0.862** -0.824** -0.527* -0.632**
(5.54) (3.59) (3.38) (2.13) (2.64)
cty02highway -4.236** -3.560** -3.480** -2.120* -2.223*
(6.02) (3.67) (3.61) (2.22) (2.15)
cty02safety 5.089* 1.470 1.180 -0.810 -0.280
(2.45) (0.80) (0.62) (0.43) (0.15)
cty02naturalrec 0.850 0.905* 0.961* 0.738* 0.616*
(1.52) (2.07) (2.21) (2.39) (2.38)
cty02sewerage -3.631* -1.900 -1.860 -0.770 -1.590
(2.43) (1.32) (1.30) (0.55) (1.04)
Constant 10.016** 10.112** 10.087** 9.030** 9.300**
(147.32) (69.25) (70.06) (14.46) (15.06)
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.30 0.31 0.43 0.47  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. N579 stands for all nonmetropolitan counties not adjacent to a metro area. Model 2 adds to Model 1 additional RTW state 
dummy variable, Census dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies as explanatory variables. Model3 includes additional amenity 
variables. Model 4 includes demographic variables. Model 5 replaces state fiscal variables with 47 state dummies. Model 6 is similar 








Appendix Table 3B. Level Equation Model Results for Sample N579, Dependent 
variables: ln(rent2002) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5
stl02_property 5.757** 3.422** 2.997**
(6.87) (3.01) (2.64)
stl02_sales -4.538** 1.270 1.690
(4.30) (1.12) (1.37)
stl02_individual -2.334** 0.080 1.170
(3.57) (0.08) (0.95)
stl02_corporate 12.334** 0.160 0.320
(3.58) (0.04) (0.08)
stl02_rest -6.620** -3.513** -2.030
(7.17) (3.19) (1.45)
stl02_firstsecond -5.911** -5.430** -4.629**
(4.70) (4.96) (4.32)
stl02_higheredu -6.991** -5.266** -7.244**
(4.33) (3.71) (3.52)
stl02_hospitalhealth -8.029** 1.070 2.240
(3.15) (0.44) (0.88)
stl02_highway 4.934** 2.707* 2.891*
(3.36) (2.40) (2.53)
stl02_publicsafety 21.967** 6.070 3.970
(7.22) (1.50) (1.01)
stl02_environhousing -1.030 -3.660 -5.436*
(0.40) (1.55) (2.16)
stl02_govtadmin 13.785** -1.460 -3.830
(5.61) (0.47) (1.11)
cty02property 0.457** 0.210 0.180 0.267**
(2.97) (1.91) (1.65) (3.33)
cty02sales 5.110** 0.530 0.720 3.490
(2.84) (0.33) (0.45) (1.77)
cty02education -0.453** -0.210 -0.170 -0.347**
(2.95) (1.71) (1.41) (3.35)
cty02highway -0.760 0.060 0.080 -0.250
(1.89) (0.16) (0.22) (0.95)
cty02safety 2.680 1.610 1.510 -0.150
(1.93) (1.73) (1.70) (0.35)
cty02naturalrec 0.470 0.270 0.250 0.330
(1.07) (0.73) (0.68) (1.09)
cty02sewerage 3.330 2.180 2.230 1.000
(1.69) (1.77) (1.82) (1.06)
Constant 6.015** 6.770** 6.778** 6.275**
(96.19) (67.35) (67.17) (63.78)
Observations 958 958 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.69 0.69 0.81  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. N579 stands for all nonmetropolitan counties not adjacent to a metro area. Model 2 adds to Model 1 additional RTW state 
dummy variable, Census dummies, and rural-urban continuum dummies as explanatory variables. Model3 includes additional amenity 
variables. Model 4 includes demographic variables. Model 5 replaces state fiscal variables with 47 state dummies. Model 6 is similar 






Appendix Table 4. Level Equation Model Results for Sample N468 Considering 
SBSI Variables, Dependent variables: ln(wage2002) and ln(rent2002) 
Model 4, +SBSI Model 4, +SBSI+ERS Model 3, +SBSI Model 3, +SBSI+ERS
stl02_property -1.610 -2.080 6.246** 6.296**
(1.00) (1.38) (5.15) (5.15)
stl02_sales 1.720 1.660 -1.260 -1.130
(1.75) (1.79) (1.44) (1.28)
top_pi -0.016* -0.010 -0.017** -0.018**
(2.22) (1.92) (4.11) (4.20)
top_capitalgains 0.010 0.010 0.020** 0.020**
(1.46) (1.04) (4.22) (4.36)
top_corporate 0.010 0.010 -0.022** -0.022**
(1.74) (1.56) (5.06) (4.95)
deathtax -0.039* -0.030* 0.043** 0.042**
(2.57) (2.05) (3.06) (3.04)
unemptax 0.010 0.013* 0.010 0.010
(1.88) (2.07) (1.75) (1.92)
utilitiescosts -0.010 0.020 0.270** 0.259**
(0.17) (0.42) (5.56) (5.32)
compensation 0.010 0.010 -0.020 -0.020
(0.64) (0.52) (1.15) (1.20)
gastax 0.030 0.000 0.516** 0.502**
(0.17) (0.02) (3.83) (3.68)
miniwage 0.010 0.010 0.208** 0.204**
(0.16) (0.34) (6.25) (5.76)
stl02_rest 3.220 1.080 -2.080 -1.800
(1.79) (0.66) (1.38) (1.19)
stl02_firstsecond 1.600 1.440 -2.100 -1.870
(0.79) (0.75) (1.31) (1.21)
stl02_higheredu -0.650 0.120 -0.350 -1.020
(0.19) (0.04) (0.14) (0.39)
stl02_hospitalhealth -5.240 -5.270 -21.981** -21.806**
(1.25) (1.40) (6.83) (6.87)
stl02_highway -6.433** -6.270** -2.290 -1.860
(2.69) (2.83) (1.24) (1.00)
stl02_publicsafety 8.110 6.130 3.900 3.810
(1.81) (1.49) (1.23) (1.20)
stl02_environhousing -11.480* -8.320 0.170 -0.400
(2.45) (1.94) (0.04) (0.10)
stl02_govtadmin -0.140 0.360 15.403** 15.238**
(0.03) (0.08) (5.15) (5.09)
cty02property 0.610 0.430 0.335* 0.314*
(1.89) (1.36) (2.32) (2.28)
cty02sales 0.000 -1.000 2.000 2.000
(0.30) (0.62) (1.73) (1.56)
cty02education -0.657** -0.511* -0.800** -0.751**
(2.67) (2.25) (4.75) (4.56)
cty02highway -3.017** -2.193* -2.409** -2.267**
(3.25) (2.44) (5.02) (4.62)
cty02safety 0.020 -0.210 4.367** 4.169**
(0.01) (0.11) (2.91) (2.68)
cty02naturalrec 0.707* 0.758** 0.140 0.170
(2.27) (2.65) (0.44) (0.52)
cty02sewerage -1.430 -1.070 -0.510 -0.590
(0.99) (0.73) (0.36) (0.41)
Constant 8.709** 9.700** 5.895** 5.881**
(13.86) (16.40) (40.11) (39.23)
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.48 0.65 0.65
wage rent
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level; Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties; The four ERS typology dummy variables are fm, mi, fl, rec. Wage data are 







Appendix Table 5. Level Equation Model Results for Sample N579 Considering 
SBSI Variables, Dependent variables: ln(wage2002) and ln(rent2002) 
Model 4, +SBSI Model 4, +SBSI+ERS Model 3, +SBSI Model 3, +SBSI+ERS
stl02_property 2.060 0.460 6.019** 5.726**
(1.41) (0.32) (4.18) (3.90)
stl02_sales 2.644* 2.377* -0.520 -0.500
(2.18) (2.06) (0.46) (0.45)
top_pi -0.038** -0.035** -0.024** -0.025**
(6.21) (5.85) (4.38) (4.56)
top_capitalgains 0.041** 0.035** 0.022** 0.023**
(5.27) (4.73) (3.58) (3.72)
top_corporate 0.000 0.000 -0.010 -0.010
(1.01) (0.46) (1.96) (1.77)
deathtax -0.069** -0.049** 0.010 0.010
(3.56) (2.66) (0.48) (0.41)
unemptax 0.025** 0.018** 0.010 0.010
(4.07) (3.00) (1.72) (1.22)
utilitiescosts 0.050 0.040 0.264** 0.242**
(0.80) (0.65) (3.57) (3.28)
compensation -0.030 -0.020 0.000 0.000
(1.25) (1.11) (0.12) (0.24)
gastax 0.473** 0.416* 0.519** 0.521**
(2.74) (2.50) (4.40) (4.33)
miniwage 0.070 0.040 0.303** 0.295**
(1.79) (1.13) (4.21) (4.09)
stl02_rest 3.170 1.170 -6.628** -6.573**
(1.52) (0.61) (3.86) (3.78)
stl02_firstsecond 0.310 1.190 -4.054** -4.466**
(0.15) (0.61) (2.75) (2.99)
stl02_higheredu -4.350 -3.790 -3.270 -3.330
(1.26) (1.18) (1.40) (1.44)
stl02_hospitalhealth -16.620** -13.699** -15.853** -15.098**
(4.22) (3.73) (5.29) (4.99)
stl02_highway -0.680 -0.870 5.462** 5.570**
(0.30) (0.41) (4.07) (4.05)
stl02_publicsafety 10.890 10.170 12.424* 12.705*
(1.58) (1.57) (1.99) (2.02)
stl02_environhousing -16.739** -10.450 -5.970 -5.160
(2.62) (1.79) (1.48) (1.26)
stl02_govtadmin 1.530 -0.700 4.160 4.070
(0.39) (0.18) (1.28) (1.29)
cty02property 0.250 0.180 0.279** 0.260**
(1.15) (0.85) (2.97) (2.77)
cty02sales -2.000 -3.375** 2.000 2.000
(1.43) (2.99) (1.40) (1.00)
cty02education -1.003** -0.897** -0.504** -0.440**
(4.59) (4.24) (4.09) (3.81)
cty02highway -0.987* -0.530 -0.410 -0.210
(2.10) (1.12) (1.15) (0.61)
cty02safety 0.930 0.480 2.018* 1.935*
(1.20) (0.65) (2.16) (2.22)
cty02naturalrec 0.160 0.150 0.520 0.520
(0.32) (0.33) (1.32) (1.36)
cty02sewerage 0.100 -0.270 1.890 1.960
(0.09) (0.24) (1.59) (1.63)
Constant 8.674** 9.363** 5.777** 5.783**
(18.65) (20.74) (34.71) (35.53)
Observations 958 958 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.51 0.54 0.72 0.73
wage rent
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level; Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties; The four ERS typology dummy variables are fm, mi, fl, rec. Wage data are 





Appendix Table 6. Level Equation Model Results for Sample N468 and N579, Fixed 
Effects Regression 
Fixed Effects from 
Wage Equation
Fixed Effects from 
Rent Equation
Fixed Effects from 
Wage Equation
Fixed Effects from 
Rent Equation
stl02_property 2.390 8.646** 4.750 5.350
(1.05) (2.98) (1.28) (1.93)
stl02_sales 0.790 -1.150 2.210 -1.740
(0.59) (0.51) (0.71) (0.63)
stl02_individual -1.040 -0.900 1.560 -1.640
(0.82) (0.36) (0.84) (0.64)
stl02_corporate -6.350 -0.480 16.230 -4.700
(0.95) (0.05) (1.67) (0.43)
stl02_rest 1.870 2.100 1.460 -8.850
(0.77) (0.56) (0.32) (1.57)
stl02_firstsecond -2.440 -10.586* -10.230 -8.750
(0.75) (2.24) (1.74) (1.54)
stl02_higheredu -0.760 -4.530 -10.910 -16.670
(0.16) (0.67) (1.80) (1.53)
stl02_hospitalhealth -4.370 -8.610 -2.340 4.810
(0.92) (1.26) (0.28) (0.40)
stl02_highway -6.780 -5.970 -0.820 7.550
(1.76) (0.89) (0.13) (0.76)
stl02_publicsafety 7.290 13.630 10.850 17.180
(1.18) (1.73) (1.18) (1.89)
stl02_environhousing -2.600 -6.910 -4.500 -10.810
(0.29) (0.59) (0.33) (0.81)
stl02_govtadmin 8.300 20.700 3.580 13.140
(1.20) (1.98) (0.35) (0.92)
rtw2 -0.030 -0.050 0.030 -0.030
(1.07) (1.17) (0.68) (0.61)
Constant 9.952** 6.423** 10.560** 6.698**
(90.43) (30.31) (52.53) (21.63)
Observations 45 45 42 42
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.42 0.10 0.17
N468 N579
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 
5% level, ** significant at 1% level; N468 (N479) stands for all nonmetropolitan adjacent (nonadjacent) 
counties; Columns 1 and 3 are Fixed effects from the wage equation which is based on Model 4 where 
county fiscal variables are dropped out from the explanatory variables. Column 2 are Fixed effects from the 
rent equation which is based on Model 3 where county fiscal variables are dropped out from the 







Appendix Table 7. Level Equation Model Results for Sample N468 and N579, Fixed 
Effects Regression Considering SBSI Variables 
Fixed Effects from 
Wage Equation
Fixed Effects from 
Rent Equation
Fixed Effects from 
Wage Equation
Fixed Effects from 
Rent Equation
stl02_property 0.387 4.729 1.397 0.406
(0.19) (1.89) (0.30) (0.10)
stl02_sales -0.465 -2.492 0.132 -0.749
(0.35) (1.05) (0.04) (0.27)
top_pi 0.004 -0.010 -0.022 -0.029
(0.49) (0.86) (1.18) (1.37)
top_capitalgains -0.008 0.016 0.008 0.017
(1.24) (1.75) (0.56) (1.11)
top_corporate -0.009 -0.025* 0.016 0.007
(0.99) (2.38) (0.98) (0.38)
deathtax 0.039 0.012 -0.054 -0.060
(1.19) (0.27) (0.73) (0.83)
unemptax 0.012 -0.006 -0.010 0.012
(1.16) (0.37) (0.43) (0.72)
utilitiescosts 0.155* 0.289** 0.139 0.258*
(2.32) (3.64) (1.11) (2.19)
compensation 0.034 -0.022 0.012 -0.055
(1.55) (0.67) (0.18) (0.77)
gastax -0.348 0.453 -0.452 -0.109
(1.27) (1.30) (0.99) (0.24)
miniwage -0.006 0.061 -0.031 0.168
(0.18) (1.29) (0.50) (2.01)
stl02_rest -0.039 1.086 -2.157 -7.643
(0.02) (0.34) (0.36) (1.47)
stl02_firstsecond -2.487 -9.014* -8.491 -2.019
(0.77) (2.08) (1.12) (0.35)
stl02_higheredu 0.868 -0.215 -6.005 -17.022
(0.16) (0.03) (0.74) (1.65)
stl02_hospitalhealth -2.878 -20.640** -3.628 -0.290
(0.51) (3.09) (0.43) (0.03)
stl02_highway -4.536 -3.054 0.304 15.193
(1.00) (0.57) (0.04) (1.59)
stl02_publicsafety 8.767 5.670 11.575 9.205
(1.27) (0.88) (0.82) (0.86)
stl02_environhousing -0.111 -5.663 1.595 -27.186
(0.01) (0.50) (0.08) (1.47)
stl02_govtadmin 4.709 18.026* 3.596 13.041
(0.58) (2.16) (0.25) (0.83)
rtw2 -0.017 -0.042 0.023 0.018
(0.55) (1.07) (0.44) (0.37)
Constant 9.886** 6.440** 10.619** 6.435**
(69.05) (31.37) (45.95) (27.00)
Observations 45 45 42 42
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.66 0.03 0.51
N468 N579
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level; N468 (N479) stands for all nonmetropolitan adjacent (nonadjacent) counties; Columns 1 and 3 are Fixed effects from the 
wage equation which is based on Model 4 where county fiscal variables are dropped out from the explanatory variables. Columns 2 
and 4 are Fixed effects from the rent equation which is based on Model 3 where county fiscal variables ar  dropped out from the 
explanatory variables. Wage data are from the BEA and Rent data are from the HUD. 
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Appendix Table 8A. Level Equation Model Results, Fixed Effects Regression by 
Nine Census Divisions, Dependent variable: Fixed eff cts from Wage Equation 
goup1 goup2 goup3 goup4 goup5 goup6 goup7 goup8 goup9
stl02_property 3.396 2.852 3.930 5.114 2.937 6.086* 2.815 3.792 3.440
(1.17) (1.05) (1.29) (2.05) (1.10) (2.26) (0.97) (1.46) (1.41)
stl02_sales 1.092 1.227 1.991 2.505 0.213 2.259 1.001 1.3480.681
(0.53) (0.65) (0.87) (1.41) (0.08) (1.17) (0.51) (0.69) (0.37)
stl02_individual 1.541 1.419 1.216 3.623 0.528 2.136 1.3501.448 0.812
(1.00) (0.94) (0.68) (2.04) (0.31) (1.34) (0.95) (0.99) (0.55)
stl02_corporate -2.316 -3.373 7.894 -11.372 -3.371 0.804 0.399 -0.506 -1.076
(0.31) (0.47) (1.35) (1.41) (0.43) (0.13) (0.05) (0.07) (0.14)
stl02_rest 2.128 2.879 -0.911 5.738* 1.706 2.716 1.078 2.190 2.383
(0.68) (1.03) (0.33) (2.30) (0.49) (0.96) (0.30) (0.75) (0.75)
stl02_firstsecond -3.712 -3.073 -3.280 -7.976* -4.080 -6.189 -5.484 -4.656 -2.575
(0.95) (0.84) (0.97) (2.28) (1.19) (1.60) (1.42) (1.31) (0.68)
stl02_higheredu -8.780 -10.014 -4.774 -8.982* -8.792 -7.743 -8.385 -7.955 -7.192
(1.33) (1.18) (0.89) (2.09) (1.34) (1.41) (1.26) (1.35) (1.19)
stl02_hospitalhealth -2.006 -2.640 4.651 -6.856 3.561 -3.241 -0.826 -1.493 -2.133
(0.30) (0.33) (0.62) (1.26) (0.48) (0.50) (0.12) (0.23) (0.32)
stl02_highway -1.987 -1.945 -2.303 -8.327* -1.431 -1.148 -2.755 -2.914 -3.180
(0.38) (0.27) (0.39) (2.69) (0.22) (0.23) (0.48) (0.58) (0.59)
stl02_publicsafety 5.566 6.326 -6.334 2.262 4.400 8.700 4.478 4.779 6.288
(0.77) (0.81) (1.29) (0.35) (0.58) (1.18) (0.53) (0.67) (0.92)
stl02_environhousing -6.562 -7.869 -0.239 5.847 -2.697 -12.556 -7.301 -5.138 -4.820
(0.63) (0.70) (0.02) (0.63) (0.28) (1.14) (0.69) (0.52) (0.52)
stl02_govtadmin -0.220 -1.139 3.715 4.926 2.750 5.148 2.768 2.876 -0.662
(0.03) (0.11) (0.51) (0.79) (0.40) (0.62) (0.40) (0.43) (0.10)
rtw2 -0.018 -0.032 -0.017 0.019 -0.023 -0.025 -0.020 -0.014-0.008
(0.48) (0.90) (0.55) (0.54) (0.60) (0.75) (0.53) (0.42) (0.26)
Constant 10.298** 10.305** 10.267** 10.286** 10.282** 10.192** 10.401** 10.278** 10.229**
(62.53) (67.63) (61.60) (64.84) (69.89) (63.91) (46.01) (68.09) (66.74)
Observations 41 43 42 39 42 43 42 46 44
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.11 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.20 0.13 0.13 0.07  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 
5% level, ** significant at 1% level. N468 (N479) stands for all nonmetropolitan adjacent (nonadjacent) 
counties. Fixed effects from the wage equation are b sed on Model 4 where county fiscal variables are 











Appendix Table 8B. Level Equation Model Results, Fixed Effects Regression by 
Nine Census Divisions, Dependent variable: Fixed eff cts from Rent Equation 
goup1 goup2 goup3 goup4 goup5 goup6 goup7 goup8 goup9
stl02_property 6.626 7.332 10.281* 8.960** 6.883 9.780* 7.232 8.125* 6.614*
(1.88) (1.98) (2.70) (2.82) (1.96) (2.59) (1.95) (2.68) (2.66)
stl02_sales -1.713 -1.744 0.236 0.500 -4.587 -1.309 -1.477-1.668 -2.559
(0.49) (0.60) (0.07) (0.19) (0.89) (0.39) (0.46) (0.54) (0.92)
stl02_individual 1.290 2.098 2.261 1.951 1.102 1.960 0.3001.259 0.703
(0.42) (0.72) (0.68) (0.51) (0.37) (0.65) (0.12) (0.46) (0.24)
stl02_corporate -2.712 0.637 8.541 -7.659 4.692 3.041 5.448 2.231 6.996
(0.25) (0.06) (0.74) (0.51) (0.39) (0.28) (0.46) (0.21) (0.55)
stl02_rest -1.824 2.385 -1.382 4.547 -2.837 -0.370 -1.765 -0.803 -1.953
(0.30) (0.61) (0.22) (0.95) (0.47) (0.07) (0.26) (0.15) (0.34)
stl02_firstsecond -12.655* -11.351 -13.926* -13.397* -12.753* -14.392* -15.005* -14.089* -12.425
(2.29) (1.88) (2.40) (2.27) (2.33) (2.45) (2.15) (2.54) (1.88)
stl02_higheredu -16.860 -23.645 -8.369 -11.254 -16.264 -12.144 -11.705 -12.797 -13.701
(1.34) (1.62) (0.67) (1.61) (1.24) (1.09) (0.94) (1.15) (1.15)
stl02_hospitalhealth 3.284 7.944 8.303 -9.144 4.973 0.8644.031 2.323 0.831
(0.26) (0.55) (0.58) (1.28) (0.31) (0.07) (0.31) (0.19) (0.07)
stl02_highway 3.246 10.435 0.479 -7.713 7.078 4.268 0.863 2.380 4.580
(0.30) (0.79) (0.04) (1.11) (0.52) (0.38) (0.07) (0.23) (0.40)
stl02_publicsafety 15.249 23.387* 5.991 7.386 17.859 20.214 13.153 15.889 18.625*
(1.61) (2.23) (0.65) (0.98) (1.59) (1.96) (1.36) (1.75) (2.14)
stl02_environhousing -15.267 -25.824 -12.848 -4.732 -11.753 -16.512 -15.306 -12.905 -9.551
(0.98) (1.61) (0.81) (0.38) (0.77) (0.96) (0.91) (0.92) (0.75)
stl02_govtadmin 16.234 -3.275 18.361 25.821* 15.036 11.341 15.489 14.154 11.807
(1.07) (0.17) (1.26) (2.21) (0.96) (0.71) (1.10) (1.02) (0.88)
rtw2 -0.056 -0.063 -0.039 -0.019 -0.017 -0.049 -0.033 -0.038 -0.031
(1.03) (1.00) (0.77) (0.40) (0.26) (0.96) (0.60) (0.80) (0.65)
Constant 6.730** 6.633** 6.547** 6.578** 6.636** 6.564** 6.805** 6.660** 6.605**
(22.59) (25.49) (24.26) (24.89) (23.63) (23.44) (15.18) (24.77) (22.75)
Observations 41 43 42 39 42 43 42 46 44
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.31 0.23 0.38 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.25 0.20  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 
5% level, ** significant at 1% level. N468 (N479) stands for all nonmetropolitan adjacent (nonadjacent) 
counties. Fixed effects from the rent equation which is based on Model 3 where county fiscal variables ar  
dropped out from the explanatory variables. Rent data are from the HUD. 
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Appendix Table 9A. Level Equation Model Results, Fixed Effects Regression by 
Nine Census Divisions Considering SBSI Variables, Dependent Variable: Fixed 
Effects from Wage Equation 
goup1 goup2 goup3 goup4 goup5 goup6 goup7 goup8 goup9
stl02_property -1.049 -1.744 -1.609 2.431 -0.411 0.255 -3.067 -0.907 -0.389
(0.28) (0.51) (0.57) (0.81) (0.13) (0.07) (0.94) (0.30) (0.13)
stl02_sales -0.762 -0.885 -0.826 -0.998 -0.749 -0.444 -0.666 -0.881 -1.047
(0.34) (0.40) (0.39) (0.47) (0.25) (0.17) (0.36) (0.42) (0.53)
top_pi -0.008 -0.005 -0.015 0.019 -0.008 -0.009 -0.003 -0.008 -0.012
(0.57) (0.40) (1.10) (1.40) (0.52) (0.59) (0.22) (0.59) (0.86)
top_capitalgains 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.013 -0.002 0.000 -0.008 -0.002 0.000
(0.03) (0.26) (0.30) (1.44) (0.17) 0.00 (0.48) (0.27) (0.03)
top_corporate 0.000 0.000 0.012 -0.018 -0.001 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.004
(0.04) (0.03) (1.19) (1.46) (0.08) (0.03) (0.31) (0.12) (0.31)
deathtax 0.008 0.047 -0.005 0.094 0.014 0.028 0.005 0.020 -0.001
(0.17) (1.17) (0.13) (2.09) (0.37) (0.64) (0.12) (0.52) (0.01)
unemptax 0.009 0.013 -0.010 0.013 0.018 0.010 0.012 0.009 0.008
(0.43) (0.82) (1.08) (0.91) (1.04) (0.58) (0.73) (0.58) (0.52)
utilitiescosts 0.161 0.164 0.101 0.238* 0.138 0.164 0.220* 0.165 0.148
(1.49) (1.74) (1.39) (2.11) (1.55) (1.56) (2.55) (1.93) (1.82)
compensation -0.003 0.003 -0.014 -0.100 0.018 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.002
(0.09) (0.09) (0.46) (1.78) (0.57) (0.02) (0.18) (0.04) (0.07)
gastax -0.315 -0.376 -0.191 -0.262 -0.146 -0.307 -0.074 -0.250 -0.270
(0.63) (0.88) (0.90) (0.83) (0.44) (0.98) (0.23) (0.84) (0.91)
miniwage 0.019 0.023 0.054 -0.042 0.032 0.022 -0.008 0.018 0.010
(0.34) (0.44) (1.18) (1.31) (0.58) (0.44) (0.19) (0.38) (0.18)
stl02_rest -1.463 -0.814 -5.070 2.419 -1.191 -1.414 -2.591 -1.656 -0.932
(0.38) (0.23) (1.81) (0.93) (0.30) (0.39) (0.72) (0.49) (0.26)
stl02_firstsecond -0.475 1.424 2.534 -7.722 -1.064 -1.505 -3.419 -0.743 0.577
(0.10) (0.30) (0.59) (1.88) (0.25) (0.37) (0.88) (0.19) (0.15)
stl02_higheredu -7.101 -9.946 -1.830 -3.393 -7.983 -6.881 -5.231 -6.220 -5.010
(0.87) (0.87) (0.35) (0.60) (1.18) (0.94) (0.69) (0.93) (0.73)
stl02_hospitalhealth -2.418 -2.584 3.528 -3.973 3.739 -2.46 2.116 -1.655 -1.689
(0.27) (0.25) (0.57) (0.68) (0.46) (0.36) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26)
stl02_highway 0.841 2.092 2.477 -7.554 1.057 0.845 -1.556 0.200 -0.297
(0.13) (0.22) (0.41) (1.65) (0.14) (0.13) (0.27) (0.03) (0.05)
stl02_publicsafety 4.762 8.106 -8.665 1.871 5.496 6.342 0.778 4.434 6.082
(0.54) (0.72) (1.46) (0.26) (0.64) (0.74) (0.08) (0.53) (0.74)
stl02_environhousing -4.108 -5.271 7.080 13.489 -4.183 -8.284 -7.037 -2.535 -4.599
(0.30) (0.38) (0.74) (1.16) (0.33) (0.57) (0.58) (0.21) (0.37)
stl02_govtadmin -0.518 -4.012 3.467 -1.070 -1.152 5.626 3.19 2.317 -0.773
(0.05) (0.26) (0.40) (0.13) (0.13) (0.59) (0.37) (0.29) (0.09)
rtw2 -0.024 -0.030 -0.012 -0.031 -0.014 -0.016 -0.015 -0.014 -0.005
(0.62) (0.87) (0.46) (0.76) (0.36) (0.41) (0.44) (0.44) (0.17)
Constant 10.290** 10.208** 10.225** 10.445** 10.195** 10.205** 10.399** 10.229** 10.182**
(55.95) (57.21) (69.65) (62.69) (58.11) (63.42) (50.91) (65.74) (69.58)
Observations 41 43 42 39 42 43 42 46 44
Adjusted R-squared -0.03 0.05 0.29 0.23 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.00  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. N468 (N479) stands for all nonmetropolitan adjacent (nonadjacent) counties. Fixed effects from the wage equation are based 







Appendix Table 9B. Level Equation Model Results, Fixed Effects Regression by 
Nine Census Divisions Considering SBSI Variables, Dependent Variable: Fixed 
Effects from Rent Equation 
goup1 goup2 goup3 goup4 goup5 goup6 goup7 goup8 goup9
stl02_property 1.935 -0.456 0.455 7.755* 1.222 -0.270 -1.826 0.850 1.500
(0.36) (0.11) (0.09) (2.64) (0.29) (0.05) (0.33) (0.21) (0.38)
stl02_sales -3.224 -4.090 -1.367 -1.567 -3.130 -4.520 -3.269 -3.606 -3.627
(0.88) (1.30) (0.40) (0.57) (0.68) (1.05) (0.95) (1.02) (1.05)
top_pi -0.031 -0.022 -0.038 -0.007 -0.030 -0.032 -0.031 -0.03 -0.034
(1.52) (1.21) (1.71) (0.33) (1.21) (1.60) (1.49) (1.55) (1.69)
top_capitalgains 0.031 0.011 0.022 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.021 0.023
(1.60) (0.81) (1.85) (1.20) (1.54) (1.48) (0.89) (1.66) (1.92)
top_corporate -0.006 0.006 0.008 -0.023 -0.003 -0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.001
(0.31) (0.28) (0.46) (1.34) (0.12) (0.19) (0.24) (0.08) (0.03)
deathtax -0.069 0.017 -0.081 -0.011 -0.034 -0.022 -0.025 -0.032 -0.048
(0.94) (0.27) (1.37) (0.16) (0.56) (0.32) (0.41) (0.53) (0.73)
unemptax -0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.016 0.002 -0.007 0.010 -0.001 -0.002
(0.24) (0.32) (0.41) (0.76) (0.08) (0.34) (0.57) (0.05) (0.09)
utilitiescosts 0.222 0.247* 0.273* 0.126 0.260* 0.309* 0.329* 0.273* 0.259*
(1.78) (2.12) (2.59) (0.98) (2.31) (2.28) (2.78) (2.74) (2.56)
compensation -0.066 -0.035 -0.092 -0.002 -0.043 -0.040 -0.045 -0.048 -0.047
(1.19) (0.72) (1.86) (0.02) (0.77) (0.66) (0.85) (0.89) (0.88)
gastax 0.446 0.071 0.389 0.788 0.417 0.410 0.454 0.392 0.390
(0.70) (0.12) (1.03) (1.48) (1.05) (0.96) (0.95) (1.06) (1.11)
miniwage 0.157 0.166* 0.168* 0.087 0.163 0.154 0.138 0.153* 0.150
(2.03) (2.30) (2.17) (1.87) (1.83) (2.00) (2.06) (2.07) (1.74)
stl02_rest -2.783 -2.410 -5.386 2.394 -3.941 -5.027 -4.939 -4.280 -3.542
(0.48) (0.49) (0.92) (0.64) (0.65) (0.87) (0.87) (0.82) (0.66)
stl02_firstsecond -6.027 -1.292 -3.132 -13.116* -5.585 -5.160 -5.154 -5.402 -4.267
(1.06) (0.19) (0.51) (2.29) (0.94) (1.00) (1.03) (1.08) (0.82)
stl02_higheredu -11.951 -21.579 -12.173 -6.329 -10.026 -7.999 -10.647 -9.959 -8.840
(1.00) (1.33) (1.30) (0.89) (0.92) (0.75) (1.06) (1.03) (0.92)
stl02_hospitalhealth -16.020 -4.603 -3.390 -24.638* -11.323 -11.249 -7.270 -12.064 -12.082
(1.08) (0.32) (0.38) (2.42) (0.76) (1.07) (0.61) (1.16) (1.13)
stl02_highway 9.351 16.967 14.129 -7.491 8.330 9.143 6.320 8.837 8.251
(0.91) (1.28) (1.36) (1.02) (0.65) (0.91) (0.70) (0.91) (0.84)
stl02_publicsafety 9.624 20.528 -1.361 2.334 9.475 8.569 6.147 9.688 10.859
(0.92) (1.56) (0.13) (0.37) (0.86) (0.79) (0.60) (1.01) (1.25)
stl02_environhousing -20.774 -20.614 -20.783 -0.726 -14.508 -10.700 -17.353 -13.951 -16.358
(1.15) (1.15) (1.47) (0.05) (0.77) (0.54) (1.02) (0.86) (0.91)
stl02_govtadmin 5.468 -8.490 18.772 19.261 8.649 10.075 10.450 9.790 7.081
(0.32) (0.35) (1.50) (1.89) (0.63) (0.74) (0.86) (0.80) (0.59)
rtw2 -0.025 -0.026 -0.009 -0.002 -0.017 0.001 0.001 -0.014 -0.006
(0.53) (0.50) (0.21) (0.04) (0.31) (0.01) (0.03) (0.33) (0.14)
Constant 6.716** 6.388** 6.440** 6.732** 6.525** 6.515** 6.566** 6.520** 6.477**
(27.14) (23.27) (28.65) (23.51) (21.47) (25.29) (19.48) (26.71) (25.67)
Observations 41 43 42 39 42 43 42 46 44
Adjusted R-squared 0.53 0.57 0.63 0.58 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.55 0.48  
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. N468 (N479) stands for all nonmetropolitan adjacent (nonadjacent) counties. Fixed effects from the rent equation are based 
on Model 3 where county fiscal variables are dropped out from the explanatory variables. Rent data are from the HUD. 
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Appendix Table 10. Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579, 
Instrumental Variable Estimation, Dependent Variables: ln(wage2002) and ln(rent2002) 
IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2
stl02_property 1.268 -2.032 29.942 2.815 0.127 0.085 5.464** 5.360** -4.598** -3.524 5.187** 5.355**
(0.11) (0.90) (0.04) (1.17) (0.09) (0.06) (4.62) (4.55) (2.59) (1.91) (4.15) (4.36)
stl02_sales 5.353 5.461** 14.308 -1.306 3.082 3.232* 0.8180.828 4.678* 7.874** 1.369 2.507
(1.06) (4.17) (0.03) (0.51) (1.87) (1.96) (0.63) (0.64) (1.96) (3.35) (0.75) (1.46)
stl02_individual -0.191 1.277 -6.985 -1.430 0.139 0.162 -0.447 -0.472 0.108 2.508 -0.664 -0.034
(0.04) (1.07) (0.04) (0.82) (0.09) (0.11) (0.38) (0.41) (0.06) (1.28) (0.47) (0.03)
stl02_corporate -13.783 -16.090** -41.302 6.173 -2.319 -2.946 2.727 2.738 -25.667** -29.034** 6.779 4.118
(1.06) (4.24) (0.03) (0.80) (0.56) (0.70) (0.81) (0.82) (3.62) (3.92) (1.20) (0.75)
stl02_rest -7.068 2.743 -80.322 3.139 3.157 2.652 -0.178 -0.231 4.434 6.956* -1.943 -2.103
(0.21) (0.43) (0.03) (0.59) (1.40) (1.17) (0.09) (0.12) (1.48) (2.27) (0.96) (1.09)
stl02_firstsecond -6.167 -5.052 -38.167 -3.379 -2.560 -3.401 -6.154* -6.210* -0.761 -3.931 -6.708** -8.122**
(0.49) (1.84) (0.04) (0.79) (0.77) (1.03) (2.52) (2.55) (0.30) (1.56) (3.85) (4.97)
stl02_hospitalhealth -1.434 14.761* -14.424 -2.652 1.0753.172 3.220 3.773 10.075 19.826** -1.806 2.727
(0.04) (1.97) (0.04) (0.32) (0.14) (0.41) (0.54) (0.64) (1.45) (2.93) (0.33) (0.55)
stl02_highway -22.874 -9.057 -55.158 -4.338 -9.306** -8.953** -9.794** -9.564** -11.852** -9.615** -5.504** -3.588*
(0.59) (1.27) (0.04) (1.31) (3.95) (3.75) (5.27) (5.18) (4.27) (3.41) (2.97) (2.13)
stl02_publicsafety 16.561 2.913 100.578 -5.656 2.300 2.151 5.404 5.072 0.782 -1.105 -8.129 -6.888
(0.35) (0.32) (0.03) (0.72) (0.55) (0.51) (1.57) (1.50) (0.14) (0.19) (1.80) (1.56)
stl02_environhousing 25.487 -3.074 185.511 -15.070 -4.316 -5.064 -5.235 -5.654 1.475 -4.197 -4.504 -6.089
(0.30) (0.19) (0.03) (1.33) (0.69) (0.81) (1.12) (1.23) (0.23) (0.63) (1.04) (1.48)
stl02_govtadmin 47.941 11.287 245.740 4.414 12.857* 13.887** 24.968** 24.555** 6.231 -0.230 12.652** 10.054*
(0.41) (0.51) (0.03) (0.33) (2.55) (2.73) (6.09) (6.07) (0.92) (0.03) (2.69) (2.30)
cty02property 2.277 1.198 6.743 -0.220 1.315** 1.343** 0.252 0.211 1.038** 1.035** 0.243 0.241
(0.62) (1.74) (0.03) (0.46) (3.88) (3.92) (1.00) (0.85) (3.94) (3.73) (1.40) (1.42)
cty02sales -2.296 -7.138** 19.988 1.711 -3.253 -3.720 -0.132 -0.394 -6.833** -8.122** 5.558** 4.172*
(0.18) (2.67) (0.04) (0.59) (1.28) (1.45) (0.06) (0.19) (2.62) (3.02) (3.01) (2.38)
cty02education -1.796 -1.602** -0.852 -0.391 -0.970 -1.173* -0.478 -0.479 -1.511** -1.671** -0.468** -0.504**
(1.25) (4.69) (0.06) (1.10) (1.72) (2.12) (1.80) (1.80) (4.84) (5.12) (2.75) (3.02)
cty02highway -3.378 -1.273 -17.406 0.481 -1.507 -1.089 -1.696 -1.701 -0.797 -0.583 -0.620 -0.526
(0.50) (0.92) (0.03) (0.29) (0.91) (0.66) (1.42) (1.43) (0.88) (0.61) (0.89) (0.77)
cty02safety 3.162 4.411 43.381 1.201 2.403 2.438 3.628 3.934 3.909 4.363 7.025** 7.750**
(0.37) (1.82) (0.04) (0.26) (0.74) (0.74) (1.48) (1.62) (1.12) (1.19) (2.67) (3.01)
cty02naturalrec 1.055 0.460 2.955 -0.115 1.036 1.012 0.3790.340 0.186 0.290 -0.725 -0.650
(0.42) (0.72) (0.03) (0.11) (1.82) (1.75) (0.78) (0.70) (0.17) (0.25) (0.81) (0.75)
cty02sewerage -143.767 -12.909 -955.151 77.284 -11.840 -13.239 -1.748 0.179 3.573 4.572 11.608 10.218
(0.34) (0.17) (0.03) (1.43) (1.22) (1.36) (0.20) (0.02) (0.32) (0.40) (1.36) (1.25)
Constant 5.328 8.628** 4.511 6.737** 8.598** 8.648** 6.356** 6.359** 8.787** 9.126** 6.745** 6.745**
(0.52) (4.47) (0.07) (32.79) (13.27) (13.19) (48.66) (48.69) (12.76) (12.66) (57.33) (58.87)
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Notes: Absolute t statistics are in parenthesis are. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant t 5% level, ** 
significant at 1% level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties, N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties 
adjacent (nonadjacent) to a metro area. IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same 
as IV1 but instead adding two more political voting behavior variables (PRES_REP72, PRES_TO72) as instruments. 
The wage model is based on Model 4 and the rent model is based on Model 3. NA stands for not applicable. Wage data 
are from the BEA, Rent data are from the HUD. 
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Appendix Table 11. Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579, 
Instrumental Variable Estimation with Clustering Method, Dependent Variables: 
ln(wage2002) and ln(rent2002) 
IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2
stl02_property 1.268 -2.032 29.942 2.815 0.127 0.085 5.464** 5.360** -4.598* -3.524 5.187* 5.355*
(0.02) (0.85) (0.01) (0.89) (0.08) (0.05) (3.09) (3.00) (2.06) (1.37) (2.01) (2.09)
stl02_sales 5.353 5.461** 14.308 -1.306 3.082 3.232 0.818 0.828 4.678 7.874* 1.369 2.507
(0.34) (2.96) (0.01) (0.36) (1.63) (1.66) (0.41) (0.42) (1.71) (2.46) (0.47) (1.00)
stl02_individual -0.191 1.277 -6.985 -1.430 0.139 0.162 -0.447 -0.472 0.108 2.508 -0.664 -0.034
(0.01) (0.82) (0.01) (0.60) (0.08) (0.09) (0.22) (0.23) (0.05) (1.10) (0.23) (0.01)
stl02_corporate -13.783 -16.090** -41.302 6.173 -2.319 -2.946 2.727 2.738 -25.667** -29.034** 6.779 4.118
(0.91) (2.71) (0.01) (0.61) (0.49) (0.60) (0.39) (0.39) (2.93) (2.94) (0.74) (0.49)
stl02_rest -7.068 2.743 -80.322 3.139 3.157 2.652 -0.178 -0.231 4.434 6.956 -1.943 -2.103
(0.04) (0.39) (0.01) (0.47) (1.21) (1.00) (0.04) (0.06) (1.13) (1.65) (0.50) (0.55)
stl02_firstsecond -6.167 -5.052 -38.167 -3.379 -2.560 -3.401 -6.154 -6.210 -0.761 -3.931 -6.708* -8.122**
(0.11) (1.57) (0.01) (0.66) (0.71) (0.93) (1.68) (1.71) (0.25) (1.16) (2.17) (2.67)
stl02_hospitalhealth -1.434 14.761 -14.424 -2.652 1.075 3.172 3.220 3.773 10.075 19.826* -1.806 2.727
(0.01) (1.50) (0.01) (0.27) (0.11) (0.32) (0.37) (0.44) (1.30) (2.48) (0.21) (0.38)
stl02_highway -22.874 -9.057 -55.158 -4.338 -9.306** -8.953** -9.794** -9.564** -11.852** -9.615* -5.504 -3.588
(0.12) (1.20) (0.01) (1.04) (3.14) (2.92) (2.81) (2.75) (3.68) (2.48) (1.45) (1.10)
stl02_publicsafety 16.561 2.913 100.578 -5.656 2.300 2.151 5.404 5.072 0.782 -1.105 -8.129 -6.888
(0.07) (0.29) (0.01) (0.54) (0.47) (0.42) (0.93) (0.88) (0.10) (0.11) (0.82) (0.78)
stl02_environhousing 25.487 -3.074 185.511 -15.070 -4.316 -5.064 -5.235 -5.654 1.475 -4.197 -4.504 -6.089
(0.06) (0.17) (0.01) (1.15) (0.52) (0.59) (0.67) (0.75) (0.16) (0.41) (0.47) (0.65)
stl02_govtadmin 47.941 11.287 245.740 4.414 12.857 13.88724.968** 24.555** 6.231 -0.230 12.652 10.054
(0.08) (0.48) (0.01) (0.30) (1.88) (1.91) (3.58) (3.62) (0.72) (0.02) (1.40) (1.23)
cty02property 2.277 1.198 6.743 -0.220 1.315** 1.343** 0.252 0.211 1.038* 1.035* 0.243 0.241
(0.13) (1.58) (0.01) (0.41) (3.15) (3.08) (0.89) (0.78) (2.47) (2.40) (0.98) (0.98)
cty02sales -2.296 -7.138* 19.988 1.711 -3.253 -3.720 -0.132 -0.394 -6.833* -8.122* 5.558 4.172
(0.04) (2.35) (0.01) (0.57) (0.97) (1.04) (0.05) (0.15) (2.08) (2.36) (1.18) (0.95)
cty02education -1.796 -1.602** -0.852 -0.391 -0.970 -1.173 -0.478 -0.479 -1.511** -1.671** -0.468 -0.504
(0.32) (3.63) (0.01) (0.84) (1.45) (1.85) (1.64) (1.66) (3.15) (3.47) (1.73) (1.87)
cty02highway -3.378 -1.273 -17.406 0.481 -1.507 -1.089 -1.696 -1.701 -0.797 -0.583 -0.620 -0.526
(0.11) (0.83) (0.01) (0.28) (0.72) (0.52) (1.25) (1.24) (0.78) (0.53) (0.73) (0.65)
cty02safety 3.162 4.411 43.381 1.201 2.403 2.438 3.628 3.934 3.909 4.363 7.025* 7.750*
(0.16) (1.24) (0.01) (0.19) (0.55) (0.53) (1.37) (1.45) (0.78) (0.84) (2.00) (2.18)
cty02naturalrec 1.055 0.460 2.955 -0.115 1.036 1.012 0.3790.340 0.186 0.290 -0.725 -0.650
(0.12) (0.80) (0.01) (0.13) (1.48) (1.45) (0.74) (0.66) (0.18) (0.28) (0.61) (0.55)
cty02sewerage -143.767 -12.909 -955.151 77.284 -11.840 -13.239 -1.748 0.179 3.573 4.572 11.608 10.218
(0.07) (0.16) (0.01) (1.18) (0.66) (0.67) (0.21) (0.02) (0.25) (0.31) (1.29) (1.12)
Constant 5.328 8.628** 4.511 6.737** 8.598** 8.648** 6.356** 6.359** 8.787** 9.126** 6.745** 6.745**
(0.11) (4.02) (0.01) (29.37) (10.21) (10.07) (30.34) (30.35) (10.12) (10.30) (40.28) (41.62)
Number of Clusters 174 174 174 174 167 167 167 167 129 129 129 129
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Observations 1998 1996 1998 1996 1040 1039 1040 1039 958 957 958 957
Nall N468 N579
Wage Rent Wage Rent Wage Rent
 
Notes: Absolute t statistics are in parenthesis are. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant t 5% level, ** significant at 1% 
level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties, N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same as IV1 but instead adding two more 
political voting behavior variables (PRES_REP72, PRES_TO72) as instruments. The wage model is based on Model 4 and the rent 





Appendix Table 12.  Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579, 
Instrumental Variable Estimation, Dependent Variables: ln(earning2000) and 
ln(housing2000) 
IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2
stl02_property 3.185 -1.283 7.260 7.192* 1.597 1.327 6.800** 6.866** -0.703 -0.226 -0.060 -0.351
(0.25) (0.70) (0.55) (2.17) (1.34) (1.11) (3.02) (3.07) (0.47) (0.15) (0.02) (0.13)
stl02_sales 6.494 5.998** 8.970 9.023** 6.087** 5.896** 8.5 0** 8.579** 5.148** 6.483** 12.329** 9.198**
(1.17) (5.69) (1.42) (2.64) (4.54) (4.39) (3.55) (3.57) (2.58) (3.43) (3.17) (2.60)
stl02_individual 0.677 2.258* 7.430 7.532** 3.925** 3.575** 9.992** 10.007** 0.629 1.530 13.789** 10.530**
(0.13) (2.35) (0.96) (2.84) (3.16) (2.88) (4.51) (4.55) (0.38) (0.97) (4.50) (3.76)
stl02_corporate -18.002 -19.398** -25.071 -25.073* -6.069 -6.714* 4.309 4.332 -17.490** -18.959** -60.422** -55.423**
(1.26) (6.34) (1.82) (2.52) (1.80) (1.97) (0.73) (0.74) (2.94) (3.18) (5.20) (5.09)
stl02_rest -11.147 2.124 -2.633 -2.244 2.455 1.549 7.167* 7.225* 2.166 2.814 9.870* 3.565
(0.30) (0.42) (0.05) (0.32) (1.33) (0.84) (2.13) (2.16) (0.86) (1.14) (2.12) (0.84)
stl02_firstsecond -9.658 -6.788** -12.550 -12.605* -6.720* -7.009** -17.832** -17.790** -6.751** -8.288** 1.210 4.087
(0.70) (3.07) (1.21) (2.35) (2.48) (2.61) (3.63) (3.64) (3.14) (4.08) (0.32) (1.19)
stl02_hospitalhealth -0.013 17.927** 13.166 13.627 11.402 12.438* 27.690* 27.329* 7.777 12.035* 21.326 11.022
0.00 (2.97) (0.58) (1.16) (1.79) (1.97) (2.39) (2.38) (1.34) (2.21) (1.87) (1.09)
stl02_highway -23.364 -6.039 -14.024-13.804** -10.992** -10.480** -14.573** -14.709** -7.915** -6.712** -7.170 -10.390**
(0.54) (1.05) (0.49) (3.05) (5.72) (5.39) (4.39) (4.47) (3.40) (2.96) (1.80) (2.99)
stl02_publicsafety 21.703 3.062 5.808 5.413 1.518 1.795 -3.858 -3.644 8.778 8.787 -30.695** -26.928**
(0.41) (0.42) (0.12) (0.57) (0.45) (0.52) (0.60) (0.57) (1.83) (1.84) (3.09) (2.86)
stl02_environhousing 25.399 -11.041 -9.309 -10.482 -13.224** -12.680* -48.164** -47.911** -2.484 -4.511 -30.410**-15.403
(0.27) (0.86) (0.07) (0.63) (2.60) (2.49) (5.31) (5.33) (0.46) (0.84) (2.84) (1.60)
stl02_govtadmin 59.955 11.146 31.742 30.780 14.801** 15.731** 10.924 11.136 14.266* 11.815* -13.958 -1.945
(0.46) (0.63) (0.27) (1.96) (3.59) (3.79) (1.45) (1.49) (2.51) (2.12) (1.39) (0.22)
cty02property 1.951 0.485 2.517 2.484** 0.708* 0.698* 1.798** 1.820** 0.573** 0.578** 1.696** 1.939**
(0.48) (0.87) (0.63) (3.80) (2.56) (2.50) (3.90) (3.99) (2.59) (2.59) (4.41) (5.34)
cty02sales -0.153 -5.875** 5.308 5.183 -5.982** -6.388** -1.607 -1.449 -1.282 -2.053 4.003 4.936
(0.01) (2.73) (0.50) (1.29) (2.89) (3.06) (0.44) (0.40) (0.59) (0.95) (1.02) (1.37)
cty02education -2.129 -1.780** -4.415** -4.412** -1.787** -1.909** -4.966** -4.954** -1.729** -1.797** -4.202** -4.287**
(1.35) (6.46) (3.86) (8.07) (3.87) (4.23) (9.59) (9.63) (6.61) (6.85) (10.99) (11.78)
cty02highway -3.658 -0.968 -1.480 -1.398 -0.874 -0.590 -1.510 -1.544 -0.721 -0.667 0.182 -0.575
(0.49) (0.87) (0.13) (0.60) (0.65) (0.44) (0.70) (0.72) (0.95) (0.87) (0.11) (0.37)
cty02safety 2.077 3.660 3.528 3.389 2.859 3.019 1.625 1.474 1.117 1.540 -1.106 3.043
(0.22) (1.88) (0.09) (0.44) (1.08) (1.12) (0.36) (0.33) (0.38) (0.52) (0.17) (0.50)
cty02naturalrec 0.461 -0.296 0.485 0.470 0.249 0.212 -0.298 -0.276 -0.109 -0.059 0.619 -0.014
(0.16) (0.57) (0.20) (0.33) (0.54) (0.45) (0.35) (0.33) (0.12) (0.06) (0.33) (0.01)
cty02sewerage -161.648 14.002 -99.121 -95.560 -14.042 -14.578 7.694 6.680 12.926 12.222 16.885 -9.665
(0.34) (0.22) (0.19) (1.51) (1.78) (1.83) (0.52) (0.46) (1.40) (1.32) (0.90) (0.57)
Constant 5.512 9.832** 8.912* 8.890** 10.219** 10.205** 7.722** 7.715** 8.921** 9.035** 9.324** 9.683**
(0.49) (6.32) (2.53) (11.36) (19.34) (19.10) (16.33) (16.37) (15.46) (15.59) (12.75) (13.96)
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Observations 1998 1996 1998 1996 1040 1039 1040 1039 958 957 958 957
Nall N468 N579
Earning Housing Earning Housing Earning Housing
 
Notes: Absolute t statistics are in parenthesis are. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant t 5% level, ** significant at 1% level. 
Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties, N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a metro area. 
IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same as IV1 but instead adding two more political voting 
behavior variables (PRES_REP72, PRES_TO72) as instruments. The wage model is based on Model 4 and the rent model is based on 
Model 3. NA stands for not applicable. Wage data are from the BEA, Rent data are from the HUD. 
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Appendix Table 13. Level Equation Model Results for Sample Nall, N468, and N579, 
Instrumental Variable Estimation with Clustering Method, Dependent Variables: 
ln(earning2000) and ln(housing2000) 
IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2
stl02_property 3.185 -1.283 7.260 7.192 1.597 1.327 6.800*6.866* -0.703 -0.226 -0.060 -0.351
(0.05) (0.35) (0.12) (1.56) (0.99) (0.82) (2.06) (2.11) (0.29) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09)
stl02_sales 6.494 5.998** 8.970 9.023 6.087** 5.896** 8.580* 8.579* 5.148 6.483* 12.329* 9.198
(0.36) (3.16) (0.36) (1.57) (2.87) (2.80) (2.02) (2.04) (1.87) (2.54) (2.02) (1.70)
stl02_individual 0.677 2.258 7.430 7.532* 3.925* 3.575 9.992** 10.007** 0.629 1.530 13.789** 10.530**
(0.04) (1.60) (0.22) (2.20) (1.99) (1.84) (2.84) (2.89) (0.25) (0.66) (3.05) (2.76)
stl02_corporate -18.002 -19.398** -25.071 -25.073 -6.069-6.714 4.309 4.332 -17.490* -18.959* -60.422**-55.423**
(1.03) (2.95) (0.54) (1.82) (0.91) (1.00) (0.39) (0.39) (2.12) (2.28) (3.90) (3.91)
stl02_rest -11.147 2.124 -2.633 -2.244 2.455 1.549 7.167 7.225 2.166 2.814 9.870 3.565
(0.06) (0.23) (0.01) (0.29) (0.76) (0.48) (1.37) (1.40) (0.62) (0.82) (1.56) (0.66)
stl02_firstsecond -9.658 -6.788 -12.550 -12.605 -6.720 -7.009 -17.832* -17.790* -6.751 -8.288** 1.210 4.087
(0.16) (1.77) (0.30) (1.44) (1.53) (1.64) (2.01) (2.02) (1.94) (2.59) (0.20) (0.74)
stl02_hospitalhealth -0.013 17.927 13.166 13.627 11.402 12.438 27.690 27.329 7.777 12.035 21.326 11.022
0.00 (1.85) (0.15) (0.68) (1.02) (1.13) (1.20) (1.18) (0.92) (1.68) (1.31) (0.74)
stl02_highway -23.364 -6.039 -14.024 -13.804*-10.992** -10.480** -14.573* -14.709* -7.915* -6.712 -7.170 -10.390
(0.11) (0.58) (0.11) (2.04) (3.30) (3.07) (2.29) (2.32) (2.22) (1.94) (1.16) (1.93)
stl02_publicsafety 21.703 3.062 5.808 5.413 1.518 1.795 -3.858 -3.644 8.778 8.787 -30.695* -26.928
(0.09) (0.24) (0.03) (0.42) (0.30) (0.35) (0.40) (0.38) (1.45) (1.42) (2.04) (1.87)
stl02_environhousing 25.399 -11.041 -9.309 -10.482 -13.224 -12.680 -48.164** -47.911** -2.484 -4.511 -30.410 -15.403
(0.06) (0.48) (0.02) (0.52) (1.30) (1.25) (2.83) (2.83) (0.30) (0.55) (1.85) (1.03)
stl02_govtadmin 59.955 11.146 31.742 30.780 14.801 15.731* 10.924 11.136 14.266 11.815 -13.958 -1.945
(0.09) (0.35) (0.06) (1.39) (1.85) (1.97) (0.85) (0.88) (1.80) (1.44) (0.78) (0.12)
cty02property 1.951 0.485 2.517 2.484** 0.708 0.698 1.798** 1.820** 0.573 0.578* 1.696** 1.939**
(0.10) (0.50) (0.14) (3.29) (1.62) (1.57) (3.11) (3.06) (1.96) (1.97) (3.46) (4.43)
cty02sales -0.153 -5.875 5.308 5.183 -5.982 -6.388 -1.607 -1.449 -1.282 -2.053 4.003 4.936
0.00 (1.59) (0.12) (0.78) (1.80) (1.87) (0.28) (0.25) (0.38) (0.60) (0.83) (0.96)
cty02education -2.129 -1.780** -4.415 -4.412** -1.787** -1.909** -4.966** -4.954** -1.729** -1.797** -4.202** -4.287**
(0.35) (4.24) (0.98) (5.42) (2.92) (3.30) (5.89) (6.00) (6.34) (6.48) (9.17) (9.87)
cty02highway -3.658 -0.968 -1.480 -1.398 -0.874 -0.590 -1.510 -1.544 -0.721 -0.667 0.182 -0.575
(0.11) (0.53) (0.03) (0.48) (0.47) (0.33) (0.47) (0.49) (0.59) (0.55) (0.07) (0.23)
cty02safety 2.077 3.660 3.528 3.389 2.859 3.019 1.625 1.474 1.117 1.540 -1.106 3.043
(0.09) (1.34) (0.02) (0.30) (0.69) (0.70) (0.28) (0.25) (0.39) (0.52) (0.13) (0.36)
cty02naturalrec 0.461 -0.296 0.485 0.470 0.249 0.212 -0.298 -0.276 -0.109 -0.059 0.619 -0.014
(0.05) (0.47) (0.05) (0.32) (0.52) (0.45) (0.41) (0.38) (0.12) (0.07) (0.42) (0.01)
cty02sewerage -161.648 14.002 -99.121 -95.560 -14.042 -14.578 7.694 6.680 12.926 12.222 16.885 -9.665
(0.07) (0.12) (0.04) (1.18) (0.83) (0.83) (0.37) (0.34) (1.39) (1.32) (0.68) (0.39)
Constant 5.512 9.832** 8.912 8.890** 10.219** 10.205** 7.722** 7.715** 8.921** 9.035** 9.324** 9.683**
(0.10) (3.49) (0.57) (8.17) (14.06) (14.03) (12.46) (12.52) (12.75) (13.00) (10.52) (10.80)
Number of Clusters 174 174 174 174 167 167 167 167 129 129 129 129

















































































Observations 1998 1996 1998 1996 1040 1039 1040 1039 958 957 958 957
Nall N468 N579
Earning Housing Earning Housing Earning Housing
 
Notes: Absolute t statistics are in parenthesis are. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant t 5% level, ** significant at 1% 
level. Nall stands for all nonmetropolitan counties, N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a 
metro area. IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same as IV1 but instead adding two more 
political voting behavior variables (PRES_REP72, PRES_TO72) as instruments. The wage model is based on Model 4 and the rent 






Appendix Table 14. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample N468 and N579, 
Dependent Variables: ∆wage and ∆rent 
Base Base+ERS Base Base+ERS Base Base+ERS Base Base+ERS
∆st_property -0.109 -0.114 1.260 1.185 0.297 1.350 -1.977 -1.845
(0.12) (0.13) (0.97) (0.92) (0.28) (1.32) (1.71) (1.56)
∆st_sales 1.928 1.911 7.971** 7.916** 0.389 1.379 2.537 2.603
(1.36) (1.37) (4.00) (4.03) (0.25) (0.91) (1.28) (1.31)
∆st_individual -1.953* -1.873* 2.977* 2.907* -2.199 -2.782* 0.067 -0.001
(2.06) (2.02) (2.17) (2.12) (1.73) (2.37) (0.04) 0.00
∆st_corporate 3.168 3.372 9.411 9.729 7.368 9.900* -8.846 -8.243
(1.07) (1.20) (1.66) (1.73) (1.64) (2.26) (1.38) (1.30)
∆st_rest 0.836 1.004 -1.330 -1.138 -0.519 0.185 -3.523 -2.889
(0.59) (0.73) (0.57) (0.49) (0.27) (0.10) (1.30) (1.05)
∆st_firstsecond 0.379 0.094 -5.230** -5.423** 1.815 1.269 -1.924 -2.455
(0.43) (0.11) (3.67) (3.85) (1.63) (1.18) (1.21) (1.57)
∆st_hospital -2.633 -2.138 -6.937** -7.199** 0.357 1.655 0.053 0.193
(1.53) (1.24) (2.78) (2.90) (0.18) (0.85) (0.02) (0.08)
∆st_highway 2.120 1.686 1.111 1.159 0.178 -0.656 5.868** 5.512**
(1.47) (1.21) (0.50) (0.53) (0.11) (0.41) (2.87) (2.67)
∆st_safety 0.409 0.030 -4.303 -4.294 5.344 1.466 7.181 6.447
(0.14) (0.01) (0.87) (0.88) (1.47) (0.42) (1.54) (1.35)
∆st_environhousing -1.156 -1.233 -0.645 -0.535 1.146 1.343 3.596 4.438
(0.69) (0.75) (0.26) (0.22) (0.52) (0.64) (1.43) (1.74)
∆st_govtadmin -7.478** -6.697* -12.282** -11.322** -8.977** -6.212* -27.961** -27.081**
(2.68) (2.52) (3.11) (2.84) (2.88) (2.05) (6.77) (6.57)
∆ct_property 0.459* 0.597* 0.425 0.504 0.047 -0.038 -0.038 -0.051
(2.15) (2.46) (1.39) (1.64) (0.23) (0.19) (0.16) (0.22)
∆ct_sales 1.135 0.879 3.920** 3.994** -0.894 -0.552 -0.096 -0.070
(1.37) (1.01) (3.23) (3.45) (0.88) (0.69) (0.10) (0.07)
∆ct_education -0.092 -0.078 -0.267 -0.257 -0.609** -0.627** 0.027 0.061
(0.48) (0.43) (1.39) (1.31) (3.42) (3.42) (0.15) (0.33)
∆ct_highway -0.420 -0.520 0.483 0.493 1.521** 1.409** 0.219 0.207
(0.82) (1.07) (0.75) (0.75) (2.69) (2.72) (0.55) (0.52)
∆ct_safety -2.361* -2.628** -3.824** -3.876** -0.503 -0.644 -0.617 -0.576
(2.49) (2.99) (2.68) (2.69) (0.95) (1.27) (0.87) (0.80)
∆ct_naturalrec -0.685* -0.716** 1.089** 1.116** 1.066 1.102 0.712 0.795
(2.42) (2.62) (3.63) (3.73) (1.54) (1.47) (0.88) (0.95)
∆ct_sewerage 0.185 0.377 0.385 0.432 -0.362 -0.279 0.381 0.612
(0.27) (0.52) (0.63) (0.69) (0.45) (0.36) (0.45) (0.74)
Constant 0.323** 0.281** 0.014 0.031 0.435** 0.395** -0.065 -0.075
(3.51) (3.17) (0.14) (0.29) (5.27) (4.82) (0.72) (0.85)
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 958 958 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.20 0.31 0.31 0.16 0.23 0.28 0.28
N468 N579
∆wage ∆rent ∆wage ∆rent
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a metro area. ∆w ge=ln(wage2002)-
ln(wage1992) and ∆rent=ln(fmr02_2)-ln(fmr92_2). Column 1 in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 
adds to Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, rec). Column 3 in the rent equation is based on the benchmark Model 3 





Appendix Table 15. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample N468 and N579, 
Instrumental Variables Estimation, Dependent variable: ∆wage and ∆rent 
 IV1 IV2  IV1 IV2  IV1 IV2  IV1 IV2
∆st_property -1.497 1.237 -32.948 -8.632 2.200 -4.722* -15.082 -5.804
(0.17) (0.46) (1.56) (1.62) (0.25) (2.01) (1.25) (1.88)
∆st_sales -1.033 0.116 -10.186 -3.583 -3.632 -0.525 22.022 12.624*
(0.11) (0.02) (0.40) (0.27) (0.41) (0.14) (1.42) (2.48)
∆st_individual 4.656 -1.086 77.393 32.659 -19.037 -8.989* 7.695 -9.165
(0.22) (0.12) (1.61) (1.88) (1.25) (2.31) (0.36) (1.63)
∆st_corporate 6.088 6.543 2.611 1.719 1.153 23.914 -1.518 -6.830
(0.48) (0.56) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (1.72) (0.03) (0.30)
∆st_rest -1.870 -0.904 -7.989 5.901 -2.574 -3.846 26.606 12.995
(0.32) (0.18) (0.36) (0.58) (0.19) (0.72) (0.98) (1.39)
∆st_firstsecond -5.059 -2.996 -26.343 -6.258 7.137 7.051** -4.868 -4.650
(0.69) (0.81) (1.35) (0.98) (1.59) (3.25) (0.72) (1.69)
∆st_hospital -13.089 -16.360 40.612 29.730 -11.935 -15.170* 2.564 -1.819
(0.75) (1.34) (0.70) (1.01) (0.89) (2.51) (0.11) (0.20)
∆st_highway 3.128 -0.565 56.263 25.392* 7.127 2.529 -8.893 3.576
(0.24) (0.10) (1.65) (1.98) (0.59) (0.78) (0.47) (0.71)
∆st_safety 30.125 29.526 -11.866 -27.550 14.990 16.176* -10.828 -10.538
(1.64) (1.66) (0.20) (0.89) (0.89) (1.98) (0.46) (1.08)
∆st_environhousing 10.524 6.971 41.255 4.955 -11.314 -0.326 41.120 12.330
(0.78) (0.98) (1.17) (0.43) (0.58) (0.06) (1.12) (1.31)
∆st_govtadmin -41.475** -42.065** 2.580 16.111 -30.762 -6.668 -17.184 -26.431
(2.81) (2.92) (0.05) (0.59) (0.95) (0.74) (0.48) (1.86)
∆ct_property 0.851 -0.439 11.501 -0.953 -7.891 -0.570 12.911 1.649
(0.18) (0.15) (0.92) (0.22) (0.89) (0.36) (1.02) (0.74)
∆ct_sales 8.404 4.081 62.169 30.789 -8.642 -4.517* 4.774 -4.749
(0.47) (0.44) (1.48) (1.70) (1.33) (2.16) (0.39) (1.50)
∆ct_education 1.070 1.574 -6.732 -2.977 -0.577 -0.371 -3.929 -1.399
(0.52) (1.40) (1.28) (1.31) (0.31) (0.44) (0.76) (0.78)
∆ct_highway 0.956 1.885 -7.500 -2.662 3.231 1.825* -0.927 0.451
(0.24) (0.88) (0.79) (0.59) (1.41) (2.37) (0.35) (0.49)
∆ct_safety -3.346 -3.010 -3.424 -1.588 17.264 1.347 -35.771 -8.790
(1.55) (1.56) (0.49) (0.44) (0.87) (0.34) (1.17) (1.55)
∆ct_naturalrec -0.595 -0.638 1.546 1.711 9.043 2.114 -0.636 0.311
(0.61) (0.68) (0.39) (0.81) (0.83) (0.63) (0.05) (0.06)
∆ct_sewerage -0.613 -0.181 -6.789 -3.999 -3.291 -1.577 -0.262 -2.258
(0.26) (0.11) (1.04) (1.24) (0.95) (1.17) (0.06) (1.32)
Constant 0.334 0.277* 0.168 0.094 0.227 0.414** -0.033 -0.194
(1.62) (2.35) (0.46) (0.49) (0.75) (4.53) (0.11) (1.84)
F statistics (All endog. vars. 
=0)
2.30[0.002] 2.17[0.003] 5.18[0.000] 5.05[0.000] 2.67[0.0 0] 2.62[0.000] 7.12[0.000] 6.65[0.000]
DWH test for endogeneity 54.65[0.000] 55.63[0.000] 80.22[0.000] 68.32[0.000] 33.30[0.015] 33.79[0.013] 82.74[0.000]76.21[0.000]
Sargan test of exogeneity of 
the instruments
NA 0.13[0.937] NA 6.05[0.049] NA 3.52[0.172] NA 5.81[0.055]
Observations 1040 1039 1040 1039 958 957 958 957
N468
∆wage ∆rent ∆wage ∆rent
N579
 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% 
level. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a metro area. ∆wage=ln(wage2002)-ln(wage1992) 
and ∆rent=ln(fmr02_2)-ln(fmr92_2). Column 1 in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to 
Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, rec). Column 3 in the rent equation is based on the benchmark Model 3 and 
Column 4 adds to Column 3 four additional ERS variables. IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is 
same as IV1 but instead adding two more political voting behavior variables (PRES_REP72, PRES_TO72) as instruments. NA stands 





Appendix Table 16. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample N468 and N579, 
Instrumental Variables Estimation with Clustering M ethod, Dependent variable: 
∆wage and ∆rent  
IV1,cluster  IV2,cluster IV1,cluster IV2,cluster IV1,cluster  IV2,cluster IV1,cluster IV2,cluster
∆st_property -1.497 1.237 -32.948 -8.632 2.200 -4.722 -15.082 -5.804
(0.10) (0.33) (0.76) (0.91) (0.14) (1.42) (0.80) (1.01)
∆st_sales -1.033 0.116 -10.186 -3.583 -3.632 -0.525 22.022 12.624
(0.07) (0.01) (0.21) (0.16) (0.26) (0.11) (1.04) (1.54)
∆st_individual 4.656 -1.086 77.393 32.659 -19.037 -8.989 7.695 -9.165
(0.14) (0.08) (0.80) (1.12) (0.78) (1.88) (0.25) (0.90)
∆st_corporate 6.088 6.543 2.611 1.719 1.153 23.914 -1.518 -6.830
(0.30) (0.41) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (1.09) (0.02) (0.18)
∆st_rest -1.870 -0.904 -7.989 5.901 -2.574 -3.846 26.606 12.995
(0.22) (0.15) (0.19) (0.40) (0.14) (0.59) (0.66) (0.91)
∆st_firstsecond -5.059 -2.996 -26.343 -6.258 7.137 7.051** -4.868 -4.650
(0.45) (0.60) (0.60) (0.54) (1.70) (2.93) (0.69) (1.11)
∆st_hospital -13.089 -16.360 40.612 29.730 -11.935 -15.170 2.564 -1.819
(0.44) (0.87) (0.39) (0.63) (0.76) (1.53) (0.09) (0.13)
∆st_highway 3.128 -0.565 56.263 25.392 7.127 2.529 -8.893 3.576
(0.14) (0.07) (0.79) (1.03) (0.41) (0.71) (0.34) (0.49)
∆st_safety 30.125 29.526 -11.866 -27.550 14.990 16.176 -10.828 -10.538
(1.04) (1.04) (0.10) (0.44) (0.68) (1.26) (0.44) (0.74)
∆st_environhousing 10.524 6.971 41.255 4.955 -11.314 -0.326 41.120 12.330
(0.53) (0.72) (0.54) (0.21) (0.37) (0.04) (0.72) (0.87)
∆st_govtadmin -41.475 -42.065 2.580 16.111 -30.762 -6.668 -17.184 -26.431
(1.68) (1.82) (0.02) (0.27) (0.50) (0.60) (0.30) (1.18)
∆ct_property 0.851 -0.439 11.501 -0.953 -7.891 -0.570 12.911 1.649
(0.10) (0.09) (0.49) (0.13) (0.43) (0.28) (0.64) (0.58)
∆ct_sales 8.404 4.081 62.169 30.789 -8.642 -4.517 4.774 -4.749
(0.29) (0.28) (0.78) (1.04) (0.83) (1.16) (0.27) (1.15)
∆ct_education 1.070 1.574 -6.732 -2.977 -0.577 -0.371 -3.929 -1.399
(0.33) (0.98) (0.77) (0.94) (0.18) (0.34) (0.50) (0.69)
∆ct_highway 0.956 1.885 -7.500 -2.662 3.231 1.825 -0.927 0.451
(0.16) (0.62) (0.45) (0.40) (0.95) (1.94) (0.38) (0.59)
∆ct_safety -3.346 -3.010 -3.424 -1.588 17.264 1.347 -35.771-8.790
(1.23) (1.27) (0.39) (0.35) (0.45) (0.28) (0.73) (1.15)
∆ct_naturalrec -0.595 -0.638 1.546 1.711 9.043 2.114 -0.636 0.311
(0.53) (0.64) (0.29) (0.70) (0.54) (0.43) (0.05) (0.05)
∆ct_sewerage -0.613 -0.181 -6.789 -3.999 -3.291 -1.577 -0.262 -2.258
(0.17) (0.07) (0.58) (0.74) (0.60) (1.04) (0.04) (1.28)
Constant 0.334 0.277 0.168 0.094 0.227 0.414** -0.033 -0.194
(1.03) (1.74) (0.34) (0.40) (0.47) (4.05) (0.07) (1.14)
Number of Clusters 167.000 167.000 167.000 167.000 129.000 129.000 129.000 129.000
F statistics (All endog. vars. 
=0)
2.22[0.004] 2.11[0.006] 4.02[0.000] 3.69[0.000] 4.53[0.0 0] 4.40[0.000] 4.47[0.000] 4.56[0.000]
DWH test for endogeneity 32.23[0.021] 32.03[0.022] 37.81[0.004] 33.61[0.014] 28.85[0.050] 30.32[0.03] 30.82[0.03] 27.14[0.07]
Sargan test of exogeneity of 
the instruments
NA 0.06[0.972] NA 1.63[0.444] NA 2.17[0.338] NA 3.58[0.167]
Observations 1040 1039 1040 1039 958 957 958 957
N468 N579 
∆wage ∆rent ∆wage ∆rent
 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% 
level. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a metro area. ∆wage=ln(wage2002)-ln(wage1992) 
and ∆rent=ln(fmr02_2)-ln(fmr92_2). Column 1 in the wage equation is based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to 
Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, rec). Column 3 in the rent equation is based on the benchmark Model 3 and 
Column 4 adds to Column 3 four additional ERS variables. IV1 is the 2SLS model using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is 
same as IV1 but instead adding two more political voting behavior variables (PRES_REP72, PRES_TO72) as instruments. Standard 











Appendix Table 17. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample N468 and N579, 
Dependent Variables: ∆earning and ∆housing 
Base Base+ERS Base Base+ERS Base Base+ERS Base Base+ERS
∆st_property -2.141 -1.959 3.360* 3.173* 1.549 3.362* -0.634 0.763
(1.44) (1.39) (2.36) (2.28) (0.95) (2.19) (0.37) (0.47)
∆st_sales -1.840 -1.370 7.448** 7.527** 3.830 5.633* 1.827 2.886
(0.85) (0.63) (3.58) (3.68) (1.61) (2.51) (0.70) (1.17)
∆st_individual -3.377* -3.096* -6.534** -6.522** -1.840 -2.710 -7.159** -7.723**
(2.41) (2.32) (4.64) (4.69) (0.87) (1.37) (3.23) (3.66)
∆st_corporate 0.710 -0.020 -24.693** -23.285** -3.720 1.040 -35.474** -30.738**
(0.14) 0.00 (4.78) (4.55) (0.53) (0.15) (4.81) (4.28)
∆st_rest -8.048** -7.177** -8.322** -7.708** -4.120 -4.110 -8.628** -7.145*
(3.90) (3.60) (4.22) (4.16) (1.41) (1.42) (3.02) (2.57)
∆st_firstsecond -0.470 -0.170 -0.124 -0.676 0.840 0.920 4.745* 3.246
(0.33) (0.12) (0.09) (0.51) (0.46) (0.54) (2.34) (1.69)
∆st_hospital 2.790 3.950 8.569** 8.816** 0.610 1.940 -3.691 -2.008
(1.13) (1.65) (3.40) (3.58) (0.19) (0.65) (1.04) (0.58)
∆st_highway 4.497* 3.610 -0.040 -0.483 3.400 2.400 2.101 0.383
(2.03) (1.69) (0.02) (0.25) (1.35) (1.00) (0.81) (0.15)
∆st_safety 10.387* 8.583* 7.028 5.542 26.652** 18.719** 20.278** 14.344*
(2.43) (1.99) (1.55) (1.24) (4.36) (3.19) (3.41) (2.50)
∆st_environhousing 2.170 2.070 15.414** 14.425** 5.580 3.200 3.425 3.951
(0.87) (0.88) (6.48) (6.19) (1.77) (1.06) (1.08) (1.27)
∆st_govtadmin 1.660 2.520 -20.276** -18.021** -17.355** -13.259** -19.817** -16.062**
(0.44) (0.70) (5.74) (5.13) (3.26) (2.64) (3.63) (3.04)
∆ct_property 0.550 0.610 0.069 0.329 0.550 0.350 0.467 0.314
(1.11) (1.18) (0.13) (0.71) (1.35) (1.04) (1.41) (0.87)
∆ct_sales 0.590 0.150 -1.847 -2.322 -4.123* -3.134* 0.173 0.815
(0.46) (0.12) (1.47) (1.81) (2.48) (2.35) (0.11) (0.45)
∆ct_education -0.530 -0.661* -0.323 -0.319 0.330 0.220 -0.034 -0.025
(1.40) (2.09) (1.06) (1.08) (1.06) (0.74) (0.11) (0.08)
∆ct_highway 0.070 -0.250 -1.026 -1.177 0.830 0.370 0.424 0.330
(0.10) (0.38) (1.23) (1.41) (0.82) (0.37) (0.54) (0.44)
∆ct_safety 1.360 1.420 1.966 1.700 1.460 1.050 -0.564 -0.550
(1.07) (1.06) (1.17) (0.96) (1.88) (1.33) (0.45) (0.45)
∆ct_naturalrec -0.050 -0.270 -0.012 -0.079 0.770 0.510 -0.180 -0.191
(0.13) (0.75) (0.02) (0.16) (0.98) (0.68) (0.18) (0.20)
∆ct_sewerage 1.320 1.290 0.624 0.828 0.210 -0.040 -0.330 0.039
(1.58) (1.69) (0.86) (1.21) (0.18) (0.04) (0.27) (0.03)
Constant 0.393** 0.342** 0.744** 0.746** 0.286* 0.230 0.699** 0.611**
(2.97) (2.67) (5.97) (6.00) (2.09) (1.67) (4.50) (4.06)
Observations 1040 1040 1040 1040 958 958 958 958
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.43 0.62 0.64 0.45 0.52 0.39 0.44
N468 N579
∆earning ∆housing ∆earning ∆housing
 
Notes: Robust t statistics based on Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 
1% level. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a metro area. The data for wage and rent are 
from the Census. ∆earning=ln(earning00)-ln(earning90) and ∆housing=ln(housing00)-ln(housing90). Column 1 in the wage equation 
is based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi,fl, rec). Column 3 in the 





Appendix Table 18. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample N468 and N579,          
Instrumental Variables Estimation, Dependent variable: ∆earning and ∆housing 
IV1 IV2  IV1 IV2 IV1 IV2  IV1 IV2
∆st_property 0.180 -2.415 -9.456 6.666 14.848 -8.032 7.968 -17.928*
(0.01) (0.57) (0.73) (1.42) (1.00) (1.36) (0.31) (2.53)
∆st_sales -0.654 1.806 4.575 4.063 7.441 12.685 -29.067 1.191
(0.05) (0.15) (0.26) (0.33) (0.51) (1.40) (0.81) (0.10)
∆st_individual -11.754 -12.643 26.094 7.454 -25.571 -1.821 -91.621 -42.138**
(0.37) (0.88) (0.92) (0.47) (1.01) (0.19) (1.84) (2.94)
∆st_corporate 31.039 37.524* 25.823 0.247 -25.755 50.068 90.150 67.825
(1.66) (2.00) (0.85) (0.01) (0.41) (1.44) (0.66) (1.25)
∆st_rest -17.428* -20.306** -38.047* -22.995** 6.338 -11.19 -101.193 -45.351*
(2.07) (2.59) (2.54) (2.73) (0.29) (0.83) (1.54) (2.12)
∆st_firstsecond -2.942 -4.742 -31.310* -13.721* 1.744 0.229 2.285 8.380
(0.27) (0.81) (2.19) (2.29) (0.23) (0.04) (0.13) (1.25)
∆st_hospital -29.734 -33.800 -31.582 -18.554 5.186 -12.936 -81.583 -71.673**
(1.17) (1.73) (0.93) (0.80) (0.23) (0.85) (1.53) (3.36)
∆st_highway -5.775 -4.336 29.551 14.597 8.077 7.281 86.217 37.722**
(0.30) (0.50) (1.45) (1.26) (0.40) (0.89) (1.90) (3.19)
∆st_safety 49.054 48.139 66.776 49.221 3.257 10.402 43.423 54.094*
(1.83) (1.69) (1.68) (1.78) (0.12) (0.51) (0.76) (2.37)
∆st_environhousing 4.219 5.366 59.649** 37.081** -20.659 1.311 -111.142 -18.826
(0.21) (0.47) (2.69) (3.34) (0.64) (0.09) (1.32) (0.84)
∆st_govtadmin -31.384 -28.303 -79.796* -71.450** -31.883 45.897* 47.132 34.004
(1.45) (1.23) (2.31) (2.89) (0.59) (2.03) (0.57) (1.04)
∆ct_property 1.011 3.384 4.531 -5.114 -14.524 7.754 -32.565 -2.802
(0.15) (0.71) (0.53) (1.16) (0.98) (1.94) (1.25) (0.56)
∆ct_sales -4.795 -5.637 22.967 12.717 -9.370 1.949 -36.216 -13.505
(0.18) (0.38) (0.96) (0.84) (0.87) (0.37) (1.38) (1.73)
∆ct_education 1.657 1.738 0.495 1.085 2.641 2.492 9.824 6.555
(0.54) (0.96) (0.20) (0.66) (0.86) (1.17) (0.88) (1.60)
∆ct_highway 0.052 0.483 -3.125 -2.919 -0.979 -4.822* 4.162 -0.224
(0.01) (0.14) (0.61) (0.84) (0.26) (2.49) (0.66) (0.10)
∆ct_safety 4.791 4.121 4.157 5.138 33.100 -15.780 78.964 10.06
(1.51) (1.34) (0.91) (1.56) (1.01) (1.59) (1.29) (0.78)
∆ct_naturalrec -0.836 -0.997 -2.402 -1.177 7.353 -10.719 -15.405 -24.650
(0.58) (0.66) (0.90) (0.64) (0.40) (1.27) (0.46) (1.88)
∆ct_sewerage 1.997 2.452 -3.243 -3.234 -2.630 1.579 -7.099 -0.387
(0.58) (0.91) (0.76) (1.09) (0.46) (0.47) (0.62) (0.09)
Constant 0.344 0.405* 0.882** 0.824** -0.182 0.274 0.090 0.419
(1.14) (2.15) (3.77) (4.96) (0.36) (1.19) (0.13) (1.62)
F statistics (All endog. vars. 
=0)
2.47[0.001] 2.49[0.000] 12.27[0.000] 11.67[0.000] 3.18[0.000] 5.71[0.000] 14.74[0.000] 14.35[0.000]
DWH test for endogeneity 43.49[0.000] 49.16[0.000]126.65[0.000]116.76[0.000] 83.09[0.000] 97.99[0.000]205.68[0.000]172.39[0.000]
Sargan test of exogeneity of 
the instruments
NA 1.44[0.488] NA 4.90[0.086] NA 9.22[0.01] NA 13.20[0.001]
Observations 1040 1039 1040 1039 958 957 958 957
N468 N579
∆earning ∆housing ∆earning ∆housing
 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% 
level. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a metro area. The data for wage and rent are from 
the Census. ∆earning=ln(earning00)-ln(earning90) and ∆housing=ln(housing00)-ln(housing90). Column 1 in the wage equation is 
based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, rec). Column 3 in the rent 
equation is based on the benchmark Model 3 and Column 4 adds to Column 3 four additional ERS variables. IV1 is the 2SLS model 
using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same as IV1 but instead adding two more political voting behavior variables 





Appendix Table 19. Difference Equation Model Results for Sample N468 and N579, 
Instrumental Variables Estimation with Clustering M ethod, Dependent variable: 
∆earning and ∆housing 
IV1,cluster IV2,cluster IV1,cluster IV2,cluster IV1,cluster IV2,cluster IV1,cluster IV2,cluster
∆st_property 0.180 -2.415 -9.456 6.666 14.848 -8.032 7.968 -17.928
(0.01) (0.35) (0.35) (0.79) (0.55) (1.07) (0.24) (1.67)
∆st_sales -0.654 1.806 4.575 4.063 7.441 12.685 -29.067 1.191
(0.03) (0.08) (0.12) (0.17) (0.37) (1.02) (0.59) (0.06)
∆st_individual -11.754 -12.643 26.094 7.454 -25.571 -1.821 -91.621 -42.138
(0.22) (0.57) (0.38) (0.25) (0.64) (0.14) (1.20) (1.52)
∆st_corporate 31.039 37.524 25.823 0.247 -25.755 50.068 90.150 67.825
(1.32) (1.37) (0.44) (0.01) (0.28) (1.38) (0.49) (0.82)
∆st_rest -17.428 -20.306 -38.047 -22.995 6.338 -11.119 -101.193 -45.351
(1.32) (1.92) (1.21) (1.46) (0.21) (0.65) (1.05) (1.33)
∆st_firstsecond -2.942 -4.742 -31.310 -13.721 1.744 0.229 2.285 8.380
(0.14) (0.46) (1.01) (1.40) (0.24) (0.03) (0.11) (0.72)
∆st_hospital -29.734 -33.800 -31.582 -18.554 5.186 -12.936-81.583 -71.673
(0.82) (0.95) (0.39) (0.41) (0.26) (0.57) (1.15) (1.85)
∆st_highway -5.775 -4.336 29.551 14.597 8.077 7.281 86.217 37.722*
(0.18) (0.33) (0.64) (0.66) (0.35) (0.62) (1.38) (2.31)
∆st_safety 49.054 48.139 66.776 49.221 3.257 10.402 43.423 54.094
(1.01) (0.74) (0.79) (0.84) (0.11) (0.37) (0.67) (1.38)
∆st_environhousing 4.219 5.366 59.649 37.081 -20.659 1.311-111.142 -18.826
(0.12) (0.26) (1.37) (1.81) (0.44) (0.07) (0.91) (0.51)
∆st_govtadmin -31.384 -28.303 -79.796 -71.450 -31.883 45.897 47.132 34.004
(0.79) (0.50) (1.05) (1.36) (0.31) (1.78) (0.36) (0.63)
∆ct_property 1.011 3.384 4.531 -5.114 -14.524 7.754 -32.565-2.802
(0.07) (0.37) (0.25) (0.63) (0.48) (1.52) (0.86) (0.34)
∆ct_sales -4.795 -5.637 22.967 12.717 -9.370 1.949 -36.216 -13.505
(0.11) (0.23) (0.38) (0.43) (0.53) (0.38) (1.03) (1.18)
∆ct_education 1.657 1.738 0.495 1.085 2.641 2.492 9.824 6.555
(0.37) (0.64) (0.10) (0.44) (0.47) (0.70) (0.60) (1.24)
∆ct_highway 0.052 0.483 -3.125 -2.919 -0.979 -4.822 4.162 -0.224
(0.01) (0.09) (0.29) (0.49) (0.18) (1.81) (0.50) (0.04)
∆ct_safety 4.791 4.121 4.157 5.138 33.100 -15.780 78.964 10.06
(1.18) (1.09) (0.79) (1.24) (0.51) (1.71) (0.88) (0.64)
∆ct_naturalrec -0.836 -0.997 -2.402 -1.177 7.353 -10.719 -15.405 -24.650
(0.54) (0.56) (0.45) (0.38) (0.29) (0.74) (0.30) (0.60)
∆ct_sewerage 1.997 2.452 -3.243 -3.234 -2.630 1.579 -7.099 -0.387
(0.39) (0.60) (0.36) (0.60) (0.28) (0.40) (0.41) (0.06)
Constant 0.344 0.405 0.882 0.824** -0.182 0.274 0.090 0.419
(0.60) (1.37) (1.80) (2.82) -0.230 -0.910 -0.090 -1.110
Number of Clusters 167 167 167 167 129 129 129 129
2.460 2.430 5.730 5.520 1.880 4.170 12.810 12.030
[0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0. 00]
26.660 26.870 35.910 33.020 30.680 28.840 31.910 21.090
 [0.086]  [0.082]  [0.000]  [0.017]   [0.031]  [0.050]  [0.023]  [0.275]
NA 1.70 NA 1.75 NA 6.49 NA 2.45
  [0.427]  [0.417]  [0.039] [0.294]
Observations 1040 1039 1040 1039 958 957 958 957
F statistics                                    
(All endog. vars. =0)
DWH test for endogeneity
Sargan test of exogeneity of 
the instruments
N468 N579
∆earning ∆housing ∆earning ∆housing
 
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics is in parentheses. P-values are in bracket. * indicates significant at 5% level, ** significant at 1% 
level. N468 (N579) stands for nonmetropolitan counties adjacent (nonadjacent) to a metro area. The data for wage and rent are from 
the Census. ∆earning=ln(earning00)-ln(earning90) and ∆housing=ln(housing00)-ln(housing90). Column 1 in the wage equation is 
based on the benchmark Model 4 and Column 2 adds to Column 1 four additional ERS variables (fm, mi, fl, rec). Column 3 in the rent 
equation is based on the benchmark Model 3 and Column 4 adds to Column 3 four additional ERS variables. IV1 is the 2SLS model 
using lagged fiscal variables as instruments. IV2 is same as IV1 but instead adding two more political voting behavior variables 








Appendix Table 20. Sample-Split Chow Test Results for Wage and Rent (or, 
Earning and Housing) Equations in Tables 18-27, Respectively  
Table Equation n k RSSNall RSSN468 RSSN579 F-Statistic F-Critical Conclusion
Tables (18; 19) Wage 1998 53 0.119 0.053 0.061 1.544 1.347 Rejection
Rent 1998 34 0.533 0.305 0.209 2.070 1.436 Rejection
Tables( 20; 21) Earning 1998 53 0.228 0.083 0.133 2.164 1.347 Rejection
Housing 1998 43 0.784 0.307 0.414 3.896 1.386 Rejection
Tables (22; 24) Wage 1998 60 0.117 0.052 0.060 1.398 1.325 Rejection
Rent 1998 41 0.502 0.289 0.193 1.932 1.395 Rejection
Tables (23; 25) Wage 1998 64 0.110 0.049 0.056 1.412 1.315 Rejection
Rent 1998 45 0.497 0.287 0.190 1.789 1.377 Rejection
Table 26 Earning 1998 60 0.223 0.079 0.131 1.971 1.325 Rejection
Housing 1998 50 0.745 0.290 0.394 3.391 1.357 Rejection
Table 27 Earning 1998 64 0.204 0.073 0.120 1.701 1.315 Rejection
Housing 1998 54 0.711 0.276 0.379 2.968 1.343 Rejection 
Notes: RSSNall  is the total sum of the squares of the residuals in the full sample. RSSN468 and RSSN579 are the 
sum of the squares of the residuals in two-subsample regression respectively. The parameter k is the 
regression coefficients and n is the total observations in the full sample (Nall). Rejection means that the 
null hypothesis is rejected, implying that the pooled (whole) sample regression is inadequate and we should 
run separate regressions for the two subsamples (N468 and N579) in this study. The Chow test (Chow, 
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